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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WENDY LOMSDAL, * 
Plaintiff/Appellee APPELLANT'S OPENING 
* BRIEF 
vs. 
* 
KEITH COX, 
Defendant/Appellant * App. Ct. No. 20000370-CA 
Trial Ct. No. 974100564 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellant, Keith Cox, during a divorce/custody action, had a judgment entered 
against him, after a trial was held, in the First Judicial District -Logan Department, on 
February 23, 2000. This appeal originates from the trial court's abuses of discretion, 
refusal to take judicial notice, denial of due process and equal protection under the law, 
and issues of res judicata involving multiple jurisdictions. This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to the Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3, as amended,[1953]. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Did the trial court correctly apply the legal standard in entering a judgment against 
the appellant by way and through the Decree of Custody? More specifically, did those 
measures that the trial court used constituted a denial of the appellant's constitutional 
1 
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guarantees as implemented by the First District Court-Logan, State of Utah's: re-
litigation of claims that had previously been adjudicated in Missouri, of which the 
appellee and the appellant stipulated to as equaling a Utah Judgment; the trial court's 
refusal to take judicial notice; an insufficient explanation of the custody award within the 
Decree of Custody's Findings of Fact; the voluntary and continual imposition of gender 
based discrimination in awarding both the initial custody award and the final custody 
award by trial courts in the State of Utah, in this case and a host of others. 
Supplemental to the aforementioned errors, the trial court erred when it accepted 
the Plaintiff's Affidavit of Impecuniosity, in light of the plaintiff removing $4,025.66 
from her checking account one week prior to filing the same. 
An additional abuse occur when the trial judge levied a $1000.00 charge for 
attorney's fee against the appellant, for a perceived excessive use of the court's time. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues raised in this appeal present both questions of law and of fact, which 
are brought forward within the body of this appeal. In consideration of this appeal, 
resulting from the misapplication of existing law, as it relates to the arbitrary use of the 
district court's interpretation, that final judgment deserves no deference, and is reviewed 
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for correction of error, and clarification of law. As to the extent that there are disputed 
factual issues, the trial court's refusal to take judicial notice, and the ignoring of an 
existing judgment in another jurisdiction, those facts are included within the record and 
included for review for clear error. 
Therefore the standard would be for either an reversal of the Decree of Custody as 
issued by the First District Court - Logan against the Appellant, and the imposition of the 
Missouri Judgment, or the issuance of an Extraordinary Writ, by this Appellate Court, 
granting permanent, primary custody of the minor child, to the Appellant. 
3 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The full text of the following determinative constitutional provisions and rules are 
reproduced at Appendix III: 
A. The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; 
• t \ . 
B. The Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; 
C. The Fifth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution; 
D. Article III, Section 2, of the U.S. Constitution; 
E. Title 42 United States Code Section 1983; 
F. Article I, Section 1, of the Constitution of Utah; 
G. Article I, Section 7, of the Constitution of Utah; 
I. Article I, Section 11, of the Constitution of Utah; 
J. Article I, Section 18, of the Constitution of Utah; 
K. Article I, Section 24, of the Constitution of Utah; 
L. Article I, Section 26, of the Constitution of Utah; 
M. Article I, Section 27, of the Constitution of Utah; 
N. Article IV, Section 26, of the Constitution of Utah; 
O. Utah Code Annotated, 78-7-9; 
P. Utah Code Annotated, 62A-4a-412; 
Q. Utah Code Annotated, 30-3-5.2; 
R. Utah Code Annotated, 76-5-301; 
S. Utah Code Annotated 76-5-303; 
T. Utah Code Annotated 78-45c-201; 
U. Utah Code Annotated, 30-3-3,30-3-4; 
V. Utah Code Annotated, 30-3-10,30-3-10.4; 
W. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 201,803,902 
X. Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-506, Rule 4-903, Rule 4-911; 
Y. Utah Rules of Judicial Conduct, Canon 1, Canon 2, and Canon 3. 
4 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of Case 
This is an appellate action asking the Court to vacate, dismiss, reverse, or issue an 
extraordinary writ for relief from the First District Court-Logan9 s Decree of Custody, 
wherein it awarded custody to the appellee, and granted attorney fees to the appellee. 
B. Course of Proceeding 
Appellant, Keith Cox, brought this action for relief, contrary to the entry of the 
Decree for Custody entered against him in the First Judicial District Court, pursuant to the 
Equal Protection Clause and the of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, U.S. Constitution Amendment XIV. 
Appellant alleges that he was denied due process and equal protection under the law 
because the trial court refused to acknowledge a prior judgment entered in Missouri, and 
initially reduced the appellant's custody rights, which are inherent rights reserved under 
the K and X Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, for no reason other than his gender. 
The appellant further contends that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to take 
judicial notice when properly motioned and when the court failed to adequately explain 
the basis for its decision to award custody to the appellee. 
C. Disposition in the Court Below 
On February 23, 2000, the First District Court-Logan Department, J. Judkins 
presiding, concluded a civil bench trial for custody and rendered its decision. That 
5 
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decision was against the Appellant and in favor of the Appellee, granting custody of the 
minor child to the Appellee. 
In contention were the hearings before Commissioner Garner, on May 7,1998, and 
April 29,1999, as gross injustices visited upon the Appellant by the trial court. 
D. Statement of the Facts 
Appellant had filed an action where the parties at issue resided at that time, the 
State of Missouri. The Appellee was properly served and failed to file a responsive 
pleading, or appear on the designated date and time. The Circuit Court of Missouri issued 
a Judgment, November, 1996, wherein both parties were given joint legal custody of their 
minor child Anna. 
The mother fled from that jurisdiction and began to reside in Utah, where she then 
filed an action in the First District in 1997. Initially she claimed that the Appellant was 
not the natural father and had a protective order taken out against him. Subsequent to a 
trial, the Appellee and Appellant, signed a Stipulation, January 21, 1997, within which 
she agreed to acknowledge the Missouri Judgment as a Utah Judgment, and a copy of 
which was filed with the district court. 
The protective order, taken out January 26,1996, Plato, Missouri, was recognized 
by Commissioner Daniel Garner, but the court at all other times refused, ignored, or 
disregarded any mentioning of prior orders, judgments, or official documents outside of 
Utah, as they related to this case. 
6 
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April 29,1999, the court recognized that both the appellant and the appellee were 
"good parents," based upon Mr. Price's input and the evaluation reflected the same. The 
Divorce was granted, under the bifurcation, which was denied, but somehow granted, and 
the issues of custody, visitation, and the evaluation were reserved until trial. 
The trial occurred February 3 and 23, 2000. The Appellant, after having bore the 
entire economic burden of pretrial legal maneuvering and exploitation by the court and 
opposition, was forced to represent himself Pro Se. 
The Appellant used an estimated one(l) hour, forty-five (45) minutes of the total 7 
hours of trial time. The end result was that J. Judkins awarded attorney fee equaling 
$1000.00 to the appellee, based upon the appellant's perceived excessive use of time 
during the trial. The court affirmed and awarded primary custody to the appellee, subject 
to the appellant's right to visitation. Hence, the origination of this claim currently before 
the Utah Court of Appeals. 
The remaining facts that are disputed are readily within the trial court record and 
within Appellant's Brief before this Court now. 
7 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The appellant believes that the First District Court - Logan Department erred in 
awarding custody to the plaintiff-mother, and against him when the Circuit Court of 
Missouri had already entered a final judgment of the same facts, involving the same 
parties. The trial court in Utah also failed to recognized a previous set of facts, all at 
issue before that court, which established prior adjudication within the jurisdiction of 
Missouri, and Stipulated to by both of the parties at issue and referenced herein. 
Additionally, upon motion before the First District Court-Logan, the appellant 
asked that the court take judicial notice of several facts of law and circumstance of which 
both parties were aware, and that information was readily made available to the court, its 
officers, and the custody evaluators. In that the evaluation was not performed by a 
psychologist and failed to meet all factors under Utah law. 
As the record of this case reflects, the trial court failed to meet the minimum 
requirements of satisfactorily articulating its rationale for the custody arrangement within 
the body of the Decree of Custody's Findings of Fact. When initially the court granted 
the mother temporary primary custody, under the guise of the tender years doctrine, and 
the natural father was stripped of his primary custody rights, without a trial, and 
supplanted with mere visitation rights contrary to due process. 
8 
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The final determination was based without a sufficient showing of evidence and 
thereby rendered the defendant-father at a disadvantage in his pursuit for primary custody 
of the child. The trial court required, after leave, a custody evaluation which intentionally 
overlooked evidence of the plaintiffs lack of parenting skill, involving her past conduct 
relating to the abuse of her children. Stemming out of this adverse, and biased 
application of custodial evaluation standards the proceedings would have concluded 
differently and the custody decree would have reflected such. 
Appellant asserts that there are substantial defects and fraudulent measures 
employed within the custody determination, specifically surrounding the Findings of Fact 
and within the custody evaluation process. Furthermore, the appellant contends that the 
Guardian Ad Litem, and counsel for the plaintiff-appellee, were allowed to interview 
witnesses, without benefit of appellant or appellant's counsel's presence. This was 
admitted to in open court and can only be either an abuse of discretion by the court 
allowing the same or due process was denied. The appellant was given approximately 
1.75 hours of time during the trial, which lasted two days, totaling 7 hours. The Court, 
the plaintiff and the Guardian Ad Litem consumed the remaining time, but ironically the 
court granted $1000.00 to plaintiff-appellee because of a supposed perception of 
extensive time taken by appellant to present his case. 
It is the appellant's belief that the First District Court-Logan abused its discretion 
in awarding custody to the plaintiff by 1) the re-litigation of a claims that had previously 
9 
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been adjudicated in Missouri; 2) the trial court's refusal to take judicial notice, which 
amounted to a violation of appellant' due process rights; 3) the insufficient explanation of 
the Findings of Fact; 4)imposing gender based discrimination in awarding the initial 
custody arrangement; 5) Guardian Ad Litem and counsel for the plaintiff interviewed and 
corresponded with witnesses outside the court, and outside the presence of the defendant; 
6) ignoring the signed stipulation, freely entered into by the parties at issue; 7) levying 
attorney fees against the appellant arbitrarily; 8) the acceptance of the plaintiffs affidavit 
of impecuniosity one week after the plaintiff withdrew $4,025.66 and closed her bank 
account. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY RE-LITIGATING THE 
CLAIMS THAT HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN ADJUDICATED IN A COURT OF 
COMPETENT JURISDICTION IN MISSOURI. 
The Missouri Circuit Court held session, to hear argument on paternity issues 
involving Anna Marie, due to the mother's failure to appear default judgment was entered 
against her, and joint legal custody was awarded to each of the parties at issue before the 
10 
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court, subject to the limitations included within that Amended Judgment. Ms. Lomsdal 
was properly served and then failed to file any responsive or statements of defense, and 
then failed to appear. 
Jacobsen v Jacobsen, 703 P. 2d 303305 (Utah 1985), outlines "When there has 
been an adjudication, it becomes res judicata as to those issues which were either tried 
and determined, upon all issues which the party had fair opportunity to present and have 
determined in the other proceedings." 
This principle, res judicata, is fully applicable in this custody determination. 
Within the esteemed Circuit Court of Missouri, Case No. CV196-154DR, said Judgment 
awarded Keith Cox, Plaintiff, paternal rights as the natural father with "the birth 
certificate," to be "changed to reflect," that; and joint legal custody with primary physical 
custody of the minor child remaining with Wendy Lomsdal; filed October 23,1996, with 
visitation under the following provisions: 
A. Eight weeks in the summer; 
B. Alternating holidays; 
C. One (1) week in October and March of each year; 
D. Each party to be responsible for one half of any transportation costs involved in 
transporting the minor child to and from the afore-mentioned visits with Plaintiff." 
(See Exhibit I, A, pg 1) 
11 
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In January 1997, within the jurisdiction of the First Judicial District-Logan, case 
number 964000353 PA, the appellee entered and signed a stipulation with the appellant 
agreeing to the following: 
1. Plaintiff, Wendy Lomsdal, agrees to dismiss her Utah action for paternity. 
2. Plaintiff, agrees to dismiss the Protective Order and incorporate same in this 
action. 
3. Plaintiff, agrees to recognize the Missouri Judgment as a Utah Judgment. 
(See Exhibit I, B) 
A Utah case determined the criteria necessary for preclusion, Madsen v Borthick, 
769 P. 2d 245. 247 (Utah 1988), wherein the court stated "Claim preclusion bars a cause 
of action only if the suit in which that cause of action is being asserted and the prior suit 
satisfies three requirements. First, both cases must involve the same parties or their 
privies. Second, the claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the 
first suit or must be one that could and should have been raised in the first action. Third, 
the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits." In this case, currently 
on appeal, all three criteria have been satisfied, the only caveat is that this case involves 
child custody and that same child's welfare. 
From the inception of this case in Missouri, and then again in Logan, it has been 
the contention of the appellant that both the threat of abuse and that actual abuse have 
been visited upon the child by either the mother or within her immediate area of control. 
12 
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Yet, the Utah District Court-Logan, failing to act in accordance with any provision of 
Utah Law; Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5.2, §78-7-9, or §62A-4a-412; omitted any 
right minded or reasonable person standard, the court granted the mother temporary sole 
custody in lieu of evidence submitted contrary to that assumption, e.g., photographs of 
bruising to the minor child. The photograph were enough to warrant the Commissioner to 
assign the Guardian Ad Litem, but not enough to preserve either the safety of the child or 
the natural father'slights under due process. (See Exhibit II). 
Within the body of the case of State in Interest of J. L. W., 900 P.2d 543. 550 
(Utah 1995), J. Bench clearly outlines what ought be preserved "All too frequently, there 
comes to the state's attention parents whose own conduct has effectively destroyed the 
parent-child relationship and the state must remove the child from its environment if it 
determines that removal would be in the best interests of the child. Moreover, when the 
relationship has been destroyed, "it is usually in the best interests of the child to terminate 
that relationship and allow the child an opportunity to establish a meaningful relationship 
with loving, responsible parents." When this right and privilege is to be afforded to the 
father, who is the loving, responsible parent, and to the minor child, is the question 
currently before this court. Despite the court's acknowledgment and awareness of a prior 
decree, the stipulation agreement of the parties, and absent the required showing of a 
substantial material change of circumstance, this case was allowed to move forward to 
trial. Utah Court of Appeals has ruled on this beforehand with extreme caution, Larson v 
13 
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Larson, 888 P. 2d 719. 722 n.2 (Utah App. 1994), "We have . . . trepidation about the 
applicability of res judicata to child custody and related proceeding . . . where the welfare 
of children is at stake.," but again in this case not even a cautionary remark by the trial 
court. 
The court laid out in Cummings v Cummings, 384 Ut. Adv. Rep. 5. (1999), res 
judicata definitions in related domestic matters. "Res judicata prohibits only a later cause 
of action based on matter which could have sustained the claim determined on the merits 
in the former judgment-not a cause of action which might have been determined only if 
an additional argument, not made in the previous case, had proved persuasive on the 
separate and distinct claim which formed the basis of the prior judgment." 
"Claim preclusion prevents the re-litigation of claims that have been fully litigated 
between these parties and also those claims which should have been litigated in the prior 
action," Copper State Thrift & Loan v Bruno, 735 P. 2d 387, 389 (Utah App. 1987). 
The appellee was properly served, as the Missouri Amended Judgment indicates, and she 
failed to appear. A default judgment was entered against her, she again failed to appeal 
the entry of that judgment, and that judgment stood inasmuch as the parties shared joint 
legal custody. Within this case there has been an adjudication, thereby it became res 
judicata as to those issues which were tried and determined. (See Exhibit I, A). 
Where a prior judgment was entered, Missouri Circuit Court, of which all issues 
were tried and the parties had an opportunity to present and have determined in those 
14 
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proceedings, then the First District Court should have been proscribed from entering a 
judgment on those issues. Neither party displayed or claimed that a substantial and 
material change of circumstances occurred except for the appellee's absconding with the 
minor child from the jurisdiction of Missouri, in violation of Utah Code Annotated, § 
76-5-301, §76-5-303,and §78-45c-201, of which the court completely ignored upon the 
initial custody award, before J. Harris, November 17,1997. The First District Court aided 
the appellee in the commission of a felony. Utah Code Annotated, §30-3-3, clearly 
delineates what constitutes a material change and determines the costs therein. Neither 
party filed a Motion for Modification of Custody and each party was aware of the existing 
order in Missouri. 
Without such a showing of material change of circumstance, the trial court should 
have been barred from hearing the parties grievances in this action. As neither party 
claimed such a change, the trial court was barred from entering a final judgment or even 
addressing the claims with the Missouri mandate in existence. 
State in Interest of J. J. T., 877 P.2d 16L 164, (Utah 1994), this court found that 
"Moreover, non-application -or at least the flexible application - of res judicata in 
termination of parental rights proceedings does not leave the parents unprotected and 
subject to vexatious litigation. There are other protections in place that adequately 
safeguard the parent's rights without compromising the significant concern for the child's 
welfare." 
15 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Point II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE, WHEN 
PROPERLY MOTIONED, CONSTITUTED A VIOLATION OF THE APPELLANT'S 
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS. 
As each of the parties, and their respective attorneys were aware, all the records 
and proceedings that the appellant was motioning the trial court to take notice of, and 
counsel for the opposition and appellee herself had time and place to rebut, the trial court 
should have granted the Defendant's Motion For Court to Recognize Adjudicative Facts 
Pursuant to Rules of Evidence (Rule 201). (See Exhibit I, E) 
Especially when the court did not sua sponte take judicial notice of those prior 
adjudicated facts, and proper notice to each of the parties already existed, since those 
adjudicated facts pertained to the plaintiff-mother's prior incidents of child abuse. The 
appellant insured that each of the respective parties, and/or their counselors, were notified 
of defendant-father's intent, the motion was arranged and in accordance with Utah Rules 
of Evidence, Rule 201. Under subsection (c) "Court may take judicial notice, whether 
requested or not." However, under subsection (d) "a court is required to take judicial 
notice if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary information." Moreover, 
the rule states in subsection (f) "judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the 
proceeding." As the record reflects, the court had the information available via the 
motion, by way of attachments/exhibits, and also through the DCFS investigations and the 
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investigation report of the Guardian Ad Litem. In the case of Zions First Nat' 1 Bank v 
National Am. Title Ins. Co., 749P.2d65L 654 (Utah 1988), the rule applies even where 
the facts are not disputed and the issue raised is one of law. 
The facts contained within the appellant's motion were essential to rebutting the 
custody evaluation,(whereas the evaluator ignored those facts), the techniques employed 
therein, and to thwart any attempt to decrease the appellant's custodial rights via any 
determination by the court. During the May 7,1998, hearing, the trial court stated to the 
plaintiff "If everything turns out the way you say, then you have custody of this child on a 
permanent basis,..." 
(See Exhibit HI, A; pg. 14, Lines 21-23) 
Since the court relied heavily upon a deficient evaluation, and established the 
criteria surrounding the award and its relationship to the evaluation, then custody should 
be reverted to the defendant. Both Mr. Price, and Diane Balmain, Guardian Ad Litem, 
held out before the court that they were privy to knowledge about all items contained 
within Mr. Cox's motion. Attorney Balmain, during the February 23, 2000, trial date, 
stated "I received information from the State of Missouri regarding the issues of past 
abuse against Ms. Lomsdal's other children, as perpetrated by a former partner." (See 
Exhibit III, D; pg. 167-168) 
Yet, neither the evaluator nor the Guardian Ad Litem gave any credence to the 
relevance or importance of that information. In fact the evaluator completely ignored 
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most of the information, and justifiably excused the plaintiff-mothers actions within the 
body of the evaluation. Ms. Balmain, failed to follow-up on the information and only 
gave the information, as provided by DCFS a cursory inspection. DCFS reports, 
stemming from 1997 through 1999, all claim defects in parenting by the mother, 
substantiate allegations against her, but claim there are no defiencies sufficient to change 
custody. The Guardian Ad Litem, and Mr. Price, in turn passed the information to the 
trial court, where at trial testimony was given by DCFS about abuse, and all failed to act 
in good conscience. (See Exhibits I, M; III, D, pg. 167-168; HI, D, pg 170; III, D, pg. 
149) 
The court whitewashed over the adjudicated facts from Missouri and the State of 
Washington, awarded custody to the plaintiff and thereby denied Mr. Cox his 
Constitutional guarantee of equal protection and due process. The custody decree and the 
change in the custody award, minus this judicial prejudice, would have bestowed upon the 
appellant an more favorable result. This is beyond the "reasonable likelihood," standard 
in use today, State v Hutchinson, 655 P.2d 635, 636 (Utah 1982). 
The parent-child relationship is accorded Constitutional protection as delineated 
within the case of In re K.S., Jr . & B.S., 737 P.2d 170, 172 (Utah 1987). Given that the 
welfare of the child is tantamount to the custody proceedings, those same proceedings 
may not eliminate the parent's right to Due Process. Appellant claims that the trial court, 
in this case, erred by not allowing the judicial notice of evidentiary items, supposedly 
18 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
being relied upon by the custody evaluator, and the Guardian Ad Litem, while those same 
items were excluded from examination, admission into evidence, and admission into the 
record. Appellant's custodial rights were seriously eroded without support of clear and 
convincing evidence and without benefit of a trial. 
The error, as committed by the First District Court- Logan, in not taking judicial 
notice, when properly noticed, resulted in prejudice sufficient to warrant reversal of the 
custody decree and an Appellate Court Writ of Extraordinary Relief granting the 
appellant sole custody of the minor child. There exists more than a reasonable likelihood 
that the outcome would have been more favorable to the defendant-father if said notice 
were given appropriate weight by the trial court as in State v Knight, 734 P. 2d 913. 919 
(Utah 1987). 
Point III 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, IN LIGHT OF THE 
EVIDENCE OR ABSENT EVIDENCE, AND THAT THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE 
INSUFFICIENT TO EXPLAIN THE BASIS IN AWARDING CUSTODY OF THE 
PARTY'S MINOR CHILD TO THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE. 
The trial court did not adequately explain the basis for its decision to award 
custody to the plaintiff/appellee initially, or within the Decree for Custody. Within the 
Findings of Fact, subheading 5, "The custody evaluation ordered by the court 
recommended that custody be awarded to the petitioner." There is no express mentioning 
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1 
of why the custody evaluation conformed to the court's determination. Absent, also, is an 
explanation of the legal or logical basis for reaching this conclusion. It is not located | 
within the Findings of Fact nor disclosed clearly in any other findings made by the trial I 
court proceedings. Inadequate Findings of Fact constitute error on the part of the trial 
court, and unless the facts in the record are "clear, uncontroverted, and capable of 
supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment," Kinkella v Baugh, 660 P.2d 233. I 
236 (Utah 1983), this case should be reversed. In Sukin v Sukin, 842 P. 2d 922. 925. I 
(Utah 1992), the court determined that "the court should enter clear findings regarding the
 a 
decision." Of which is seriously lacking within the trial court's findings in this case. (See 
Exhibit I, C, pg.2) I 
The only reference that has any resemblance or adherence to statutory factors that I 
would attribute the custody award of the minor child to the appellee is located under . 
subheading three (3) of the Findings of Fact, it reads: 
"The minor child has been residing with the Petitioner and her step-brothers 1 
and sisters. The respondent has been exercising standard visitation." I 
Clearly this falls short of a reasonable explanation on the basis of awarding m 
custody to the appellee, in any court elsewhere, and it doesn't qualify as a minimum 
requirement of respect toward Utah Code Annotated §30-3-4 (l)(d). (See Exhibit I, C, • 
pg.2) I 
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Unless there is some merit within Commissioner Daniel Garner's prejudicial 
statement, on April 29,1999, "Dr. Price is held in high esteem in this court. That doesn't 
mean that we rubber stamp custody evaluations, but any evidence contrary to his findings 
would have to clear a high hurdle," then the trial court, in this matter, was biased at the 
onset. It seems that bias is the logical deduction, especially when Mr. Price is not a 
Doctor, but the court, seems ready to hand out a title without benefit of acclimation 
toward a specific doctorate degree sufficient to persuade a Board of Psychologist or any 
other school of the sciences. (See Exhibit III, B, pg. 4) What this amounts too is an 
additional barrier that the defendant-father had to satisfactorily summit and it is outside of 
the trial court's broad based discretion to insist upon. Additionally, the Findings of Fact 
lack any reflective qualities of this caveat. As the Appellate Court stated in Rucker v 
Dalton, 598 P. 2d 1336.1338 (Utah 1979): "The importance of a complete, accurate, and 
consistent findings of fact in a case tried by a judge is essential to the resolution of 
dispute under the proper rule of law. To that end the findings should be sufficiently 
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate 
conclusion on each factual issue was reached." 
Since the trial court's Findings of Fact are clearly erroneous in that regard, and the 
appellant has now marshaled evidence to support the premise, a reversal of the final 
determination is in order. If the appellant has not sufficiently marshaled evidence, it is 
because he was barred by the trial court, and as the Appeals Court has avoided in the past, 
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Cox Rock Products v Walker Pipeline Constr., 754 P. 2d 672. 676 (Utah 1988) Note 
4, Rule 201, "we would have the power to take judicial notice for the first time and, 
indeed, might do so in an appropriate case," or by proscription relating to the trial court's 
refusal to take judicial notice, which would have allowed the marshaling of evidence to 
support such. 
Point IV 
THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS AND EQUAL 
PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW WHEN THE TRIAL COURT AND THE STATE 
OF UTAH IMPOSED, UNDER "COLOR OF LAW," GENDER BASED AND 
ECONOMIC DISCRIMINATION IN AWARDING THE INITIAL CUSTODY 
ARRANGEMENT. 
Commissioner Daniel Garner, during a hearing held May 7, 1998, openly 
remarked, in court to the defendant-father, "So if you want custody, put your money 
where your mouth is and pay for the custody evaluation so we can get it started." 
(See Exhibit HI, A, pg.13) 
If the court is now claiming that the best interest of the child are secondary to the 
income and/or the financial positions of the parties, then by 1) openly debating the need 
for a custody evaluation; and 2) requiring the defendant-father to bear the costs 
associative, on the court's recommendation of a custody evaluation; and 3) parleying the 
exchange of money for the physical possession of a human being, the trial court is 
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attempting to sell the custody of children to the highest bidder, and thereby selling justice, 
not dispensing justice within the parameters of the U.S. Constitution, Constitution of 
Utah, or the Utah Code Annotated. 
Furthermore, the appellant asserts that what Commissioner Garner did was make 
an offer, to which the appellant accepted, by way of payment as instructed, each side was 
aware of the consideration and thereby an unenforceable, unconscionable contract was 
formed. The breach occurred in the performance by the court in its awarding the custody 
to someone other than the defendant-father, who, unwittingly, and successfully completed 
his portion of the agreement. 
During the same hearing, appellant's former counsel, Mr. Larson, was allowed to 
prejudice the appellant by withdrawing from the case, for the most unscrupulous of 
reasons, by exclaiming in open court, "I just — Fm not going to do a custody battle for 
poor people/' Mr. Larson wasn't claiming non-payment for legal services, but merely 
placing the appellant under an adverse light before the court. The court, after making a 
statement "because looking at what Fm seeing here, Fve seen these type of accidents 
before, these pictures here." Where is the concern for Due Process or Equal Protection if 
not for the father at least for the child? A withdrawal of counsel under the Utah Code Of 
Judicial Administration Rule 4-506, fails to mention a parol request being sufficient 
with permission of the court. Utah Rules of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2 b, states in 
part, "A judge shall not lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance the private 
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interests of others; nor shall a judge convey or permit others to convey the impression that 
they are in a special position to influence the judge." (See Exhibit III, A, pg.6, andpg 8) 
Also contained in Canon 3, (B), (8), it states that" A judge should require similar 
abstention on the part of court personnel subject to judicial direction and control." As 
Mr. Larson is an officer of the court, subject to judicial direction and control, the judge 
improperly allow public comment which definitively affected the outcome, impaired the 
proceedings fairness and thereafter interfered with the appellant's chance at having a fair 
trial. 
There is no other reason than the gender of the appellee that allowed her to retain 
custody of the child. It was not in the child's best interests, in accordance with U.C. A. 
§30-3-10, and Hutchinson v Hutchinson, 649 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah 1982), to remain with 
the mother who openly displays severe emotional and mental instabilities, or who has 
abused her own children, abdicated custody of her children, and has continually 
introduced paramour after paramour into her children's lives. 
Understandably, the trial court is given great latitude and breadth with its 
discretionary powers, but it is clear at this juncture that the responsibility of children is 
too vast and weighty for the existing court system to bear. It is indecipherable how, in 
this case alone, both a little girl and her father could be forced to endure this type of 
treatment inflicted upon them by a state court system too proud to enlist the aid of the 
legislature for a familial court breakdown. The appellant has found volumes of case law 
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wherein countless children have been harmed more by the judiciary than by the 
divorce/custody action itself, and in a state such as Utah where it is claimed to be family 
oriented. 
The court establish in Palmore v Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429.431-434, (FLA.1984), as it 
held that "Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly, 
or indirectly, give them effect, * * * the reality of private biases and the possible injury 
they might inflict are permissible considerations for the removal of * child from the 
custody of its natural (parent)." [Gender neutrality added] 
The maternal preference, or tender years doctrine violates the Equal Protection 
Clause of the United States Constitution. For the State of Utah, or the judiciary within to 
assume a position of gender profiling is erroneous and the presumption is discriminatory. 
By arbitrarily applying this presumption, that only mothers can provide the critical 
nurturing and/or child rearing skills, indicative and relative to a specific age, without 
looking at individual characteristics and/or circumstances, the court did not evaluate the 
best interests of Anna Marie Cox. The trial court blindly assumed that the mother, albeit 
through stereotypical profiling she appears innocent enough, was more capable than the 
father to continue raising the child until such time as a trial could take place. The goal of 
granting custody, whether initially or post-trial, is based upon the best interests standard 
and is indisputable a substantial governmental interest under the Equal Protection Clause. 
The appellant claims that that is more responsibility than a district court Commissioner 
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can handle or to take on, and that policy is capricious by nature and ought be proscribed 
in the future. As laid out in most state statutes, the state is assumed to have a duty to 
protect the interests of minor children, particularly those of the tender years, not with 
discriminatory policies or arbitrary application of existing laws. "Public officials sworn 
to uphold the Constitution may not avoid a constitutional duty by bowing to the 
hypothetical effects of private * prejudice that they assume to be both widely and deeply 
held" Palmer v Thompson. 403 U.S. 217, 260-261. (1971). 
When a combination of Article III § 2 of the United States Constitution, in 
pertinent part: "The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising 
under this Constitution, the Law of the United States . . . and between a State, or the 
Citizens thereof," Amendment V, of the U.S. Constitution, "Nor shall any person . . . be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law," Amendment X, of the 
U.S. Constitution, "The powers not delegated to the United States, * * * nor prohibited 
by it to the States, are reserved . . . to the people," Amendment XIV of the United 
States Constitution, "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, * * * No State 
shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection under the laws," and IX 
Amendment's "of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others 
retained by the people," Article I, §24 of the Constitution of Utah, wherein "All laws of 
a general nature shall have uniform operation;" Article IV §1 Utah Constitution, "The 
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judicial powers shall be vested . . . in a trial court of general jurisdiction know as the 
district court, and in such courts as the Legislature by statute may establish;" and with the 
clear path that Utah's District Courts, not only in this case but a multitude of custody 
cases, invokes the tender years doctrine and awards initial custody to mothers, absent an 
immediate showing of a potential for harm, or immediate harm. Constitution of Utah 
Article I, Section 18, forbids bills of attainder. Yet, in this case Bills of pains have been 
enacted against the appellant-father. By way of a direction, from the beginning, showing 
that the defendant-father suffered numerous instances of gender bias, economic bias, and 
arbitrary applications of the law, would have the case fail under any one of these 
standards, we, as United States citizens uphold as crucial to our identities before god. 
That the appellant was denied his rights to due process under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments is undeniable, but so too were the minor child's. Under the 
Equal Protection Clause, both the minor child and the father were never afforded such, 
each of the parties should have been granted the minimum standard under the same, they 
were not. Whereas the Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted by the majority in Yick 
Wo v Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356372 (1886), "undoubtedly intended not only that there 
should be no arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty, or arbitrary spoliation of property, but 
that equal protection and security should be given to all under like circumstances in the 
enjoyment of their personal and civil right; that all persons should be equally entitled to 
pursue their happiness . . . that they should have like access to the courts of the country 
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for the protection of their persons and property, the prevention and redress of wrongs, * * 
* Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others, is prohibited, but 
legislation which, in carrying out a public purpose, is limited in its application," never 
opened the door for a state or a state court to arbitrarily administer justice with a 
preference of gender. There is no reason that the First District Court should not have 
f 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
issued a temporary order granting joint legal custody to each of the parties, except for 
gender discrimination, that has long been entrenched within its rulings. It is unclear how 
to install within the courts of the State of Utah a gender neutral policy, without the 
formation of a state family court system, unless through the repeated inundation of 
appellate briefs such as this one. The mother in this case testified that she wasn't sure of 
the age of one of her children. (See Exhibit III, D, pg 76) I 
If it is acceptable for the First District Court to impose archaic philosophies, of 
biased assumptions or gender preference, as reviewed in Yick Wo, then we are left with 
agencies or officers, that implement (quoting J. Matthews), "arbitrary and unregulated 
discretion and special consent, * * * then it seems to us that there has been a wide I 
departure from the principle that have heretofore been supposed to guard and protect the 
rights and liberties of the American people. * * * a discrimination against any class can be 
made in its execution, thereby evading and in effect, nullifying the provisions of the 
National Constitution, then the insertion of provisions to guard the rights of every class I 
and person in that instrument was a vain and futile act." • 
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Appellant asserts that if the events, as he perceives them to be, were such that the 
government or an official of the government placed him in a situation of gender-biased 
discrimination, then an abuse of discretion and a violation of due process occurred. This 
case is a bona fide denial of his equal protection under the law and discriminatory under 
42 U.S.C. §1983, the V, IX, and XIV Amendments of the UJS. Constitution. 
Assuming a defensive posture as an anticipatory reaction, the appellate retorts to 
what other criteria could the courts have used in making its determination. "Moral 
character and emotional stability," as expressed, would have conclusively benefitted the 
defendant-father. He has no moral constraints, is established in the local community, and 
in fact, the appellant was willing to relocate from Missouri to Utah in order to continue 
his contact with his child. The appellant was never labeled as having a "long history of 
maladaptive lifestyle* * * diagnosis AXIS II 301.90 personality disorder NOS 
(Borderline, Narcissistic , dependant traits)." (See Exhibit I, D, pg. 11) 
Borderline Personality Disorder shows "extreme affective instability as reflected in 
drastic mood shifts and impulsive or erratic self-destructive behaviors." (Fine & Sansone, 
1990) 
Person with such a disorder have transient episodes in which they appear to be out 
of contact with reality and experience delusions or other psychotic-like symptoms, for a 
majority these psychotic symptoms lasted 1-12 weeks. (Miller, F.T. 1993) 
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Narcissistic Personality Disorder shows an exaggerated sense of self importance 
and a lack of empathy for the feelings of others. (DSM-IV 1998) 
Those who do enter treatment may terminate therapy prematurely, particularly if 
their therapist is confrontational. The narcissist's exploitation would be more for the 
purpose of demonstrating domination, prestige, and superiority, rather than for the __ 
personal, material gain of the antisocial personality. (Widiger, T. & Trull, T. 1993) 
Personality disorders do not stem from reactions to stress. They stem from gradual 
development resulting from persistently maladaptive ways of perceiving, thinking about 
and relating to the world. These approaches significantly impair functioning and cause 
subjective stress. 
The appellant, acting as Pro Se, at various stages of the proceedings, was never 
silenced by the court, the court never had to restrain the defendant, and neither the 
Guardian Ad Litem, opposition, or the custody evaluator introduce any evidence to 
impact the emotional or psychological stability of the appellant. 
Beginning in the Missouri Courts, and then traveling to Utah, reestablishing 
residency therein, the appellant's actions are reflective of the duration and desire to 
maintain and continue custodial rights with his daughter. As to the personal care issue, the 
defendant-father is more than able to provide personal care and not just surrogate care for 
his daughter, again evidenced by his voluntary displacement from the Midwestern region 
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of the of the country to the State of Utah. That action by the appellant can only be 
construed as personal care and untainted love for contact with his daughter. 
The appellant doesn't have a history of drug abuse, nor use, does not drink, does 
not have a history of drinking, and no other cause was introduced that would apply. The 
defendant-father never relinquished custody of his daughter nor any other of his children, 
which cannot be said of the plaintiff-mother, who admittedly gave up custody of two of 
have children, physically abused at least three of her children, with this evidence in hand 
the trial court should have been strongly cautioned. It did not feel the need for caution, 
because in the trial court's action there isn't any room for error. Although the appellant is 
not independently wealthy, he has maintained gainful employment which is directly 
proportional to the plaintiff-mother's earning capacity. 
PointV 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
MISINTERPRETED THE LAW IN APPLYING MR. PRICE'S EVALUATION TO 
THE DECREE OF CUSTODY 
Appellant claims that the custody evaluation was invalid due to the inability of the 
preparer to apply the scientific standards, as laid out in Frye v United States, 293 F. 
Supp.1013 (D.C. 1923), as it pertains to the testing procedures and the individual(s) 
administering the test(s), thereby eliminating the credibility and reliability of the 
evaluation, and the preparer was not qualified to refute determinations of other 
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professionals. The custody evaluation was performed by Mr. Price, a licensed clinical 
social worker, who relied upon material accumulated by a nurse, in order to refute the 
prior findings of two Board Certified Psychologists, a Circuit Court Judge in Missouri, 
and a thorough investigation by both a Hospital and the Department of Family Services in 
Missouri. Neither Mr. Price nor the nurse have the credentials to refute or ignore the 
i 
i 
i 
previous findings by nationally accredited, professionally, trained individuals within the 
field of child psychology and family law. Mr. Price never mentioned the clinical 1 
diagnosis of two other Board Certified Psychologist during the trial. (See Exhibit /, D) 
To further conflict with the Frye test, during the trial Mr. Price states that he was 
"Unable to use the normal tests and evaluations that I would have used on a child who 
was five and a half or older." This was accomplished without providing what test he I 
would normally have used or how the testing was modified for this case. (See Exhibit III, 
C,pg.l4) 
The methods that Mr. Price employed are not accepted by his peers. Mr. Price 
ignored the empirical evidence of child abuse allegations, as they related to Wendy I 
Lomsdal. Mr Price admitted to having knowledge that Ms. Lomsdal has seven children, -
fathered by four different men, involving six marriages, over a period of 13 years, and yet 
he stated in his report that Ms Lomsdal possesses better parenting skills than Mr. Cox. 1 
Both the trial court and Mr. Price admitted awareness of Ms. Lomsdal's pluralistic I 
marriage arrangement involving Mr. Cox, and one of her former spouses. Mr. Price i 
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admitted knowing that Ms. Lomsdal previously gave up custody of two of her other 
children, Sonny Gray and Star Atwood. Mr Price admitted that he was aware of the 
circumstances surrounding the child abuse allegations of Ms. Lomsdal's minor child, 
Rachel, in Missouri, and yet he still felt she possessed better parenting skills than Mr. 
Cox, who has never been charged with Felony childjibused, never assisted in the abuse of 
children. In fact, the evaluation describes Ms. Lomsdal as being more "flexible than 
closed-minded," more "solution oriented than adversarial," and more aware than Mr. Cox 
of the "Child's Needs." Was this in the context of her ability to adequately choose father 
figures, or mates who are as she describes them "drug addicts," or who she claims had 
"sexually abused," one of her children as she claims Mr. Atwood had, or who was ill 
with "covecanidida, severe allergic reactions, depression," but these were "self 
diagnosed," by Mr. Jackson, one of appellee's former husbands? (See Exhibits /, D; I, F; 
I,G) 
The trial court must have given some credence to the party's relative stabilities 
within their respective communities or the trial court ignored crucial facts of evidence. 
During the trial, attorney for the Guardian Ad Litem, Diane Balmain, questioned Mr. 
Price, as to"How many different addresses Keith had lived at, to which Mr. Price 
curiously replied, " At least three(3). 619 East 400 North and then he moved shortly after 
this report." (See Exhibit III, C, pg. 22) 
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This equals two, not three. It is simply disingenuous of Mr. Price to further the 
injury by pretending that simple arithmetic is outside of his performance level. What is 
even more preposterous is that the appellant moved to 619 East 400 North before the 
visit, and Mr. Price was more than aware of this fact. Social workers are simply that, 
social, they are inherently liberal-minded in their dealings with challenged people and 
sympathetic to the downtrodden. 
In relationship to the appellant's stability, the appellee admitted to moving four 
times across the same amount of states, then onto Washington, Oregon, then Utah where 
she has resided in at least two different addresses prior to the time of the trial. What is 
even more implausible is that fact that two individuals, each with nearly identical familial 
backgrounds, education levels, and earning potentials, could score in the manner 
described by Mr. Price. Not in one instance does Mr. Cox outscore Ms. Lomsdal, of 
which the random ordering of people couldn't produce the same results in a million 
attempts. 
Mr. Price spent 6 hours with appellant, 2 of which were spent with Mr. Cox and 
his daughter. Appellee only spent 3 hours total, 2 of which were spent with Ms. Lomsdal 
and her daughter. Odd that a woman with as many recorded problems, involving past 
abuse, psychological disabilities, child custodial issues, several failed marriages, and as 
Mr. Price described as "struggling with depression," could warrant, in good 
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consciousness, 1 hours time to determine her mental health as it pertains to this case. (See 
Exhibit HI, C, pg. 37) 
Mr. Price, in describing the scoring claims "The following ratings, 1 through 10, 
10 being the highest and best score. Under the heading "Honesty," Mr. Price gives 
appellee a score of 5, and the appellant a 1 and then states "She was able to respond to the 
questionnaire in a forthright, knowledgeable manner." If 10 is the best that a person can 
score and a 1 is the worst, then a 5 would be average, which is what the appellee received. 
However, honesty is not a variable, it exists at 100%, anything less would be dishonest, 
not "forthright." Therefore, she would have had to have had a score of 1 or lower. There 
isn't one mention of what determined the score of 1 being given to the appellant, Mr. 
Cox, under that category, not his answers, not his informal communication, just a score of 
1 that leads any reader of that report to believe he is dishonest. (See Exhibit /, D, pg. 5) 
Mr. Price describes Mr. Cox as being "very closed minded in his responses. He 
took every opportunity to look good and put Wendy in the role of the villain." Whatever 
bubble world Mr. Price lives in the rest of us do not, If Mr. Price is familiar with custody 
and divorce proceedings, then the objective is for one party to arrive, at the ending point, 
in a better position than the other party without maliciousness or deceit. Both are outside 
of Mr. Price's comprehension. (See Exhibit I, D, pg. 5) 
Maybe Mr. Price doesn't believe in villains, but anyone who takes their 11 month 
old child to the hospital with, "significant bruising to the right side of Rachel's head. * * 
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* Rachel has bruising on left arm, left leg, and right side of her head. Rachel has 
decreased use of left arm and left leg. * * * Ms. Rainey stated that Rachel has many 
injuries. These include a right subdural hematoma, which is one to five days old, a right 
black eye, which is now green: the black eye would be three to five days old. She has 
bruises on both hands, that probably occurred last night. Rachel also has a fractured right 
forearm, and probably a left fractured tibia, which is two to three weeks old," could only 
be described as a villain in light if the photographic evidence of the child currently at 
issue. Mr. Price admitted to having all of this information plus the appellee's statement 
that "Wendy Lomsdal and an unknown male (later identified as Butch Crandall) said that 
three days ago Rachel fell out of a chair." (See Exhibit I, F; and II) 
What is more peculiar about the present case is that the minor child, currently at 
issue, was suspected of being abused by her mother, Ms. Lomsdal, after being made 
aware of the allegations and the photographic evidence, during the May 7,1998, hearing 
before Commissioner Garner, stated that the origin of those injuries as simply, "She fell 
off a chair. " The appellee, has the most hazardous furniture known to man, and yet 
Utah's Department of Family Services failed to make a logical connection, as did the trial 
court, between past behavior of the appellee and current circumstances. (See Exhibits I, F; 
I, M,pg.2[7-1997],pg5[l-1997]; and III, A, pg. 8, III, D,pg. 149-150) 
During a court hearing, in Logan, on April 4, 1996, appellee stated that the abuse 
to another one of her children occurred in "Plato, Missouri. I wasn't in the room. I only 
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saw the results." Never mind that it took her between two weeks and five days to get 
Rachel to the hospital, of course that child had to quit breathing first 
This having been said with Commissioner Garner's instruction that in determining 
whether to grant a protective order the court had to determine "whether abuse occurred or 
the likelihood of abuse occurring," the end result should have been different. By ignoring 
appellee's admission, the judgment of conviction of the court in Missouri, the findings by 
the Department of Family Services of Missouri, and the photographic evidence provided 
by the appellant, the trial court awarded a protective order against the appellant and then 
custody was awarded to the appellee on a temporary basis. This should disgust the 
common senses of every purveyor of justice anywhere in the world. (See Exhibit II) 
The custody evaluation states that Wendy "would like to be the custodial parent 
and for Keith to have standard non-custodial visitation." During the hearing of April 4, 
1996, before Commissioner Garner, on a protective order, Wendy asserted that she didn't 
"want any contact," between Anna and Keith. Then in the stipulation of January 1997, she 
contradistinguishes her position again, and then during the trial reverts her position again. 
At one point during the proceedings the appellee claimed that the appellant wasn't the 
natural father, and completely ignored the Amended Judgment's Paternity Clause issued 
by the State of Missouri. (See Exhibit I, B; and I, A) 
Within the Investigative Summary, performed by the Texas County Department of 
Family Services, Missouri, the preparer stated "Initially, Ms. Lomsdal did not want to tell 
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this worker much information. Periodically, this reoccurred by Ms. Lomsdal's making 
statements such as "I'm not going to tell you," and "Why do you have to know?" It was 
later determined that the appellee had a hand in the abuse and she plead guilty, that status 
held in abeyance, under the condition that she testify against her paramour/co-abuser, Mr. 
Crandall. (See Exhibit I, F) 
Utah's First District Court- Logan, and Mr. Price completely disregarded this 
extreme set of circumstances. The court then awarded custody to the appellee, against the 
appellant, who never had a conviction for anything other than minor offenses, no arrest or 
conviction for child abuse, suspected child abuse, nor even an official inquiry on the later. 
Mr. Price's evaluation is so contradictory of any standard in use today that it should have 
been dismissed and another evaluator/evaluation mandated. 
Mr. Price, within the body of the evaluation, claims that Keith is attempting to 
manipulate the proceedings, but in every instance there are only quotes from Wendy, or 
accusations by Wendy where she claims that Keith is accusing her of some act. (See 
Exhibit I, D,pg. 1,2,3) 
In one bizarre incident, appellee admitted to the evaluator that she "is having 
visions or communications with God." By itself would be nothing but when coupled with 
her marital circumstances, i.e. plurality, her patterns of abuse, "Narcissistic," disorders, 
self diagnosis of severe medical problems, ought to warrant caution at the minimum. Mr. 
Price states, "If she has some different and strange beliefs, so be it." The appellant can 
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only wonder if Mr. Price would directly assist in the furtherance of harm upon children, 
or if he is simply inept as a custody evaluator. (See Exhibit I, D, ppg. 11,12, and 13) 
Some of the most contradictory information in the evaluation is on page six. 
"Keith is able to play with her, to keep her attention. And to let her engage in activities 
which s ^ Anna w ^ father." 
Then, "Wendy was able to get Anna Marie to give her feedback about the activities. 
Mother and daughter seemed to enjoy being with each other." There isn't one derogatory 
remark about either parent within this section, they both actually seem to be equal as the 
observation lays out, but the scoring shows a clear bias against the appellant. The 
observation and their respective results, as listed and explained above the scoring section, 
are never employed or explained in a correlative manner within the summary. (See 
Exhibit I, D, pg 6) 
Appellant avows that the purpose of the trial court, in this matter, was to provide 
appellant with a forum for a redress of grievances, wholly free of arbitrary shackles that 
would hamper or constrict his life, or liberties within. Interstate Excavating, Inc. v 
Agla Development Corporation, 611 P. 2d 369 (1980), "Speaking generally about such 
problems, it is to be kept in mind that access to the courts for the protection of rights and 
the settlement of disputes is one of the most important factors in the maintenance of a 
peaceable and well-ordered society. * * * The uniformly acknowledged policy of the law 
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I 
is to accord litigants the opportunity for a hearing on the merits, where that can be done 
without serious injustice to the other party." 
Appellant claims that an actual bias and/or prejudice existed via Commissioner I 
Daniel Gamer's and Judge Clint Judkins' refusal to follow and/or apply the Utah Code of 
Judicial Conduct, Canon 3 (B) (8), "A judge shall dispose of all judicial matters 
promptly, efficiently, and fairly." 
It was not fair to remove the custodial rights of the appellant and grant them to the I 
appellee given that so much evidence was provided to the court, (the fact that the appellee 
took substantial steps to give up custody on several occasions), the majority of which was 
unaccounted for by the court, and the same evidence did not have enough muster a 
minimal sufficiency test to enter Mr. Price's evaluation, or minus any apparent disability I 
on the behalf of the appellant. Court made rules, such as the one's enacted in this case, 
must give way to the issue of what concerns the best interests of the child, not judicial 
efficiency or the moral standards of the community. {See Exhibit I, A; I, F; I, I) 
40 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Point VI 
THE ALLOWANCE OF COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF AND THE 
GUARDIAN AD LITEM TO INTERVIEW WITNESSES, OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE 
OF THE COURT AND THE APPELLANT, AND TO INVOKE JUDICIAL POWERS 
IS A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS 
Appellant asserts that through the United States Constitution, Amendment XIV; 
the Constitution of Utah; Article I, Sections l,7,ll,and 24; Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration, Rule 4-903; Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 201; confers upon the First 
Judicial District Court, and Attorney Diane Balmain, granted authority and direction for 
Bill Burnard, an student intern, to deny the appellant his visitation rights without a court 
order or hearing. 
This occurred on two different occasions in September, 1999, as admitted to 
during the trial. Neither by motion nor an order of the court was entered, rather the 
Guardian Ad Litem, without benefit of hearing, determined that their office, via a student 
intern, would establish Utah law and its applicability. In this the appellant's rights under 
Utah law, U.S. Constitution, Amendment IX, X, and XIV, Constitution of Utah, 
Article I, Section 26, and 27 were circumvented. (See Exhibit HI, C, page 63) 
These events were witnessed by Mr. J. Vincent Eccles, who accompanied the 
appellant. Mr. Burnard claimed that the appellant had failed to provide a current address. 
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I 
I 
When it was explained that the appellee refused to accept the letter containing such, Mr. 
Burnard claimed inadequacy. The Appellant further extended his manners by offering ] 
his address in a written form to Mr. Burnard, who promptly refused to accept. Subject to 1 
United States law and Utah Law De facto laws are prohibited by both, and clearly this is 
de facto law. Mr. Burnard was acting as an agent of the Guardian Ad Litem's office 
when he was not, Diane Balmian never denied, or reproached Mr. Burnard for his actions, I 
and the court failed to condone him either. In essence this is a de facto law enforced by I 
officers of the court, as agents of the State of Utah, violating appellant's rights as barred . 
by MacLeod v United States, 229 U.S. 416, and People v Davis, 272 N.W. 2d 707,710, 
and Wortham v Walker, 128 S.W. 2d 1138, 1145. There is no possibility that the I 
statutory "responsible party," had performed the investigation when Attorney Balmain, j 
appointed a student intern, who himself employed terroristic tactics and de facto law. i 
There is a proper avenue for the redress of grievances and it is not held in the street by 
manipulative student interns. (See Exhibit I, K; III, C, pg. 60-63) I 
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Point Vn 
BY THE FRAUDULENT FILING OF PLAINTIFF'S AFFIDAVIT OF 
IMPECUNIOSITY THE COURT SHOULD HAVE AWARDED FEES AND 
REASONABLE COST EQUALLY TO BOTH PARTIES. 
The plaintiff-mother had fraudulently filed an Affidavit of Impecuniosity with the 
court on December 1,1997. The Defendant filed a Motion for Costs and Fees on 
February 3, 2000, pursuant to Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 902 (9) and Rule 803 (8), 
and Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-911 (2) (A). Wherein the petitioner 
had paid $2000.00, to Dennis Matthews for trial. On November 20,1997, she withdrew 
$4,025.66 and closed her checking account. The plaintiff failed to disclose this to the 
court and as a result the appellant has been forced to pay for the custody evaluation, his 
own attorney, and then after the trial the trial court imposed a $1000.00 fee for the 
reimbursement of appellee's attorney costs, in addition to the costs incurred for this 
appeal. (See Exhibit /, H; and I) 
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
This Court is entreated with an obligatory stance to make whole and right the 
Appellant who has been served with continual abuses of discretion, oversights of law and 
procedure, and misconduct by the adverse party and the trial court itself. It is one of the 
most important aspects of living in the United States, the existence of a court system, 
without the prospect of arbitrary application of the laws therein. It is this very court 
system whose primary and most vital function is to afford litigants an opportunity to be 
heard and grant justice between the parties contesting. The trial court failed to give 
sufficient weight to the higher priority: the implementation of justice and an absolute 
obligation to fairness at all stages of those proceedings within the confines of the law. 
For those reasons the custody decree should be vacated, that decision by the trial court 
should be reversed, and this Honorable Court ought to issue an Writ for Extraordinary 
Relief specifying the Appellant as the primary care giver of the parties minor child, 
subject to the appellee's right to supervised visitation. 
For the abuses of discretion and misconduct by the trial court the case should be 
reversed, at a minimum, with the return of Appellant's joint legal custody status 
previously given to him by the State of Missouri, and all costs should be returned to the 
Appellant. 
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WAIVER OF ORAL ARGUMENT 
Given the straightforwardness of the facts in contention, appellant hereby asserts 
that this opening brief, should stand sufficient enough in allowing the Court to render its 
decision, and preclude a reply brief or oral argument from either party hence forth. The 
appellant also would lodge a stern objection to this court allowing the filing of a brief by 
the Guardian Ad Litem. 
RESECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ d a y of October, 2000. 
Keith Cox, Pro Se 
Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Appellant's Opening Brief, this tht/O day of October, 2000, to Dennis Matthews, 
attorney for the appellee, and the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Keith Cox, Pro Se 
Appellant 
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.o 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DOUGLAS COUNTY. MISSOURI 
In the Matter of: 
ANNA MARIE CAROL LOMSDAL 
a Minor 
by KEITH WAYNE COX. as Next Friend 
KEITH WAYNE COX 
vs. 
Plaintiff. 
WENDY ALBERTA LOMSDAL. 
Defendant. 
Case NO; CV196-154DR 
AMENDED JUDGMENT 
Comes now the Plaintiff. KEITH WAYNE COX. Individually and as Next 
Friend of Anna Marie Carol Lomsdal. minor child, by and through attorney. 
Daniel A. Parmele. The Defendant. Wendy Alberta Lomsdal. having failed to 
file any responsive pleading to the Petition For a Determination of 
Paternity, pursuant to service on July 15. 1996. is hereby found to be in 
default. In particular, the Court finds that: 
1. Plaintiff. Keith Wayne Cox. is declared to be the father of Anna 
Marie Carol Lomsdal. born to Defendant. Wendy Alberta Lomsdal. on March 19. 
1995. The birth certificate of the child will be changed to reflect Plaintiff 
as the father of the child. 
2. That the parties are awarded joint legal custody; that Defendant 
is awarded primary physical custody of the minor child and Plaintiff shall 
have reasonable visitation as set forth below: 
A. . Eight (8) weeks in the summer. 
B. 1 Alternating holidays; 
C. One (1) week in October and March of each 
D Each party to be responsible for one-haIf IJIP ofMany ' 
T/^ AA u* YULU1C 
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o n 
transportation costs involved in transporting the minor child to and from the 
afore-mentioned visits with Plaintiff. 
3. That Plaintiff. Keith Wayne Cox. shall pay $75.00 per month to 
Defendant. Wendy Alberta Lomsdal. as support for the minor child as calculated 
under Rule 88.01. to start on the 1st day of October. 1996. and continue on 
the 1st day of each month thereafter through the Douglas County Circuit Clerk. 
* 4*. 'IMt Plaintiff be awarded the right to claim the tax deduction for 
t 
ite of Missouri 
unty of Douglas } 
CERTIFICATE OF TRUE COPY 
ss. 
ij Tom L. Roberts, Clerk of the Circuit Court and Ex-Officio Recorder or Deeds 
indjor'Douglas County, Missouri, do hereby certify the atjove ap/f foregoing to be 
I complete copy of the original 
 l t  n 
b rt I 
i my office i 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, J have 
I at Ava, Missouri this; 
as fully as the same appears on record in the 
a*£aee. 
lixed my ojficjal 
19J 
w.rMi : m M n*~~.M~. 
OCT 2 3 « 
— ^ 4 « r\r^i • , i C 
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SuzanneMarychild-7082 ]^< '/? ,| ••,-, p i t <:: 
HULT&MARYCHILD " ' J j | 1 1 -
Attorney for Plaintiff 
110 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 543 
Logan, Utah 84323-0543 
Telephone: (801) 753-7400 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
WENDY ALBERTTA LOMSDAL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KEITH WAYNE COX, 
Defendant 
The parties have agreed to the following Agreement, and request that the Court make it an 
Order, as follows: 
1. Plaintiff, Wendy Lomsdal, agrees to dismiss her Utah action for paternity. 
2. Plaintiff agrees to dismiss the Protective Order and incorporate same in this action. 
3. Plaintiffagrees to recognize the Missouri Judgment as a Utah Judgment 
4. The Utah Judgment shall be modified in the following regards: 
a. Defendant/Father shall have one week visitation at the time of Father's Day, 
and also during the period of the child's birthday, in March. Said visitation shall take place at the 
home of the Plaintiff/Mother. 
CasahlQ. /£^<3..t>-3 
1 V - (XP 
JAN 27 1997 
* 
STIPULATION 
* 
* 
* Case No. 964000353 PA 
* 
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b. Defendant/Father shall be entitled to take the minor child to his home in 
Missouri, for the period of October 1,1997 through the Thanksgiving Holiday. 
c. Defendant/Father shall have the right to visit the minor child on the first and 
third weekend of every month at the PlaintifiBMother's residence. 
d. Due to the expenses of visitation transportation, a made-up visit is to be 
allowed in the year that it is missed, and thereafter is waived. 
e. The schedule for 1998, and subsequent years, shall be by mutual agreement 
of the parties. If no agreement can be reached, visitation shall be as set forth in the Missouri, 
Douglas County, decision. 
f. After the child is four and one-half (414) years old, the parties shall split 
physical custody of the minor child as follows: From the first of January for the first six months of 
the year, the minor child shall be in the father's home, and for the second six months of the year, 
the minor child shall be in the mother's home. 
g. Other visitation s hall occur as the parties shall agree. 
5. The parties agree that child support in the amount of $75 shall be paid monthly 
through the Office of Recovery Services. 
6. Video tapes of the respective families are to be exchanged monthly between the 
parties, and shown to the minor child. 
DATED this day of January, 1997. 
Wendy A. Eomsdal, 
PlaintifFMother 
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Dennis Mathews (2119) 
55 North Main, Suite 302 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (4 35) 753-7999 
Attorney for Petitioner 
MRST DISTRiC 
'00 FEG 29 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WENDY A. COX (LOMSDAL), 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
KEITH COX, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 974100564 DA 
This matter came on for trial on the 3rd and 23rd of February, 
2000, before the Honorable Clint Judkins, District Court Judge. The 
Petitioner was present in court represented by her attorney, Dennis 
Mathews. The Respondent was present in court, pro se. The minor 
child of the parties was represented by the Guardian ad Litem, 
Dianne R. Balmain. Witnesses were sworn and evidence was presented, 
and based upon the evidence, and the Court being fully appraised in 
the matter, the Court now enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. This matter came before the court having been bifurcated 
for trial. A decree of divorce was entered in this matter on or 
about the 24th day of September, 1998. The issues reserved for this 
trial are: child custody, visitation and attorney's fees and costs. 
2. That one child has been born to the parties, namely; Anna 
Marie, born March 19, 1995. 
3. The minor child has been residing with the Petitioner and_,n 
Case No. ^ J T W J 
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3. The minor child has been residing with the Petitioner and 
her step-brothers and sisters. The Respondent has been exercising 
standard visitation. 
4. Testimony was given, and photographs were admitted into 
evidence, indicating some bruising on the minor child. While the 
court is concerned about the bruising, the matter was investigated 
by the responsible agencies, DCFS and the Police, and no abuse was 
found to have occurred. 
5. The custody evaluation ordered by the court recommended 
that custody be awarded to the Petitioner. 
6. The Custody Evaluator recommended that both parties stay in 
therapy and attend parenting classes 
7. That the care, custody and control of the minor child 
should be awarded to the Petitioner, subject to the Respondent's 
right of reasonable visitation. In this matter, reasonable 
visitation should be defined as such times as the parties may 
agree, and if they can not agree, then as is set forth in UCA §30-
3-35. 
The statutory provisions concerning, health and accident 
insurance, day care costs and uninsured medical expenses should 
apply. 
8. The Court finds that the Respondent caused an inordinate 
amount of time to be spent getting this matter to trial and in 
trial. Respondent should be ordered to pay $1000.00 towards 
Petitioner's costs and attorney's fees. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court now enters the 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. A Decree should enter awarding the care, custody and 
control of the minor child to the Petitioner, subject to the 
Respondent's right of visitation. 
2. A Decree should enter based upon and not inconsistent with 
the above Finding of Fact. 
DATED this ^P ~ day of VlAM/^Vk 2000. 
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T. BRENT PRICE, Ph.D. 
CLINICAL SOCIAL WORKER 120 NORTH MAIN 
BRIGHAM CITY, UT 84302 
(435) 723-2881 
February 16, 1999 
CUSTODY EVALUATION 
PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION 
NAME DATE OF BIRTH AGE 
Wendy Lomsdal 
Keith Wayne Cox 
Anna Marie Carol Lomsdal 
June 9,1956 
April 18,1947 
March 19,1995 
42 
51 
3 
DATES OF EVALUATION 
July 22, 1998 
August 4, 1998 
August 25,. 1998 
August 26, 1998 
October 26, 1998 
October 30,1998 
November 5, 1998 
November 19, 1998 
December 3,1998 
PRINCIPLES 
One hour 
One hour 
One hour 
One hour 
One hour 
One hour 
One hour 
One hour 
One hour 
Keith in Dr. Price's office 
Keith in Dr. Price's office 
Wendy in Dr. Price's office 
Keith, Anna Marie in Dr. Price's office 
Wendy and Anna Marie in Dr. Price's office 
Keith in Dr. Price's office 
Wendy and Anna Marie at home 
Keith in Dr. Price's office 
Keith and Anna Marie at home 
Wendy Lomsdal is a 42-year-old white, married female. She is living at 156 West 400 North, 
Logan, Utah. Wendy graduated in 1974 from high school in Beaverton, Oregon. She attended 
Portland Community College for two semesters. She has been married six different times and 
has seven children. She is working as a nurse's aid in a private home. She takes care of two 
ladies in their homes. She graduated in 1996 from a nurse's aid course at Bridgerland. Her 
children are Sonny Gray, 18, Star Ann Atwood, 14, Alberta Rose Jackson, 11, Sarah Elaine 
Jackson, age ten, Rachel Ann Jackson, age seven, David Michael Jackson, age five, and Anna 
Marie Carol Lomsdal, age three. 
Keith Wayne Cox is a 51-year-old white, married male. He lives at 619 East 400 North, Logan, 
Utah. Wendy states that he has moved again since the report was completed. He graduated in 
1966 from Ava High School, Ava, Missouri. He attended carpentry and home construction 
training. He married Martha Metcalf. There were six children bom to this marriage. He married 
Wendy Lomsdal on June 27, 1997. Keith reports thaLhgji^d with ^e£(^ijr<^ #^47^g^REGO!NG 
November 17, 1994, then again from Febmary ^f^^feT^^mber^s l^ j f iUE AND CORRECT COPY 
%- ' # , - r i> \ * t ^ OF THE ORIGINAL FILED IN FIRST 
JZtCiZtr. 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURTS. 
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Anna Marie is the three-year-old daughter of Keith Cox and Wendy Lomsdal. She lives with 
her mother at 156 West 400 North, Logan, Utah. She attends Sandra Hundley's daycare program 
from 7:15 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. five days a week. 
MAIN OBJECTIVE OF EVALUATION 
The main objective of this evaluation is to provide information to the court and develop a 
custody plan of maximum benefit to Anna Marie Carol Lomsdal. This will be done by 
identifying the strengths of each important adult in her life, and then creating an arrangement that 
will offer Anna Marie the widest possible exposure to these strengths. Another way of saying 
this is that the "best" arrangement is the arrangement that matches those things Anna Marie 
needs most with what each important person in her life has to offer her. A bit later we will 
explain in more detail what is meant by a parental or adult "strength". 
FACTORS LEADING UP TO THE CURRENT EVALUATON 
Wendy met Keith in Missouri. She was married to Michael Jackson at the time. Michael is the 
father of four of her seven children. At the time Wendy and Keith met they were married to 
different spouses. Shortly after they met, Keith moved in with Wendy and her husband, Michael 
Jackson, with Michael's permission. They lived together for eight months. Wendy reports that 
Michael was very depressed and mentally ill at the time. Keith reports that Wendy and Michael 
were not having sex, therefore, Michael gave Wendy to Keith. She was married to Michael 
Jackson when Anna was conceived and was still married to Michael when Anna was born. This 
is a rather strange situation. 
Wendy and Keith are both very angry with each other. Both individuals are strong willed and 
seem as though they are not willing to negotiate or compromise. Wendy apparently didn't want 
Keith in her life any more. She left Missouri without telling Keith. She moved to Cache Valley 
nine months after Anna was born. Wendy reports that Keith was trying to convince her that she 
had a mental illness and not able to take care of the children. Wendy reports that he has 
threatened her and would not allow her to get a Social Security number for Anna, or tell Family 
Services about Anna. She believes that Keith does not trust the government. Wendy is afraid 
that Keith will skip town with her daughter. She reports that she had a restraining order for Keith 
in Missouri. Since she has been in Utah she has had to get two restraining orders against Keith. 
Wendy and Keith made reconciliation while in Cache Valley. They were married on June 27, 
1997, and were then separated on November 17, 1997. Wendy reports that she got a restraining 
order after Keith became abusive to Rachael, one of her other daughters. Since their separation 
Wendy states that she has a difficult time keeping track of Keith. He has moved approximately 
four times. She has no idea where he lives at the present time. 
Keith went to court on April 4, 1998, to have regular visitation with Anna. There was a hearing 
in which Keith was granted visitation with Anna. Keith believes that Wendy has kept and still 
keeps Anna away from him and tries to deny him visitation. Keith also believes that Wendy is 
abusing Anna. In June, 1998, Wendy asked Keith to sign Anna over to another man. He refused 
and asked Wendy to have Anna's name changed to Cox. At the present time it is Anna Lomsdal. 
Keith and Wendy have a number of conflicts and involvement with the courts and police 
regarding visitation. This couple has a very difficult time communicatingZSTx^f W£ndyr£ FOREGOING 
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PREVAILING LIVING/CUSTODY ARRANGEMENTS 
Wendy has a protection order against Keith. She does not trust him with Anna. Wendy has 
temporary custody with Keith having the following visitation: Wednesday 5:30 p.m. to 8:30 p.m. 
and every other weekend from Friday 5:30 p.m. to Sunday at 8:30 p.m. Keith has alternating 
holiday visitation. 
CURRENT PREFERENCES OF ADULT PARTICIPANTS 
Wendy does not know if Anna is safe with Keith. She is afraid that Keith may hurt Anna or 
leave town. Wendy wants to protect Anna. She believes that Keith will spank and hit her like he 
has done with her other children. At times Wendy does not want Anna to have visitation with 
Keith but she realizes that he must have some visitation. She would like to be the custodial 
parent and for Keith to have the standard non-custodial visitation. 
Keith would like to have Anna Marie go with him on short visits. In July, Keith would like to 
take Anna with him to Missouri. He wants to be able to spend time with his daughter. He wants 
custody of Anna Marie and wants her to live with him. He is afraid that Wendy is physically 
abusing her. Keith wants to be able to have a relationship with his daughter without the 
interference that he has experienced in the past. Keith would like to be the custodial parent with 
Wendy having the standard non-custodial visitation. 
PURPOSES OF EVALUATION AND SOURCES OF INFORMATION 
A major purpose of this evaluation is to measure the impact each parent has on Anna Marie in a 
wide variety of situations - situations that are vital for a child's healthy psychological 
development. 
In all instances, Anna Marie was never asked direct guilt-inducing "choice" questions which pit 
one parent against the other. In fact, a child rarely understands at a conscious level the full 
implications of any particular test task. (Some are semi-obvious; others are not obvious at all). 
In this regard, keep in mind that children are "programmed" (or "bribed") verbally: "Remember, 
honey, if anyone asks, Daddy never picks you up on time," or "Your Mom does nothing but 
complain, she wrecks all our good times." By relying on nonverbal responses, as the tests do, the 
child is never forced to disobey a parental request, and loyalty conflicts are thereby eliminated or 
greatly reduced. 
The child's responses to the test items are mostly deep, unconscious, gut-level reactions. An 
unconscious response is based on thousands of observations and interactions filtered and 
"weighed" by each child's own unique set of needs, assets, and liabilities. In other words, when 
a child responds to a test item, that response is the result of countless interactions with the 
"measured" parent, weighed and filtered through the child's own unique personality system. 
This brings us to the complexity of custody decision making. 
In contradistinction to what one might think, the most critical data in custody decisions are not, 
strictly speaking, what a parent may do, but how a child reacts to what a parent does. 
Hence, the major thrust of an evaluation is n o t i o ^ ^ r ' 
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In this particular evaluation, which essentially involves two entire families, a variety of other 
techniques were used; in addition to those already mentioned. Each adult participant responded 
to all or most of the following: 
1. A specially designed Questionnaire for Custody Evaluations. 
2. An extensive Self-Report Data form designed to allow each participant to express many 
personal points of view systematically. 
3. Spontaneous and structured Family Interaction Data described more fully elsewhere in this 
report. 
4. The Parent Awareness Skills Survey (PASS) enables us to understand how each parent 
chooses to communicate with Anna Marie. It shows the degree to which a parent can 
identify the important issues involved in responding to a child in a variety of situations; the 
degree to which a parent chooses solutions adequate to help children with everyday crises; 
the attention paid to clear expression and the child's feelings; and a variety of other important 
issues which together determine how effectively a parent will convey his or her ideas to a 
child. 
5. A specially developed test that asks key participants detailed questions about Anna Marie's 
schedule. This test is useful not only in determining what these adults view as a child's 
"normal" day, but further, by comparing answers allows one to ascertain who in fact is really 
taking care of the child. This is especially helpful in situations like the present one, where it 
is alleged that one participant who is actively seeking more time with the child is not, in fact, 
the one who is spending much time with her. 
SELF-REPORT DATA AND INFORMATION FROM SELECTED DOCUMENTS 
Self report and questionnaire data summary 
The following ratings, 1 through 10, 10 being the highest and best score, summarizes the 
respondents' responses to the Child's Access to Parental Strength form, and the Self-Report Data 
form. 
This chart offers ratings in the following areas: 
Solution-oriented vs. Adversarial: the responses are screened for the degree to which the 
respondent has a solution-oriented outlook toward custody problems as opposed to an entrenched 
adversarial stance. The solution-oriented person puts the needs of the child first and further 
recognizes that the "other family" may have legitimate contributions to make toward the child's 
welfare as well as needs of their own. 
The second category is called Flexible vs. Closed-minded. This category measures the degree to 
which a person is creative and flexible as opposed to having a dogmatic, know it all attitude. 
The third category is called Honesty and it m^asttnesilhetiegree to which the respondent,offersor-,^,yi/K 
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The fourth category called Awareness of Child's Needs measures the degree to which the 
respondent is aware of a child's ever-changing developmental needs. 
The fifth category, Number of Constructive Ideas, is exceedingly important. It shows the amount 
of energy and thoughtflilness the respondent has given over the complex issues, which surrounds 
childcare in a tense and adversarial situation. 
The sixth category called Quality and Competency of Response, refers to the degree to which 
solutions offered are goal-directed. An example would be the degree to which discipline is used 
as a means of achieving specific goals. For example, better behavior, rather than simply a way of 
merely hurting or punishing a child. 
\ Category 
1 1. Solution-oriented vs. Adversarial 
1 2. Flexible vs. Closed-minded 
1 3. Honesty 
4. Awareness of Child's Needs 
5. Number (actual) of Constructive Ideas 
6. Quality of Competency of S»luti«ns 
Participants 
Keith 
2 
2 
1 
1 
10 
1 
Wendy 1 
4 
5 
5 
8 
25 
5 1 
Keith's performance on this part of the test shows his lack of parenting skills. Keith is very 
adversarial in his approach to his daughter. He wants to have custody and cut Anna away from 
her mother and siblings. He is very closed minded in his responses. He took every opportunity 
to look good and put Wendy in the role of the villain. He had only a minimal amount of 
constructive ideas and the quality of the solutions was rather poor and unworkable. 
Wendy wants Anna to have regular visitation with her father. Wendy knows how bonded Anna 
is with her brothers and sisters. She wants Anna to be with her family. She knows that Keith 
needs visitation but she believes that Keith sabotages her childcare arrangements and her other 
children. Wendy, answered in normal thought out responses without making herself look good. 
She was able to respond to the questionnaire in a forthright, knowledgeable manner. She is very 
aware of her daughter's needs and has some vital knowledge about her daughter. She had an 
adequate amount of constructive ideas; the quality and competency of the solutions were about 
average. 
FAMILY INTERACTION DATA 
Child development research has not shown that any particular parents behavior is absolutely 
necessary (or sufficient) to produce a mentally healthy child. However, the body of research as a 
whole, clinical experience and common sense do suggest that certain behaviors are highly 
desirable. This evaluation includes a careful consideration of these factors (i.e., patience, 
flexibility, a willingness to be communicative, etc.). 
Our interest is much more on the so-called interaction factor which states that what is important 
is not necessarily how a parent behaves tdw^fdQBhild, but rather how ^ xhildisabletto utilize^or.^ ^ ,i , ~ 
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For example, I am much less interested in whether a parent does things "by the book" than 
whether the parent chooses his or her words and actions in a way that is based on the child's 
ability to understand and profit from these words and actions. 
This means that I place high value on the parent who is a consistent and accurate listener to, and 
observer of, what is going on in the child. It is only with this information that a parent can 
choose what the best words and actions at any given moment happen to be. This underscores the 
fact that excellent observation and listening skills, coupled with a high degree of flexibility, are 
far more important tools for a parent to have than "book learning". 
The following observations and the results of these observations are expressed by rating the 
following categories: 
1. The parent's ability to meaningfully communicate a sense of warmth, love and acceptance. 
2. The parent's ability to communicate clearly. 
3. The parent's ability to teach and be a role model for competent problem solving. 
4. The extent to which the parent conveys a sense that he or she (the parent) understands (even 
though not necessarily agreeing with) the child's views and feelings. This ability to make a 
child feel listened-to and understood is a main ingredient of a child's growing sense of 
self-esteem. 
5. The extent to which a parent's responses are based on accurately perceived feedback from the 
child. 
6. The extent to which the parent accurately gauges a child's emergent needs. 
7. The extent to which the parental response engenders independence and a sense of 
self-sufficiency in the child. 
Summary of Family-Interaction Observations 
Category 
1 1. Communicates acceptance and love 
2. Communicates clearly 
3. Role-model for competence 
4. Understands child's position 
5. Accurate perception of feedback from child 
1 6. Gauges child's needs 
7. Engenders independence 
Participants 
Keith 
5 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Wendy 
6 
5 
5 
4 
4 
4 
4 1 
Keith and his daughter Anna were observed on August 26, 1998. She was excited to be with her 
father and play with him during the observation. Keith was able to play with her, to keep her 
attention, and to let her engage in the activities which she enjoyed doing. Anna was able to 
express her feelings towards her father. 
Wendy and Anna Marie were able to participate in the play activities. Anna felt very 
comfortable with her mother. There was a lot of hugging and time spent sharing ideas. Wendy 
was able to engage her in the various activiti^tKe^^^laying with. Wendy was able to get 
Anna Marie to give her feedback about the^ct^^ and datgfi^^,^rnpjd^e^gyp0Rp 
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PARENT AWARENESS SKILLS SURVEY (PASS) 
The Parent Awareness Skills Survey (PASS) yields scores that reflect the degree to which a 
parent is aware of certain important elements in interacting with children. The first has to do 
with a parent's ability to be aware of, to identify, so to speak, the critical issues involved in given 
situations. For example, a question asks about a 3-year-old who grabs toys away from an 
8-year-old. There are a variety of issues one could choose to address in this situation. One 
might, for example, simply hit the 3-year-old and yell at him not to grab the toy away. This may 
even be effective, at least in the short run, in stopping the 3-year-old from grabbing. However, 
the savvy parent is aware of several other critical issues in a situation like this. For example, that 
it is not all that unusual for 3 year olds to "grab". Secondly, there would be awareness that both 
children need help in coping with the described situation. This is what is meant by an awareness 
of critical issues involved. It is an awareness of just what it is that needs to be addressed in 
creating an optimum solution. Other areas measured by the PASS include the parent's awareness 
of a solution that is adequate to the situation. An awareness that it is important to communicate 
in words that are understandable to children, an awareness that one should address the child's 
emotional feelings which are aroused in the various situations, and an awareness that it is often 
important to take into consideration the child's past history. For example, suppose a parent 
notices that his or her child cannot take in too much information by the spoken word all at one 
time. A parent so noticing would give directions in short spurts rather than in long sentences. 
The final area measured by the PASS reflects the degree to which a parent pays attention to 
whether or not what he or she is doing is working. We call this an awareness of feedback data. 
This means that the parent fine-tunes his or her response as things go along, based on how the 
child is responding, and modifies what is being done so as to insure maximum effectiveness. 
Category 
1. Awareness of Critical Issues. 
J2. Awareness of Adequate Solution 
3. Awareness of Communicating in Understandable Terms 
4. Awareness of Child's Feelings 
5. Awareness of Child's Past History 
6. Awareness of Feedback Data 
Participants 
Keith 
2 
5 
3 
2 
4 
3 
Wendy j 
4 i 
5 
4 
4 
5 
4 1 
Keith has a very minimal amount of awareness of critical issues with the situations presented to 
him. He was able to come up with an average amount of solutions that would be considered 
adequate. He was aware of the need to communicate to the child in understandable terms. He 
could use some help in the areas of feelings, past history, and feedback data. Keith has some 
positive parenting skills. He could use some additional help through reading and additional 
instruction. 
Wendy has a better awareness of the critical issues when dealing with parenting issues. She 
seems to be able to come up with adequate solutions. She is aware of the need to communicate 
in understandable terms with the child. She knows the child's feelings, past history, and is aware 
of the need for feedback data. Wendy has adequ^e,£arenting skills .
 c _ O T j C V - u A j J ^ F FOREGOING 
,9 f ^ IS A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY 
t OF THE ORIGINAL FILED IN FIRST 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURTS. 
] DATE 9-t5~9f 
ILAA A SI 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Home Environment 
Betty M. Cadwell and Robert H. Bradley developed the home observation for Measurement of 
the Environment at the University of Arkansas in 1984 for the purpose of evaluating whether or 
not a child's environment is conducive to their optimal development. It consists of assessing 
environment characteristics in the child's home as well as interaction between the child and their 
caregiver. The version used for Anna was the Early Child Home Inventory. 
On November 5, 1998, at about 5:00 p.m. this evaluator visited Wendy's home. The home is 
located at 156 West 400 North, Logan, Utah. Five of Wendy's children were at the home. Anna 
was helping them color pictures with pencils and crayons. The children were friendly and 
excited to help answer the questions. Anna was very much a part of the situation. Her older 
brother David, age five, was pouting and had a difficult time saying much. Anna's three older 
sisters were laughing and seemed to enjoy what they were doing. They were able to show me the 
home and backyard. The home is a three-bedroom home with a full basement. Some of the 
children live in the basement bedroom. The home was cluttered and lived in, but basically it was 
clean and much like any home which has six children and a working mother with no father in the 
home. 
The home is determined to be in the lower fourth of homes evaluated. There were some learning 
materials available to the children. Anna's older siblings share some learning experiences when 
they do their school lessons. The physical environment could use some cleaning and more 
stimulation. Anna and the other children have responsibilities in the home. She is expected to 
pick up her bedroom area and dress herself. There are older siblings who are modeling a host of 
behaviors. The children have playground equipment and sufficient books and videos to provide 
stimulation. The home is probably the best Wendy can do with the amount of money coming 
into the home and the lack of time with her children. 
Keith's apartment was visited on December 3, 1998. He and Anna were there when I arrived at 
5:45 p.m. This is an apartment in a large apartment complex just below Utah State University. 
There is limited space in front of the apartment; there is no play area close by. This apartment 
was originally used for college students. The apartment has three rooms; kitchen-living room, 
bedroom, and bathroom. Keith had his bed, and Anna had her bed in the comer. She had several 
toys, however, she had no books. Anna was making some pictures and gluing them together. 
Keith had sufficient food, but the apartment had no artwork or refinement. It appears to be a 
place where Keith sleeps and cooks some meals, but he does not spend a lot of time there. This 
would not be a place where a child of three years of age should be raised. This is an apartment 
building with few other young children, with a lot of cars coming and going. This is not a place 
where Anna can grow up and be stimulated and develop her abilities. Wendy has recently told 
me that Keith has moved again. This evaluator has not visited Keith's new apartment. Keith has 
moved a significant amount of times since he has been in Utah. He does not seem to be able to 
settle in one place and stay. 
Denver Development 
Developmental Evaluation of Anna Lomsdal 
Anna Lomsdal was observed and 
Ericksen, RN, MS, LMFT, on December 
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Denver Developmental Screening Test 
The Denver Developmental Screening Test was originally developed in 1967 by William 
Frankenburg, M.D. and Josiah Dodds, Ph.D., at the University of Colorado Health Sciences 
Center in Denver to detect developmental delays in children from birth through six years of age. 
It is commonly used in areas such as determining readiness for kindergarten and for screening in 
Head Start programs. It is completed by testing the child on specific skills that most children at 
similar developmental stages can perform. The DDST screens children for delays in Personal-
Social, Fine Motor-Adaptive, Language, and Gross Motor areas of development. 
Anna was administered the most recent version of the DDST, the Denver II She was brought to 
the assessment by her mother, Wendy Lomsdal, who was present during thetesting and provided 
information for the parental-response questions. 
At the time Anna was tested, her age was 3 years and 8 3A months. 
Personal-Social: This area includes the ability to perform tasks involved with self-care, such as 
self-feeding and dressing. It also includes the ability to engage socially with others in social 
activities such as playing simple games with others. Anna did not show any developmental 
delays in this area. However, her mother stated they rarely play games at home because it is 
difficult to keep the pieces of the games together. She stated Anna enjoys doing puzzles; 
however, this type of an activity would not require the social interaction that a game would. 
Fine Motor-Adaptive: This portion of the test evaluates eye-hand coordination, manipulation of 
small objects, and problem solving ability. Anna did very well in this area and passes all tasks at 
her developmental level. She enjoyed drawing and eagerly engaged for this part of the testing. 
Language: This area includes the ability to communicate wants and needs to others in an 
understandable way. Although Anna was very shy and refused to talk at first, after being in the 
playroom for a while, she answered questions that did not seem intrusive to her. However, in 
asking her to define words, when she was asked, "What is a ball, etc.," she would not respond 
verbally. However, if I picked up a little toy girl that appeared to be about the same age as Anna, 
and asked her, "Does this little girl know what a ball is," she readily responded with the correct 
answer. Thus, although she would not respond personally, she would redirect correct answers 
"through" the doll. 
Gross Motor: This area includes the ability to use large muscles to participate in activities such 
as running, hopping, and throwing. Anna passes this area, also. However, as in the language 
area, she would only respond through the doll. She seemed to be very self-conscious doing 
anything that would call attention to herself, such as trying to stand on one foot, and not being 
able to do it. 
Conclusions: Anna passes all developmental levels appropriate for her age. However, given her 
experience in attending a day care and the usually egocentric type of thinking exhibited by 
children of this age, Anna was very cautious in her interactions and responses in a way 
characteristically unusual for a child of her age. Normally, children of this age are anxious to try 
new things and to show what they do know. Anna was overly cautious about engaging in 
activities other children her age would eas^:^g$|e-iiL.. After a warp^g^t^in^wfteT^ 
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Anna's mother, Wendy, was present during and after the administration of the test. She 
encouraged Anna to cooperate and was responsive to Anna's attempts to check with her prior to 
becoming involved in the testing. Indeed, Anna seemed to need to check with her mother prior 
to attempting any of the tasks or simply playing with the toys. Instead of getting down to Anna's 
level by sitting on the small chairs at the table or sitting on the floor, Wendy stated that her back 
bothers her "from having so many children" and that she had to sit on an adult-sized chair, which 
was provided for her. 
When Anna began to draw pictures, she asked her mother to draw first, and Wendy drew for her 
and she filled in the parts. At one point during the testing, when Anna was asked to copy a 
circle, she began drawing eyes and a mouth in the circle and proceeded to draw several lines 
protruding from the body. She also drew several lines around the square, calling it a "TV." 
When Wendy suggested Anna draw hair on her "person," she drew several lines protruding from 
the head of her figure. Whenever she attempted to draw a person, she would draw a line all the 
way around the body of the figure when it was completed. 
Once Anna felt more comfortable in the playroom and after her mother gave her a verbal 
approval to do so, she began playing with all of the toys that were available to her. She explored 
the toys in normal ways appropriate to her age level. By the end of the session, she was 
randomly taking toys off the shelf as well as out of the toy box and no longer looked at her 
mother for permission. Upon finishing the session, she appeared in a hurry to leave with her 
mother, and as her mother lingered to ask a few parenting questions, Anna seemed to be 
impatient to go, even with all of the stimulating toys in the room. At the beginning of the 
session, it seemed that Wendy was very much in control of Anna's actions. However, by the end 
of the session, it seemed the opposite-Anna seemed to be demanding of her mother's leaving 
with her and Wendy seemed to comply. 
Anna's behavior at the beginning of the session seemed to be of shyness as she was very 
reluctant to explore her environment. Once she was comfortable, she seemed to open up and 
display a normal curiosity level for a child her age. However, at times her play, even after it was 
offered to her. She also seemed to be over aware of all the aspects of the playroom, including the 
books high on the shelf and a small bag of items on a top shelf which most children her age 
would not have noticed. Upon displaying this type of behavior, Wendy stated that Anna seems 
to have become very fearful of being around adult males, although she didn't know why. She 
stated that at a local store a few days ago, Anna "cowered" away from Wendy's boyfriend upon 
seeing him while in the check-out line with her, although she seems to normally feel at ease 
around him. 
At other times, Anna seemed to totally ignore what was going on in the room, especially if she 
was asked to complete a task that seemed risky for her to do. She did not outright refuse to do 
the task as most children, but she appeared to totally ignore everyone else in the room and 
focused on another activity as if to "escape" trying the task at all if it seemed she might fail at it. 
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Overall, Anna seems to be a bright child, although shyness may affect her social interactions 
with others. However, she seemed to need her mother's permission to explore the environment 
more than most children at her age, seemed to be hypervigilant of her surroundings, and was able 
to "tune out" more than other children her age when situations seemed too risky for her to 
attempt without a fear of failure. Because of these types of behaviors, it seems that Anna's best 
interest would include a secure, structured environment with as little need for adaptation as 
possible. It may also be helpful for Anna to be seen by a play therapist that could evaluate her 
further and help her work through the reasons for the hypervigilant behaviors she seems to 
display. 
This concludes The Denver Development Screening Test by Susan Ericksen. 
Psychological reports 
Wendy Lomsdal had a psychological evaluation on May 6, 1992 by Kenneth R. MacDohald, 
Ph.D., clinical psychologist. This evaluation was done in Springfield, Missouri, during the time 
she and her boyfriend were accused of abusing Rachel Jackson. Findings: "She has a long 
history of maladaptive lifestyle, characterized by relationships that are over valued and then 
devalued. There appears to be strong feelings of alienation and isolation and a desperate fear of 
abandonment. Her lifestyle appears to be abandoning men before they abandon her. Wendy 
appears to be in need of outpatient treatment, although concerns must be noted about her 
motivation to engage in that process. This makes intervention very difficult. In any event, she 
does appear to desperately need parenting training so as to understand her attitude that can 
communicate a rejection of the child. The long-standing maladaptive lifestyle, with regard to 
interpersonal relationships, will be difficult to alter as her fear of abandonment dominates her 
functioning." 
Diagnosis: Axis I Deferred 
Axis II 301.90 Personality disorder NOS 
(Borderline, Narcissistic, dependent traits) 
Axis III None 
On August 19, 1992, Brian P. Cysewski, Ph.D., Clinical Psychologist, reviewed Dr. 
MacDonald's report and MMPI. He reports that "Dr. MacDonald was interpreting the results of 
the MMPI in an overly rigid and simplistic manner. He believes that Wendy's performance 
reflected her extremely naive ultra-religious and sometimes-atypical belief system." 
Alleged Incidents of Abuse 
December 18, 1991. There was a child abuse/neglect summary from Texas County Missouri 
regarding Wendy's other daughter Rachel Jackson, DOB 1-5-1991. She was a victim of physical 
abuse and was treated at St. John's Regional Health Center, Springfield, Missouri. Protective 
custody of Rachel Jackson was taken by Chief Juvenile Officer Russell Sheldon. Rachel's 
injuries were suspicious in nature and no one could realistically ensure her safety at that point in 
time. Wendy reports that her boyfriend was the individual who abused Rachel. Wendy has some 
responsibility due to the fact she was overwhelmed, frightened, and probably depressed. This 
incident was described as a very severe case of abuse. The social service worker believes that 
Butch Crandall may have done the actual abu^J>iri^endy's part in the abuse and/or knowledge^n\no 
that the abuse was occurring was evident. Smt^^Aimey Wendy ha? b e ^ w 6 r l ^ ^ ^ ^ E C T Cnpy 
protect her children. M^^X S/wp'omGKAL FILED IN FtRS" 
* /4P%Y ' ?u JcfAL OlSiaiOT COURTS. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
On January 15, 1997 there was a Report of Child Abuse and Neglect Report. Keith Cox called 
DCFS to report that he had some pictures showing the abuse of his child Anna Marie Lomsdal. 
Keith was asking to bring the pictures to the office of Family Services. He did not show up that 
day. He had brought the pictures in on January 17, 1997. DCFS investigated the incident the 
comments by DFS worker "Very loving mother". In the closure summary the worker found no 
bruises on the child, the house was clean and Anna well cared for. 
On March 8, 1998, in child abuse and neglect report revealed a nurse from the Logan Regional 
Hospital reported that Keith Cox had taken Anna Marie Lomsdal to the hospital emergency 
room. Keith was referred to the DCFS. He reported they would not listen to him because he has 
called them so many times with complaints. During the investigation of this incident the police 
officers went to the Cache County Jail to interview Keith Cox. He was placed in jail for 
violating a protective order. On March 12, 1998, the case was closed without merit. 
On June 4, 1998, the Logan City Police was dispatched to 156 West 400 North, Logan, Utah. 
Keith had called the police because he was having difficulty obtaining custody of Anna. Keith 
called the police to prevent trouble from occurring during the exchange. Keith arrived at the 
police department a short time later. He showed them a red mark above Anna's right eye. No 
action was taken. 
On September 24, 1998, Bill Bernard from the Guardian Ad Litem wanted to inspect Keith's 
residence as he had just moved. Keith was very uncooperative and wouldn't give Bill any 
information. Officer's viewed temper of Keith Cox and the situation as a whole. Police decided 
that this night was not a good night for visitation. 
Concerns 
Keith believes that Wendy is physically abusing Anna. He has colored photos allegedly showing 
that Anna was abused. He believes he has the proof but he believes that Family Services won't 
investigate the situations. Keith has not been successful in getting them to charge Wendy. This 
evaluator has no information from anyone else that Wendy is hurting Anna. This is not 
consistent with observed behavior and information received during this evaluation. 
Keith wants to be part of Anna's life and wants to parent her. He does not have an environment, 
which he can be a part of Anna's life at the present time. Keith has moved a significant number 
of times since he and Wendy have separated. He has not provided a stable home life. 
Wendy and Keith have a great deal of anger and hostility between themselves. They do not 
know how to effectively communicate about co-parenting issues. This couple needs help to 
separate and to continue to be positive around Anna. 
Keith has given this evaluator a pile of letters that Wendy has written to him. He states she is 
mentally incompetent. Wendy is oriented to person, place, and time. If she has some different 
and strange beliefs, so be it. Both individuals have been involved in several strange situations 
before, during, and after their marriage. Having one parent accusing the other of inappropriate 
behavior only confuses the issue. Both parents have exhibited some rather strange behavior, i.e., 
moving in with each other when they were both married in the beginning of their relationship. 
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Keith believes that he can care for Anna, yet he lacks the skills, the stability and the resource M 
care for Anna Keith does not understand that Anna is part of a family w i t h e r s S d S T 
Keith loves his daughter and would benefit from getting" ^ t t o o S S ^ ^ "' 
emotiona problems, at the present time, interfere with her p a r e n t i n g t e ^ t e Z DCFT^ * 
been involved in her home and have talked with her. If they thought A n * W £ a t nsk toev 
would have continued to monitor her home and Anna y 
RULE 4-903 
D. 
u Child's preference. As a child of three years of age, she is really too young to state a 
preference. See the Denver Development Evaluation. S 
' ? * b ^ Anna Marie has six other siblings. At the present 
time she is living with five of them. She is very close and wants to be wim thVm SheTs 
bonded to them and is upset andJiusirated when she has to leave home to beWh S h 
fheeranthW T ^ " ? ^  ^ ^ *™ "* s e e m s t o « * * * * visits She bonded to her other siblings and wants to be with them. oneisoonded 
S h e h f , ^ Chi ld, 'nb°,nd W l t h b ° t h P a r e n t s- S h e v i e w s h e r h o m e ^ being with her mother 
The general interest in continuing previously determined custody arrangements where the 
^K^Z^f tUStCd\TbiSlS m e X t r e m d y * * » * £ « * c S s S T t i o n 
rlvW v ^ T1US 6 V a I U a t 0 r h a S a h o s t o f material, which states that Wendy £ 
having visions or communications with God. Keith believes that she is mentXvfflKritfi 
knew about Wendy's visions and religious beliefs whenhe moved in X h e r and" er 
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E. Factors relating to the parents character or status, or their capacity or willingness to function 
as parents, including: 
i. Moral character and emotional stability. There are major concerns about both 
individuals regarding their moral character and emotional stability. Keith has a 
number of letters trying to state that Wendy is mentally ill and emotionally unstabie 
to care for her children. However, this relationship has gone on for the past four or 
five years. Keith is able to work and support himself. Wendy also is able to work 
and support herself and her children. This evaluator considered getting a 
psychological evaluation on both parents. This was rejected because of the cost, plus 
the information would not help the court determine what was in Anna's best interest. 
Both Wendy and Keith knew about the different behaviors that each of them have 
exhibited, they have both chosen to lived together and then marry. Now Keith is 
trying to.saysheis.m^ntally ill. He has known about Wendy's behavior since the 
beginning. This evaluator believes that Keith is trying to use Wendy's behavior to his 
advantage. This couple will continue their relationship in the future. Keith is 
believed to be posturing to look good for this evaluation. Granted, he wants access to 
his child, but he has been with Wendy for a long time, and why is he now stating that 
she is mentally ill? 
ii. Duration and depth of desire for custody. Wendy is the parent who has raised Anna 
and has the experience to care for all of her children. She has a home at 156 West 
400 North, Logan, Utah. She has been the parent who has spent the most time with 
Anna. Wendy and Anna have a positive bond. Anna enjoys living with her and her 
other siblings. Keith could have a positive influence in Anna's life if he would not 
accuse Wendy of child abuse. Keith loves his daughter and wants to spend time with 
her. They spend considerable time in supermarkets, or in the Cache Valley Mall. 
Keith could use some information to increase his parenting skills. 
Hi. Ability to provide personal rather than surrogate care. Both parents work, and, 
^gzzzzz^ therefore, Anna must go to a daycare center. Wendy does not want Keith to be 
Y
 t o ^ . around the daycare provider because she is concerned about the conflict that Keith 
^•'
alfi^^J\"Xv^: W 1 ^ c a u s e anc* she is afraid she will lose her provider. Keith has never provided care 
* * ^ ' - ~r — \i* > for Anna on a regular basis for any extended period of time. 
iv. Significant impairment of ability to function as a parent through drug abuse, 
excessive drinking, or other causes. Both parents deny the use and abuse of alcohol, 
and drugs. 
Q c o a: "~v" R e a s o n s f° r having relinquished custody in the past. This is a divorce action. The 
^j a "" > £J court can use this information to help determine what is in Anna's best interest. 
m H ^ m 
y> m — ZJ. 
Ig, r-
 Q c "^i- Religious compatibility with the child. Wendy is a member of the Church of Jesus 
" """
 m
 Christ of Latter Day Saints. She attends church on a regular basis. Keith does not 
o 55 ro 
W Q > 5 p\ r! ~ k > want to make his religious affliction known. 
^ T j O
 f^ vii. Kinship. Keith and Wendy do not have any extended family in the Cache Valley 
2 m 5 -n area. 
S o m o 
a? _ o JJ H Z 
<p - ~* (-yiii, Financial conditions. Wendy makes $7.75 per hour as a health care worker with two 
5J 6 :2 elderly ladies. Keith has worked at ICON for last year. He is making $7.50 per hour. 
in T j 
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SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This couple has a host of unresolved issues. They both can point out the wrongs the other has 
done or is doing. There are some concerns about the stability of both parents. Both have real 
issues, past and present. Both parents should work on developing stable, healthy, behavior 
patterns. Wendy has a series of marriages; six, which have all failed. Keith has had two 
marriages fail. Both parents have behaviors that are self-defeating. 
Both parents should have therapy on a regular consistent basis. Therapy may help them deal 
with their self-defeating behaviors. They also need help with parenting Anna. Usually a 
recommendation of time spent with a therapist to help them co-parent would be recommended. 
There is far too much blaming and shaming happening with the parents to even be in the same 
room. At the present time, both parents need to begin taking parenting classes, either at DFS or 
at an educational institution in the Cache Valley area. 
Wendy should be the custodial parent for the following reasons, she has a past history of 
successfully raising and caring for Anna. Anna can be with her siblings and continue that 
relationship. Keith's apartment and lifestyle is not consistent in raising a three-year-old girl. 
Wendy has a home and the environment that can give Anna a chance for positive growth and 
development. 
Keith should be allowed to have regular visitation with Anna. He should not deal with the 
daycare provider. He should not go into Wendy's home or call unless he has made previous 
arrangements with Wendy. He should have the following visitation: 
Reasonable Visitation should be defined as the parents may agree. If they are not able to agree, 
the definition for school-age children (beginning kindergarten) will be as follows: 
Midweek: 
Alternate Weekends: 
One weekday evening specified from 5:30 - 8:30 p.m. to be 
specified by the non-custodigl parent or court. 
Friday 6:00 pirn, to Sunday 7:00 p.m. 
HOLIDAYS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER THE WEEKEND VISITATON AND 
THE ALTERNATING WEEKEND SCHEDULE DOES NOT CHANGE. 
Holiday Visitation: 6:00 p.m. day before the holiday to 7:00 p.m. of the holiday 
unless otherwise specified. 
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ODD NUMBERED YEARS EVEN NUMBERED YEARS 
Human Rights Day 
Easter from Friday 6:00 p.m. to 
Sunday 7:00 p.m. 
Memorial Day Friday 6:00 p.m. to 
Monday 7:00 p.m. 
July 24* to 11:00 p.m. 
Veteran's Day 
Day before or after Child's Birthday 
3:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. 
First half of Christmas vacation, including 
Christmas Eve and Christmas Day 
To 1:00 p.m. 
New Year's Day 
President's Day 
July 4th to 11:00 p.m. 
Labor Day from Friday 6:00 p.m. to 
Monday 7:00 p.m. 
Columbus Day 
UEA weekend from Wednesday 6:00 
p.m. to Sunday 7:00 p.m. 
Child's Actual Birthday to 9:00 p.m. 
Thanksgiving day from Wednesday 
7:00 p.m. to Sunday 7:00p.m. 
Second half of Christmas vacation 
Beginning 1:00 p.m. 
Christmas Day 
Father's Day: 
Mother's Day: 
With Father 9:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. 
With Mother 9:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. 
Summer Vacation: Keith should have a total of two weeks summer visitation. 
One of these weeks should be taken in July and one in August. He should notify Wendy 30 days 
in advance of the dates of summer visitation. 
Telephone: 
two times per week. 
Brief phone contact with the non-custodial parent at least 
Family Functions: Special consideration shall be given by each parent to make 
the child available to attend family functions including funerals, weddings, family reunions, 
religious holidays, important ceremonies, and other significant events in the life of the child or in 
the life of either parent which may inadvertently conflict with the visitation schedule. 
Pickup/Return: The non-custodial parent shall pick up the child at the times 
specified and return the child and the time specified. 
Special Events: The custodial parent shall notify the non-custodial parent 
within 24 hours of receiving notice of all significant, social, sports and community functions in 
which the child is participating or being honored, and the non-custodial parent shall be entitled to 
attend and participate fully. 
Records/Reports: The non-custodial parent shall have access directly to all 
school reports including preschool and day care reports and medical reports and shall be notified 
immediately by the custodial parent in the event of a medical emergency. 
Change of Address: Each parent .shall provide the other with his current address 
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Child Care: Parental care shall be presumed to be better care for the 
child than surrogate care and the court shall encourage the parties to cooperate in allowing the 
non-custodial parent, if willing and able, to provide child care. 
Religious Holidays: Each parent shall be entitled to an equal division of major 
religious holidays celebrated by the parents, and the parent who celebrates a religious holiday 
that the other parent does not celebrate shall have the right to be together with the child on the 
religious holiday. 
HELPING CHILDREN COPE WITH DIVORCE 
It is widely accepted that children of divorce suffer a number of painful emotional reactions and 
sometimes exhibit behavioral disturbance. However, a number of techniques can be used by 
divorcing parents to reduce the harmful effects on children. The most important factor, of all is 
development of a cooperative co-parenting relationship during the divorce and afterwards. 
Children usually adjust best after a divorce when they have frequent access without conflict to 
both their mother and father. 
The following five factors have been found to contribute to children's adjustment after divorce. 
1. Frequent contact with the non-custodial parent (unless there is a lot of child-centered conflict, 
or the non-custodial parent has such severe psychological maladjustment that he or she 
cannot be supportive of the child, given the involvement of the other parent). 
2. An absence of hostile comments about the other parent. This produces good co-parenting 
cooperation and support. 
3. A consistent, safe structured and predictable home environment without parenting 
disruptions. 
4. Good healthy, caring and conflict-free relationships between the child and both parents. 
5. Healthy emotional well being of the custodial parent. 
In order to improve the child's adjustment after the divorce, there should be a focus on the 
child's coping skills. In addition, parents should focus on improving each child-parent 
relationship. They should also focus on improving their own parenting skills and their 
cooperation with each other. Sometimes group treatment in the school or elsewhere can help 
children talk about their feelings after a divorce. It helps them to talk with their siblings, with 
their parents, with friends, or with a therapist. 
After a divorce, parents need to be good listeners to their children. This helps the child cope with 
emotionally charged subjects. Do not share the details of marital infidelity or sexual deprivation 
with the children. Do not tell them what you do not like about your spouse. Explain firmly to 
the children that they can not rescue or restore the marriage. Make sure they realize that the 
divorce is not their fault. Explain your reluctance to divorce. Explain how the children have 
been a great pleasure in the marriage. Let them know what changes to expect. Make sure they 
realize they will have continuing contact with both parents. 
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In the first two years after a divorce, children especially need the following four types of 
assistance: 
1. Additional emotional support. 
2. Protection from ongoing hostilities between the parents. 
3. A structured home environment with a predictable daily routine. 
4. A communication link with each parent. 
Most children clearly need both a mother and a father after divorce. Therefore, each parent must 
accept the ex-spouse in spite of personal hurt and anger. 
Of all the factors surrounding divorce that can be harmful to a child emotionally, the most 
destructive is post-divorce conflict between parents. In many cases, there is ongoing litigation 
between the parents in which each one wants to hurt the other financially and emotionally. The 
children are at great risk for getting caught up in a battle of this type. Often they are used as 
pawns in the battle. Sometimes the parents hate each other so much that they even want to kill 
each other. Physical fighting is common. Sometimes they are angry about infidelity or jealousy. 
A frequent outcome of conflict is that the father resents the support payments and eventually 
stops making them. At the same time, the mother resents the father's continuing contact with the 
children and subtly discourages that. As a result, the children lose both the financial and 
emotional support of the non-custodial father in many cases. 
Children must see themselves as made from both their mothers and their fathers. It is important 
that they can see the good qualities in both of their parents. They must view each the 
non-custodial parent as worthy because they unconsciously know they are somehow like that 
person. If they hear one parent criticized by the other, they feel personally put down. They 
might think that they would turn out like that too. This can cause the development of low self-
esteem. 
Children typically want to think that both parents can be there for them at a wedding, at a 
graduation, and other important times. They might need both parents, especially when they get 
ill or get into financial difficulty. If the conflict between parents is too great, then this source of 
support is lost for the child. 
In many cases, divorce does not end marital conflict. Sometimes the parents are so preoccupied 
with their own emotional pain that they cannot see their children's needs. This becomes an 
especially great problem when there is an ongoing custody battle between the parents. The child 
loves both parents, but they get used as a spy or informant. They also suffer when they hear 
criticism of the other parent. The result can be a feeling of sadness or worry about the parent or a 
feeling of emotional isolation. Children are desperately trying to cope with their fantasies and 
their terror. During the custody conflict, they may develop anxiety disorders and many 
symptoms of depression. Sometimes it seems that the parent is more dependent on the child. 
The child feels compelled to prevent psychological deterioration of the parent. 
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The financial problems thIKre always present with a divorce get much worse when there is a 
post-divorce legal conflict. In these cases, there is poor cooperation and increased legal fees. 
The children suffer emotionally from this, and may exhibit aggressive behavior or withdrawn 
behavior. When it's time for a weekend visit, one parent may say, 1. The children do not want to 
visit their mother or father. I cannot make them visit. 2. Of course, parents can make their 
children go to school, and in most cases they could also enforce the visitation requirements. 
Children may actually be afraid such a parent will feel hurt if they admit that they want to take 
their visits with the other parent. In these cases, the parent may subtly discourage the visit either 
by being late or not showing up at all, by changing plans at the last minute, or by suggesting 
attractive alternative activities for the child. He or she might plan to take them to a movie or a 
circus on the day when the visit with the other parent was supposed to occur. At the same time, a 
parent may get messages from a new wife, husband, or friend that he or she resents the time or 
money spent on children from a prior marriage. All of this can contribute to reduced contact 
between children and a parent. 
As the children get older, they may want to change their visitation plans to accommodate their 
own social life. The parents must be mature enough to adjust to that need without taking it as a 
personal rejection. 
The best relationship that former spouses can maintain is the cooperative, co-parenting 
relationship. If they can agree on issues surrounding child rearing, then the children will adjust 
much better. 
When the relationship between the parents is good enough that they can agree on joint custody, 
both parents on average are more satisfied. There is a lower rate of going back to court. 
The attitude that co-parents must take is one in which they are reasonable and forgiving. They 
have to maintain a sense of decency. They must not grab at the easiest weapon they can find to 
hurt their ex-spouse because that would often be the children. 
In order to make cooperative co-parenting work, each parent must repeatedly tell himself or 
herself, 1. This is another adult who loves my child. It's good for my children to have more 
adults love him or her. 2. This method can be used to help the custodial parent recognize the 
value of visits with grandparents, aunts, uncles, cousins and other people. If the parent truly 
loves the child, they can put the needs of the child first, making an effort to stay on good terms 
with ex-in-laws. 
The parents need to separate their own lingering hostility towards the ex-spouse from the child's 
need for a continuing relationship with the other parent and with grandparents. It's also 
important for the grandparents to remember not to take sides against their former son-in-law or 
daughter-in-law. 
When they get along well enough to live nearby each other and cooperate with baby-sitting and 
child care for each other, the parents help their children adjust much better. This reduces the 
child care expense and increases contact with loving family members. Often the two parents 
have different work schedules, which allows them to share childcare responsibilities. Each 
parent must remind himself or herself, 1. This is my child. I love my child. My child needs two 
parents. There is something good about my child's other parent. It's okay for my child to 
remain close to the other parent. 2. These kinds of self-statements help each parent better 
tolerate the continued contact the child has with the other parent. 
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'In some cases, divorced couples require counseling or mediation to help them cooperate in child 
rearing. This can also help control or reduce their anger, hostility, and rage. 
Children generally adjust best after a divorce when they live in the same house and attend the 
same school as they did before the divorce. They adjust best when they learn from both parents 
in advance about the divorce. They must be told by both parents, 1.1 love you. 2. They must 
have continuing contact with as many supportive relatives as possible. They must not be used as 
spies or for revenge. 
In order to establish cooperative co-parenting, each parent must realize that it's understandable 
after the pain of the divorce that they experience tension and conflict between them. However, 
the child has important needs so the parents must set aside their differences. They must bring 
their problem-solving skills to bear on helping their child with the emotional and behavioral 
difficulties that often occur for all children, and especially for children of divorce. They must 
focus on the child's needs first. That is possible and very helpful. 
Parents can learn the skills that will improve their children's adjustment. These include 
consistency, emotional stability, problem-solving skills, appropriate limit setting, and open 
communication skills. 
Teenagers are found to adjust much better when there is social support from friends, relatives, 
and sometimes a therapist. Parents have to find ways to reduce the shock and stress of divorce 
on the children. They can do this by reducing the life changes that the children must go through. 
Whenever possible, maintain family routines, family rituals, and activities. 
After a divorce, typically one or both parents will re-marry. The addition of a stepfather helps 
boys more than it does girls. Everyone in the family must go through adjustments to new 
stepparents. The adjustment to re-marriage of parents is much more difficult when there is 
ongoing hostility between the parents. 
Respectfully submitted, 
T. Brent Price, Ph.D., 
Clinical Social Worker 
April 15,1999 
Some of the information has changed. Anna is now four years of age and Keith's address has 
changed. Usually I will not do a custody evaluation until it is completely paid in advance. The 
homestudy was completed in February, 1999, but not paid for completely until April 19, 1999. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
EXHIBIT 1(E) 
« 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
KEITH COX 
619E400N 
Logan, Utah 84321 
(435)753-8697 (message phone) 
Prose 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Wendy A. Lomsdal, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
Keith Cox, 
Respondent 
MOTION OF JUDICIAL NOTICE OF 
AD JUDICATIVE FACTS 
Civil No. 974100564DA 
Now comes Keith Cox, defendant, to present the following adjudicative facts as 
Attachments (A through Z and AA), which are not in reasonable dispute. Below provides 
short comment to each Attachment. 
A. Order of the State of Washington of September 18, 1990 for Star Atwood, child of 
Wendy Lomsdal. See Page 2, Section 2.2 and all Page 3 requiring Wendy Lomsdal to 
pay child support and voluntary relinquishing custody of Star Atwood. Bears on CJA 
Rule 4-903 (E) (v). 
B. Investigative Summary Assist to Texas County of December 12, 1991 (9 pages). A 
Request for Detention by Juvenile Officer Russell L. Shelden of January 5, 1991 (1 
page). Order of Disposition of April 16, 1992 in the interest of Rachel Jackson (2 
pages). Order Terminating Jurisdiction of June 4, 1993. This material goes to the 
issue of CJA Rule 4-903 (E) (v) and/or (ix). Interestingly enough, Dr. Price does not 
address the problem of abuse in his Custody Evaluation under his heading, Rule 4-
9 0 3
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C. Hospital report of March 31, 1996. Wendy stating bruise on eye of Anna Marie 
resulted from running into edge of door. 
D. Letter of April 3, 1996 to Judge Clint Judkins of First Judicial District Court Cache 
County, State of Utah containing: writing found in trash stating that the Defendant, 
Keith Cox, is "the sacrifice" and other evidence of Wendy Lomsdal lying to the Court 
by claiming a car that is not hers. 
E. Ex parte protective order of March JJ__, 1996 stating that petitioner does not want any 
child visitation of Keith Cox with Anna Marie supervised or otherwise. Petitioner 
claims in court appearance of April 4, 1996 that Respondent repeatedly hit Petitioner. 
In her ex parte order Petitioner said Respondent hit Petitioner once. Showing 
inconsistent in her complaints. 
F. Power of Attorney by Wendy Lomsdal stating that in case of her death or incapacity, 
Eugene Perkins, a boyfriend, should become guardian of her children. This excludes 
wishes of grandparents, uncle (her brother), fathers of children, and former friends of 
Wendy. Also, letter from Michael Jackson filed with the court March 19, 1996 
stating "I just wish we, you and I, could be on friendly terms for the children's sake." 
(Page 3, Paragraph 2) 
G. Note from Wendy Lomsdal to Respondent demonstrating her strange writings in her 
own hand. 
H. Picture date October 2, 1996 received with Christmas card of December 1996 from 
Jack and Willia Carling. Picture has bruise on back of Anna Marie's leg and 
forehead. 
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L Stipulation filed by Wendy Lomsdal on January 21,1997 for split physical custody 
after the age of 4 1/2 years. Also amended Judgement from State of Missouri of 
October 23, 1996. She freely agreed with the custody agreement. The defendant 
being the author of the agreement. Her attorney reworded the final agreement. 
J. Ex parte protective order of November 7, 1997 stating that petitioner does not want 
social services investigation into her allegations within the order. 
K. Affidavit of impecuniousity of Wendy Lomsdal of December 1, 1997. Bank records 
of Lewiston State Bank: withdrawal slip for account 1042197. Withdrawal of 
$4025.66 from account 1042197 on November 18, 1997. 
L. Police Report of December 28, 1997 showing attempt of Petitioner to deny 
Respondent visitation. 
M. February 15, 1998 denial of Motion for supervised visitation. Standard visitation 
order is approved. Court orders mutual restraining order no derogatory remarks are to 
be made in the presence of the child. 
N. Handout of Dr. Steven D. Schneider, M.D., given to Defendant at curbside by 
Petitioner. 
O. Hospital report of March 8, 1998 with photographs of bruising of Anna Marie 
Lomsdal. Hospital report of March 23, 1998. 
P. Warrantless arrest probable cause statement dated March 10, 1998. Statement to 
Logan Police Department of Petitioner. Findings in order Precipe: An order for 
dismissal, Criminal 981100153 data April 20, 1998. Dismissed without prejudice in 
the interest of justice. This arrest was due to the defendant making payment of child 
support at Petitioner's work place. 
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Q. Hearing of May 7, 1998 appointing Guardian Ad Litem. 
R. Letter of Guardian Ad Litem, Dianne Balmain of May 13, 1998, which confers no 
power to deny visitation. 
S. Affidavit of Wendy A. Cox on May 26, 1998 stating that defendant, Keith Cox, lied 
about where he lived. Hearing of June 11, 1998 on Motion and Order to Show Cause 
why defendant should be held in contempt of court. Petitioner did not appear. 
T. Picture of Anna Lomsdal taken on August 15, 1998 with bruise on her mid-back. 
Police report was made. Picture of Anna Lomsdal taken on August 26,1998 with 
bruise on her head and middle of lower back. 
U. Refused certified letter, Z 157458409 postage dated September 5, 1998, with 
Respondent's address inside and outside. Wendy Lomsdal refused delivery on 8th. 
Bill Bernard denied defendant on the 9th and 11th because he had not received 
respondent's new address. He could have asked the petitioner for the address. This 
goes to custodial interference. Note of Sonny Gray gave to defendant denying 
visitation Labor Day Weekend. 
V. Hearing of September 24, 1998 stating that allegations of abuse have been 
investigated. Letter from Paul Schaaf data September 22, 1998 stating that the 
allegations of abuse were not investigated. 
W. Notice of change of address of December 1998. 
X. Letter to Dianne Balmain, Guardian Ad Litem, from Wendy Lomsdal stating that 
Anna Marie "has become very rebellious." 
Y. Series of pictures late August and early September 1999 of bruises on the back of 
Anna Marie. They are self-explanatory, ft )§0 &T fipwl <&$$fj 
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Z. Copy of Illustration 7-6 entitled Location of Injuries (source: St. Louis Police Dept.) 
from "Recognizing Child Abuse--A Guide for The Concerned" by Douglas J. 
Besharov. 
AA. Telephone page showing address of defendant at 619 East 400 North, Logan, 
Utah. 
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Rhonda Ledbetter, Social Service Worker II 
Texas County Office 
Missouri Division of Family Services 
P. 0. Box 190 
Houston, MO 65483 
Mary Taft, Social Service Worker II 
Joan Wagner, Social Service Supervisee I 
Greene County Family Services 
101 Park Central Square 
Springfield, MO 65806 
12-20-91 
INVESTIGATIVE SUMMARY 
ASSIST TO TEXAS COUNTY 
REASON FOR REFERRAL: 
On 12-18-91, Texas County Family Services contacted this office requesting an assist 
to see Rachel and interview her mother, who was to be at St. John's Regional 
Health Medical Center. Texas County received a CA/N referral from a mandated 
reporter stating that Wendy Lomsdal and unknown male took Rachel to the 
emergency room at Texas County Hospital this morning. Rachel had a closed head 
injury. There is significant bruising to the right side of Rachel's head. 
Wendy Lomsdal and unknown male said that three days ago Rachel fell out of a 
rocking chair. Wendy Lomsdal and unknown male said Rachel had bruising and 
swelling then but it got better and they didn't get medical care. This morning 
about breakfast time Rachel stopped breathing, started gasping and vomiting. 
Unknown male did CPR on Rachel. Rachel was taken to ER. Rachel has bruising on 
left arm, left leg, and right side of head. Rachel has decreased use of left 
arm and left leg. Medical personnel said bruises on head are larger than story 
would indicate and look older than three days and not consistent with story. 
INVESTIGATION: 
On 12-18-91, this worker contacted Sheila Dullum, Social Worker at St. John's 
Hospital. Mrs. Dullum explained that the mother has been repeatedly stating, 
"Please don't let thepi take my baby." The mother has also commented that over 
the past few months; Rachel has had bruises and she wondered how they got there. 
The mother also has asked the hospital if the baby would be ready to go today. 
The hospital is fearing that the mother may wish to take the baby out AMA. 
This worker was then transferred to Barbara Rainey, who is the nurse assigned to 
Rachel's care. Ms. Rainey stated that Rachel has many injuries. These include 
a right subdural hematoma, which is one-to-five days old; a right black eye, 
which is now green; the black eye would be three-to-five days old. She has 
bruises on her chest, which are three-to-four days old. She has bruises on both 
hands, that probably occurred last night. Rachel also has a fractured right 
forearm, and probably a left fractured tibia, which is two-to-three weeks old. 
This worker contacted Rhonda Ledbetter, Texas County DFS, and arrangements were 
made for Texas County Sheriff to contact Greene County Sheriff, to assist in a joint 
investigation. 
RE: Child 
Rachel Jackson 
DOB 1-5-91 
. " *C£ / / 
'<-'--
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On 12-18-91, at approximately 4:30 p.m., this worker met Greene County Deputy 
John Matney at St. John's. When Officer Matney and this worker arrived at 
the Pediatric Intensive Care Unit, Wendy Lomsdal and Butch Crandall were 
hovering over the child1s bed. This worker explained that a child abuse/neglect 
referral had been received. 
Ms. Rainey explained to Officer Matney, the mother and this worker the extent of 
Rachel's injuries. In addition to those mentioned in the previous phone 
conversation, she stated that Rachel.had two bruises on her bottom, a bruise on 
her left thigh, a bruise behind her ear, and a bloody-scabbed area under her 
nose. It was also explained that the right wrist has two bones that are broken 
and that Rachel has. lost ..three, pounds in three weeks. 
There was much verbal commotion in the room at the time. The nursing staff 
located an empty patient's room where the interviews could be held. Due to the 
continued highly emotional state of Ms. Lomsdal, Officer Matney disappeared with 
Butch Crandall. 
This worker spoke privately with Wendy Lomsdal, from approximately 5:00 p.m. to 
6:40 p.m. Ms. Lomsdal explained that she is divorced from Michael Jackson, but 
her name has not officially been changed. Ms. Lomsdal explained that she is 
using the name of Lomsdal, it is her maiden name and all of her identification 
is in this name. 
Initially, Ms. Lomsdal did not want to tell this worker much information. 
Periodically, this recurred by Ms. Lomsdal's making statements such as "I'm not 
going to tell you11, and "Why do you have to know?" 
This worker asked Ms. Lomsdal how many times she has been married. Ms. Lomsdal 
Was very reluctant to tell this worker. Ms. Lomsdal stated that she had been 
married several times, two of which occurred while she was a member of the 
Scientology Church. She explained that the marriages were not legal. Ms. 
Lomsdal stated that she was a member of this church for six years. She 
explained that she was lucky to get out and that she does have problems trusting 
people, due to these experiences. 
Ms. Lomsdal's oldest child is Sonny Gray, DOB 10-25-79. Sonny's father is Jimmy 
Gray, has lived in Flat River, Missouri, since 9-91. Sonny has maintained 
regular visitation with his father and is with his father at this time. Ms. 
Lomsdal showed this worker a Social Security letter where she receives $434 per 
month effective 1-91,. from his father's Disability from a car accident. 
Ms. Lomsdal was married to Brad Atwood for two years. Their daughter, Starr 
Ann, was born on 3-6-84. Mr. Atwood has had custody of Starr for the past two 
to three years. Ms. Lomsdal showed this worker a court order child support 
paper from Clark County stating that she is to pay $25 per month child support 
to the Child Support Enforcement Office in Olympia, Washington. 
This worker mentioned Ms. Lomsdal's mother, and Ms. Lomsdal became upset. She 
did not want this worker to contact her or to let her know anything about this 
present situation. Ms. Lomsdal explained that her mother is alcoholic and had 
schemed with her ex-husband for him to get custody of Starr Ann. Ms. Lomsdal 
explained that Brad Atwood was a drug dealer, but now he's a volunteer director 
of a food pantry. He has remarried and has one child. The family lives in 
Kings City, Oregon. 
Ms. Lomsdal further explained that when she was pregnant with Sariah, that she 
talked to Starr, and found that Social Services had conducted an investigation Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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but it was a false report of sexual abuse. (Later in the interview Ms. Lomsdal 
told this worker that Brad Atwood had sexually abused Sonny, six to seven years 
ago.) 
Ms. Lomsdal was married to Michael Jackson for five years and nine months. The 
marriage occurred in Washington. Their daughters, Sariah and Alberta "Rose11 
Jackson, were born in Amboy, Washington. Her daughter, Rachel, was born in 
Plato, Missouri, at home during an ice storm. Ms. Lomsdal had been planning the 
birth with the assistance of the mid-wife; the mid-wife was unable to come 
during the ice storm but made it there two days later to check out the baby. 
Ms. Lomsdal stated the divorce took place in Ozark County, on 10-5-90, as shown 
in the divorce papers, which this worker saw. Ms. Lomsdal stated that she has 
actually been separated from Michael Jackson for the past k\ months. She stated 
that he had been ill with a covecandida. Ms. Lomsdal stated this was a self 
diagnosis as he had not been to a doctor. She explained that he had severe 
allergic reactions, and depression stems from this disease. 
Ms. Lomsdal stated that the family came to Missouri by way of Texas. They 
initially stayed with a Cox family, in Mansfield; then they stayed with other 
friends when she got pregnant. She had then moved to Plato, Missouri, off of 
Farm Road 58-80. Ms. Lomsdal showed this worker her electrical service 
application dated 9-20-90. 
Ms. Lomsdal stated that they went to Washington in 6-91, to visit and fix up a 
truck. She ended up getting stranded there. Ms. Lomsdal stated that they 
(which include Ms. Lomsdal, Michael Jackson, and the three girls) stayed at his 
parents1 home for two months. His parents are Don and Georgia "Pete" Jackson, 
They live in Amboy, Washington. Their phone number is 206-247-5998. As the 
children were too active for an older couple, Ms. Lomsdal explained that she and 
the three daughters went to stay with friends, Vicky and Eugene Perkins, in 
Amboy. They do not have a phone but Eugene Perkins is an janitor at the Act III 
Theater, in Portland, Oregon. The theater's phone number is 503-287-0338. 
Ms. Lomsdal explained that they were there for two months. 
Ms. Lomsdal stated that she graduated from Beaverton High School. While in 
Washington, she contacted an old boyfriend who is Butch Crandall. Ms. Lomsdal 
explained that she and the girls lived at Butch1s home prior to Halloween, until 
Butch helped her with the children get back to Missouri on the bus. She stated 
that they stayed there in order to save money for the pre-paid and cheaper bus 
fare.
 rr v-
While Ms. Lomsdal and the girls were staying with Butch Crandall, she took 
Rachel to the Tanisborne Clinic, in Hillsboro, Oregon. This clinic is operated 
through St. Vincent Medical Center. Ms. Lomsdal stated that on a Sunday, in 
November, Rachel became sick with a fever of 102.9 degrees; she had round spots 
on the bottoms of her feet and ulcers in her mouth. The clinic stated that she 
had "hand, foot and mouth disease1'. Rachel was given a prescription for Tylenol 
with Codeine. Due to the ulcers Rachel did not want to continue nursing. At 
that time she weighed 19 pounds. 
During this time period, Michael Jackson came to Plato, Missouri, and stayed at 
her home in Plato during October and November. He then went back to Richfield 
(state unknown) and stayed with friends, Jim DeBuse. He is currently living 
with his parents in Amboy. 
This worker questioned Ms. Lomsdal about Rachel's current injuries and bruises. 
Ms. Lomsdal told this worker that the black eye was due to Rachel poking herself Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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in the eye. She stated that this swelled. They then put socks on her hands to 
use as mittens to keep her from rubbing her eyes. She stated that the eye 
almost healed up and then the fall from the rocking chair occurred. Ms. Lomsdal 
also stated that Sariah (three years old) also pokes Rachel in the eye. 
Ms. Lomsdal stated that she did not know about the bruises on Rachel's bottom 
until the nurse was showing this worker. 
Ms. Lomsdals initial response when this worker asked her about the bruises on 
the chest was "I don't know". Then, she explained that when Rachel had stopped 
breathinn that morning, she was trying to keep her aroused by tapping on her. 
Ms. Lomsdal did not think that she had these bruises the previous night. 
This worker asked about the arm and Ms. Lomsdal's response was that she assumed 
that it must have happened when she fell from the rocking chair. 
In asking Ms. Lomsdal about Rachel's hands, she stated that Rachel had been 
wearing mittens and the first time she had noticed these bruises was today. 
Ms. Lomsdal told this worker that the bruise on Rachel's leg must have occurred 
when Sariah was pushing Rachel in an umbrella stroller during one of their bus 
station stops. She explained that Sariah likes to care for Rachel, pick her up; 
she has dropped her on the floor and on the. T.V. corner. (This was later 
reconfirmed by Butch Crandall.) 
Ms. Lomsdal explained that all of them have had colds lately. They seem to have 
gotten these from a family with children on the bus. Ms. Lomsdal thought that 
the bloody scab on Rachel's nose was from the cold. 
This worker asked Ms. Lomsdal about the bruise behind her ear. Ms. Lomsdal did 
not know about this bruise and asked, "What bruise behind her ear?" This was 
pointed out during the session with the nurse. 
Ms. Lomsdal also stated that some of these bruises could have occurred from the 
Emergency Room Personnel that were always poking at Rachel. Barbara Rainey had 
earlier stated that a few of the bruises were from trying to find a vein and 
pointed these out to this worker. 
The rocking chair incident was discussed. In the middle of this discussion, 
Butch Crandall and ^ Officer Matney came back into the room. Ms. Lomsdal 
explained that the accident probably happened on Sunday night. This timing was 
arrived at from backtracking their steps. Ms. Lomsdal drew this worker a 
picture of her house. She stated that there was a swivel rocking chair in front 
of a bookcase, made from concrete blocks and wood. The living room is next to 
the kitchen. She stated that she had placed Rachel in the chair and then went 
into the kitchen, and within two minutes, she heard a "boom"; the next thing she 
knew was that Rachel came crawling to her on her hands and knees, crying. She 
stated there was a dot on her forehead. Rachel seemed to be okay. She did not 
have a fever and she was eating normally that evening and she stated she did not 
think too much about it. Ms. Lomsdal stated she assumed that when Rachel fell 
out of the chair, she hit her head on the concrete block. 
Ms. Lomsdal stated that the following day they went to get mail, which would 
have been on Monday; at this time Rachel's head started swelling. They put an 
ice pack on it and the swelling had gone down in a short amount of time. Ms. 
Lomsdal stated that, if (she's at fault for) anything, she did not get medical 
Viol n. 
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Ms. Lomsdal state that she was hoping Rachel would get better. She stated that 
she was late on a doctor's payment and feared he would not see her. 
At this time Butch Crandall and Deputy Matney entered the room. Ms. Lomsdal 
continued to explain that morning's activities. She stated that she had made 
pancakes for the girls. Rachel was being held by Butch, who fed her pancakes 
and applesauce. She fell asleep on his lap. 
Mr. Crandall stated that he then took Rachel for a short walk outside but about 
10 seconds after leaving the door, he came back in because she had quit 
breathing, and she felt limp and listless. Mr. Crandall stated that he told 
Wendy that something was wrong. She contacted "911", but they decided it would 
be quicker for them to drive to Houston than for an ambulance to come out there 
and then drive back. 
Ms. Lomsdal stated that she did put her finger in Rachel's mouth to check for 
foreign matter and the position of her tongue. Ms. Lomsdal stated that she was 
trying to keep from falling asleep while Butch drove them to Houston. They 
arrived in Houston about 10:00 a.m. Ms. Lomsdal stated that she was upset that 
she could not go with Rachel during the helicopter ride to Springfield. 
Ms. Lomsdal explained that Rachel does whimper. She stated that she does not 
know if the whimpering was due to being in pain or if it was something 
emotional. Ms. Lomsdal agreed with Butch that Rachel is spoiled. 
Ms. Lomsdal stated that Rachel was whimpering when she had recently tried to 
hold her hands to get her to walk around and strengthen her leg. Ms. Lomsdal 
stated, "I can't stand to hear a baby cry." She explained that she does hold 
Rachel a lot. 
Butch Crandall stated that when Rachel's head swelled, the swelling spread to 
her other eye. 
Ms. Lomsdall made a small passing comment during the questioning, "I dont' know 
(referring to how the injuries happened) unless my dogs (pause), no they did not 
do anything." 
As additional information, Ms. Lomsdal stated that Rachel has not had any of her 
immunizations. She stated her other children were on WIC, in Ozark County, in 
1990, and showed this..worker the WIC card. Ms. Lomsdal did add that maybe she 
should apply for Fo6i Stamps and AFDC. She stated she hesitate regarding AFDC 
because Rachel does not have a birth certificate. 
Butch Crandall stated that his real name is Burgess T. Crandall, III. Mr. 
Crandall's birthdate is 12-9-51. Mr. Crandall gave his address as 22880 A 
Northwest Birtch, Hillsboro, Oregon 97124. Mr. Crandall told this worker during 
the questioning that he took off on vacation as a long-haul driver for one month 
so that he could help Wendy with the girls on the bus ride to Missouri. 
Mr. Crandall stated that previously he had been a surgical scrub nurse. 
Ms. Lomsdal gave additional personal references of a brother Armand Cobbs and 
his wife, Heidi, who live in Amboy, Washington; and Mauda Tucker, 12105 N.E. 
192nd St., Battleground, Washington 98604. Their phone number is 687-3802. 
Ms. Lomsdal stated that the above friends could be contacted, along with 
Michael's parents or anyone else. She stated that this worker could go to the 
home and see the girls, even in her absence. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Numerous times, Ms. Lomsdal made statements: "I didn't hurt her", and "Please 
don't take my baby". Ms. Lomsdal would frequently apologize for her emotions, 
begging this worker, MPlease don't hold them (her emotions) against me.M Ms. 
Lomsdal seemed to be very scared during this interview. She stated that she did 
not want to be totally honest with this worker. Ms. Lomsdal explained that she 
had heard many stories about Social Services' stealing kids when their parents 
were away. Ms. Lomsdal wanted many assurances and wanted to know what this 
worker thought would happen. 
This worker and Officer Matney explained the investigative process again to Ms. 
Lomsdal and Mr. Crandall. In response to Ms. Lomsdal's questions about how this 
worker felt, this worker explained that we were trying to find out what happened 
to Rachel and that she has r?.any bruises and injuries. This worker explained 
that I was concerned that sh-3 was not taken to a doctor, especially on the part 
of Mr. Crandall, as he statec that he used to be a surgical scrub nurse. 
This worker did encourage Ms. Lomsdal to leave Rachel in the hospital until she 
is well enough to go home. This worker warned Ms. Lomsdal that she if she did 
remove Rachel against medical advice, that she may be charged with endangering 
the welfare of a minor. This worker explained to Ms. Lomsdal that herpriority 
should be Rachel's health. 
Officer Matney had arranged for Ms. Lomsdal and Butch Crandall to stay at 
Missouri Hotel as they did not have other resources. 
Afterwards, this worker discussed the case with Officer Matney. From his 
interview with Butch Crandall, Mr. Crandall stated that Wendy Lomsdal is 
emotional and at times could be violent. Butch Crandall told Officer Matney 
that when Wendy would over-punish the children, she would then give them hugs 
and tell them that she was sorry. When asked what was outside of usual 
punishment, Butch Crandall responded, "You know." (Please refer to Officer 
Matney's report.) 
Officer Matney and this worker went back into the Pediatric Intensive Care Unit 
in order for Officer Matney to take pictures. Ms. Lomsdal and Butch Crandall 
were not present at that time. Previously, Ms. Lomsdal had commented to this 
worker that Rachel bruises easily. This worker inquired of Barbara Rainey if 
this had been checked out. She stated that it had and the child does not have a 
condition where she bruises easily, according to their tests. 
While we were in the'^PICU, Dr. Brown, the Orthopedist, showed up in order to see 
Rachel and review the x-rays concerning her forearm fracture. During this time 
with the nurses, Rachel was more alert. One of the nurses showed this worker 
how much weight that Rachel had lost, by pulling up her skin near her groin and 
leg. The nurses state that Rachel will probably be in Intensive Care for 48 
hours before she is moved to the floor. 
Nurses stated that there had been a continuous problem that day with the mother 
and also Butch being in the room. 
Upon leaving this unit, Officer Matney and this worker saw Wendy Lomsdal and her 
friend in the waiting room. Ms. Lomsdal explained that she had asked a friend 
that belonged to a church up here for help. This friend is Barbara Bird, who 
lives in Willard. Her phone number is 742-3738. Ms. Lomsdal explained that she 
was now a member of the Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 
and this has been much support to her. The church people from her home have 
gotten together an offering to help with the helicopter ride.expense. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Ms. Lomsdal continued to plead for promises that we would not take' her child 
away. This worker told her that Rachel will remain in Intensive Care where she 
needs to be. 
Upon leaving, Ms. Bird caught up in the hallway with this worker. She stated 
that she is not a relative or anything but she is concerned and wanted to know 
if Ms. Lomsdal had been charges with anything. This worker stated no, and 
explained the investigative procedure to her. 
On 12-19-91, this worker spoke with Captain Ed Young of the Greene County 
Sheriff's Department regarding this case. 
On this same date, updates were also made with Sheila Dullum and Rhonda 
Ledbetter. 
On 12-19-91, this worker received a phone call from Sheila Dullum. Ms. Dullum 
stated that Ms. Lomsdal1s emotional state continues to be very difficult. Ms. 
Dullum related an incident occurring this date, where Wendy Lomsdal was in Dr. 
McCrory's office. She was begging him not to take her child. She got down on 
her knees to do this. Dr. McCrory got down on his knees to be eye-level with 
her, told her that she needed to stop this behavior and walked out of the room. 
Ms. Dullum stated that Wendy Lomsdal has been continually in the hallways 
screaming at the top of her lungs, "Don't take my baby". She has even grabbed 
one of Susie's arms (a Pediatric Clinician, R.N.). Ms. Dullum explained that 
Ms. Lomsdal had been on this tirade continuously since the child was admitted. 
Ms. Dullum also told this worker that the nurses had found an additional bruise, 
on Rachel's bottom. The bruise could be observed in the crevice area between 
the buttocks when the buttocks are spread apart. 
On 12-19-91, this worker received two phone calls from Wendy Lomsdal. She 
stated that she had talked to the doctor and knew that they were not wanting 
Rachel to go home with her. She stated that she had been talking to Sister 
Diane who is from the Chaplain's office. Ms. Lomsdal stated that she knows she 
did not hurt Rachel but she has been thinking that if she didn't Butch is the 
only other person that could have. She explained that frequently he would have 
Rachel alone for 15 to 20 minutes. He liked to take her out on walks. 
Ms. Lomsdal told this ^ worker that she had trusted him. She stated that Butch 
had Rachel alone moril- times that she had Rachel alone. Ms. Lomsdal stated, "If 
he did that to Rachel, he needs help." 
Ms. Lomsdal explained that she had had a phone call from Butch. He had gone to 
the house in order for the girls to come home. Butch told her that looking at 
the rocking chair and bookcase, that Rachel could not have hit her head, because 
the blocks were too high up. She stated that Butch told her 'that his sense of 
philosphy was that "'If people accuse me, I'll admit to it.1" 
Ms. Lomsdal explained that the first week they stayed with Butch, Rachel loved 
him; but after the second week, Rachel appeared to be afraid of him. Shewould 
reach for him and pull away. Ms. Lomsdal admitted that she had had a vague 
suspicion in Oregon but never could figure out why. Ms. Lomsdal stated that she 
had seen Butch be jealous of Rachel because Rachel loves her (Ms. Lomsdal) more 
than him. 
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Ms. Lomsdal stated that her children mean more to her than Butch Crandall. 
Ms. Lomsdal was very scared that Jimmy Gray had left his home to take the girls 
back from Butch to care for them. Ms. Lomsdal stated that Jimmy had seen Rachel 
when she was swollen. Ms. Lomsdal stated that Butch weighs 300 pounds and is 
very strong. She explained that he broke three maul handles while he was 
working on her property. 
This worker explained to Ms. Lomsdal her options of getting Jimmy to take the 
girls back to his house, or voluntarily placing the children in foster care. 
Ms. Lomsdal added an option of Jimmy's staying at her house to supervise Butch. 
Ms. Lomsdal additionally explained to this worker that Butch told her he was 
abused as a child. Ms. Lomsdal explained that he lives a hermit lifestyle. She 
stated that his family lives within six miles of his home but he has not seen 
his family in ten years. 
During these phone conversations this worker continued to encourage Ms. Lomsdal 
to get counseling over what has happened with Rachel and the alcoholism of her 
mother. Ms. Lomsdal declined counseling over her recent problems but stated she 
could use counseling about the alcoholism effects. 
On 12-20-91, this worker received a phone call from Captain Ed Young of the 
Greene County Sheriff's Department. He had been contacted by St. John's 
Security that Butch Crandall was in the hospital. This information was then 
related to Rhonda Ledbetter with a request of how to proceed. 
On 12-20-91, this worker received a phone call from Sheila Dullum. Ms. Dullum 
explained that Butch was back at the hospital, he wants to go to Oregon and 
needs money in order to get there. She explained that Ms. Lomsdal would not let 
him in Rachel's room. Rachel has now been moved to a regular room. The 
hospital has arranged for an employee to be in the room with Rachel 24-hours a 
day so that she is never left alone. 
On 12-20-91, this worker received a phone call from Wendy Lomsdal. Ms. Lomsdal 
stated that she had made a tape of all the things that she could remember. She 
explained that she did see Butch one time, in the presence of St. John's 
Security people. He denied everything and had tears in his eyes. This reminded 
her of a situation that happened with her ex-husband', Brad Atwood. 
Ms. Lomsdal told this worker that she remembered a comment that Butch had made 
to her at first. She related that Butch had stated, "I can't hurt the older 
girls, they will tell on me." Ms. Lomsdal stated that she does not want him 
around and she fears what he may do if she is home alone with her kids. 
Ms. Lomsdal stated that she wanted us to know that so that Rachel may be able to 
go to her home. She immediately added a comment, "But, you may want to 
investigate me further." 
EVALUATION: 
Ms. Wendy Lomsdal has tried to be cooperative in that she has given permission 
for a worker to visit her home and talk to Sariah and Alberta "Rose" Jackson, 
but was very hesitant to divulge her past. 
This worker has many concerns about Ms. Lomsdal's emotional state. Ms. Lomsdal 
has urged this worker not to judge her based on her emotions. Ms. Lomsdal fs Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Investigative Summary/Assist -9-
12-20-91 
behavior at Rachel's bedside has been difficult, according to hospital 
personnel, to the extent that it may be detrimental for the nurses to do their 
jobs. Ms. Lomsdal has continued to tell the doctors, nurses and other patients' 
families such comments as "Don't take my baby", ffI love her, I didn't hurt her." 
Her behavior has continued since Rachel's short hospitalization. The incidents 
in the doctor's office and hospital hallways are bizarre. 
This worker is also concerned about Ms. Lomsdal1s emotions and parenting ability 
from her comment that she can't stand to hear a baby cry. 
Rachel Jackson's physical injuries are not consistent with Ms. Lomsdal1s initial 
explanations. Ms. Lomsdal stated that the black eye occurred because Rachel was 
poking herself continuously in the eye. The bruise on Rachel's eye covers tjie 
skin around the eye and not the corner of the eye. 
Ms. Lomsdal stated that she did not know about the bruises on Rachel's bottom 
and hands. Ms. Lomsdal assumes that the broken wrist occurred when she fell 
from the rocking chair and was apparently unaware that it was hurt. 
Ms. Lomsdal stated that the bruises on Rachel's chest occurred when she was 
trying to keep Rachel from falling asleep and she thought that she had saved her 
life, and wanted to be commended for that instead of being involved in a child 
abuse investigation. The bruises on Rachel's chest are older bruises than what 
would have occurred from tapping. 
Ms. Lomsdal has indicated that the bruising may have occurred from her three-
year-old daughter, Sariah's poking at Rachel's eye, the dogs, and medical 
personnel in the emergency rooms. 
It is probable that Rachel Jackson could have fallen from the rocking chair. 
The injuries that Rachel has are not consistent with one fall from a rocking 
chair. Rachel has many bruises of different age-dating stages, two broken bones 
in her forearm that are approximately a week old, and a probable leg fracture 
which is two to three weeks old. 
At this time the situation has changed in that Ms. Lomsdal now feels that if she 
did not hurt Rachel, that Butch Crandall may have hurt Rachel. 
At this point in the investigation, there is "reason to suspect - physical 
abuse" of Rachel Jackson by an unknown perpetrator. This is based upon medical 
diagnosis and photographs. Their continues to be a need for further 
investigation into Burgess "Butch" Crandallfs role in Rachel's injuries. Based 
on Ms. Lomsdal's display of behavior in the hospital, evaluation may need to be 
completed by a psychologist and/or psychiatrist. 
Should Mr. Crandall be the actual perpetrator, assessment needs to be made into 
Ms. Wendy Lomsdalfs part in the abuse and/or her knowledge that the abuse was 
occurring. 
YTux 
Mary Taft (J~ 7 
So/fifcl Service Worker II 
1 
Sdeial Service Supervisor I 
Jo4ji Wagner IT
oc < 
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF TEXAS COUNTY, MISSOURI] n 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
vs. 
Wendy A. Lomsdal, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
Case No.: CR9-91-574FX 
DEFERRED PROSECUTION AGREEMENT 
COMES NOW the parties, State of Missouri by and through 
Bradford E. Ellsworth, Prosecuting Attorney of Texas County, 
Missouri and Defendant, Wendy A. Lomsdal, with the advise and 
counsel of J. Marty Robinson, her attorney and, in consideration of 
the mutual promises herein set forth, agrees as follows: 
1. In exchange for the promises and agreements set forth 
herein below the State agrees to defer prosecution of the class D 
felony charge of Endangering the Welfare of a Child for a period of 
two (2) years from the date of this agreement. 
2# Defendant, Wendy A. Lomsdal, agrees to cooperate fully 
with the Division of Family Services in regard to the minor child, 
Rachel Ann Jackson which agency has legal custody of said minor 
child. 
3. Defendant, Wendy A. Lomsdal, agrees to cooperate fully 
and truthfully as a witness for the State in the case of Burgess T. 
Crandell III, who is charged with Endangering the Welfare of a 
Child, in Texas County, Missouri Case Number CR9-92-102F. 
4. Defendant, Wendy A. Lomsdal, agrees to follow a course of 
good conduct and to violate no laws of the State of Missouri or its 
political subdivisions. 
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5. In the event this case is dismissed at the end of the two 
(2) year period, Defendant shall pay the Court costs applicable to 
this case. 
6, This agreement shall be filed with the Circuit Clerk of 
Texas County, Missouri. 
1. By the execution of this agrrement, Defendant, Wendy A. 
Lomsdal, waivers her constitutional right to a speedy trial. 
DATED: JUNE 22, 1992 
^ f V W / ^ C UltJ^ TXJs^drfdto 
BRADFORDIIE. ELLSWORTH 
Prosecuting Attorney 
Texas County, Missouri 
116 East Main Street 
Courthouse Annex 
Houston, Missouri 65483 
(417) 967-2029 
WENDY A£7LOMSDAL 
Defendant 
MARTY ROBINSON 
'Districty^efender 
1212A Highway 72 East 
Suite 04 
Rolla# Missouri 65401 
(314) 368-2260 
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SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR CLARK COUNTY 
In Re the Marriage of: 
WENDY A. ATWOOD, 
Now known as WENDY A.. JACKSON/ 
and 
BRAD N. ATWOOD, 
Petitioner, 
Respondent. 
NO. 85 3 01857 2 
ORDER FOR MODIFICATION 
OF CHILD SUPPORT 
FILED 
SEP 181990 
JoAnne McBride, Clerk, Clark Go. 
I . BASIS 
1.1 A Petition for Modification of Child support was filed 
by Respondent on November 6, 1989. 
1.2 (a) A hearing was held on September 14, 1990. 
(b) Persons appearing at the hearing were: Respondent's 
attorney, PHILIP A. FOSTER. 
(c) The Petition was heard on Affidavits only. 
II. FINDINGS 
Based on the case record to date, the income and resources of 
1 each party's household as set forth in the attached certified 
child support worksheets, the Financial Affidavits on file and.the 
testimony heard, if any, the Court.FINDS that: 
ORDER FOR MODIFICATION OF CHILD SUPPORT - 1 
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2.1 Support is necessary for the following dependent child: 
Name Date of Birth SSN: 
STARR ANN 3/6/84 
2.2 The Order of child support in this matter should be 
modified for the following reasons: There has been a substantial 
change of circumstances since the Decree was entered in that the 
parties voluntarily transferred physical custody of the minor 
child of the parties, STARR ANN, on or before November 8, 1987, 
and that since November 8, 1987, the minor child, STARR ANN, has 
been in the sole care, custody and control of the Respondent, and 
the Respondent has incurred financial obligations and expenses for 
the support of STARR ANN, which have not been contributed to or 
off-set by any payments made by Petitioner. 
2.3 (a) The mother's net income is $0.00 per month. The 
mother is unemployed, appears to be pregnant, and appears to be 
raising three (3) other very young children. 
(b) The father's net income is $1,717.00 per month. 
This income is actual. 
2.4 Support shall be based on the child support schedule for 
Clark County. 
(a) The amount of child support calculated using the 
standard calculation is $25.00, the minimum amount authorized 
under the schedule. 
III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
3.1 This court has jurisdiction over the parties and the 
subject matter of this action. 
MARSH, H1GC1NS 4k FOSTER 
ORDER FOR MODIFICATION OF CHILD SUPPORT - 2 im&mESmEBT. 
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3.2 Child support should be as provided in the following 
Order. 
IV. ORDER 
IT IS ORDERED that: 
4.1 The Order of child support is modified as set forth 
below. The support award is based upon the income set forth in 
the worksheet of the father. 
4.2 The parent responsible for paying child support shall 
be: Wendy Jackson, SSN: 544-74-8867, P.O. Box 83, Theodosia, MO 
65761, who is unemployed. The Court did not impute income to the 
mother. 
4.3 Support payments shall be effective as of November 1, 
1989, and are thereafter due on the 1st day of each month. 
4.4 Child support shall be paid as follows: 
Name of Child Monthly Amount 
STARR ANN $25.00 
4.5 Child support is extended beyond the eighteenth birthday 
of STARR ANN, so long as STARR ANN is enrolled in college or a 
vocational training program, but in no event past her 23rd 
birthday. 
4.6 Support payments shall be made: to the Washington State 
Child Support Registry, P.O. Box 9009, MS HJ-12, Olympia, 
..Washington 98504. 
4.7 Petitioner shall provide health insurance coverage for 
the child listed in paragraph 2.1 above if coverage that can be 
extended to cover the child is or becomes available to that parent 
MARSH. HIGG1NS A FOSTER 
ORDER FOR MODIFICATION OF CHILD SUPPORT - 3 mioXSESnm. 
P.O. BOX 34 
VANCOUVER. WA 98666 
(206) 695-7909 
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through employment or is union related as provided under RCW 
26.09.105. 
4.8 Respondent shall have no obligation to pay child support 
to Petitioner from November 8, 1987, onwards. 
WARNING: VIOLATION OF THE RESIDENTIAL PROVISIONS OF THIS 
ORDER WITH ACTUAL. KNOWLEDGE OF ITS TERMS IS PUNISHABLE BY CONTEMPT 
OF COURT, AND MAY BE A CRIMINAL OFFENSE UNDER RCW 9A.40.070(2). 
VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER MAY SUBJECT A VIOLATOR TO ARREST. 
Any parent owing a duty of child support shall be obligated 
to provide health insurance coverage, including both medical and 
dental, for his or her child if coverage that can be extended to 
cover the child is or becomes available to that parent through 
employment or is union-related as provided under RCW 26.09.105; 
IF PROOF OF HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IS NOT PROVIDED WITHIN 
TWENTY (20) DAYS, THE RECEIVING OR THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL & 
HEALTH SERVICES MAY SEEK DIRECT ENFORCEMENT OF THE COVERAGE 
THROUGH THE RESPONSIBLE PARENT'S EMPLOYER OR UNION WITHOUT FURTHER 
NOTICE TO THE RESPONSIBLE PARENT AS PROVIDED UNDER CHAPTER 26.18 
RCW. 
THE PARENTS SHALL COOPERATE IN THE PROMPT PROCESSING OF ALL 
INSURANCE CLAIMS AND REIMBURSE THE OTHER FOR ALL OUT-OF-POCKET 
EXPENDITURES REIMBURSED BY INSURANCE. THE PARENT MAINTAINING THE 
INSURANCE SHALL PROVIDE THE OTHER PARENT WITH SIGNED INSURANCE 
CLAIM FORMS AND ID CARDS AS REQUIRED BY THE INSURANCE COMPANY AND 
SHALL TIMELY PROCESS ALL CLAIMS. 
NOTICES 
AS PROVIDED BY RCW 26.23.050(1), A NOTICE OF PAYROLL DEDUCTION MAY 
BE ISSUED OR OTHER INCOME WITHHOLDING ACTION UNDER RCW CHAPTERS 
26.18 OR 74.20A MAY BE TAKEN WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE TO THE 
RESPONSIBLE PARENT, IF A SUPPORT PAYMENT IS NOT PAID WHEN DUE, AND 
AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO OR GREATER THAN THE SUPPORT PAYABLE FOR ONE (1) 
MONTH IS OWED UNDER AN ORDER ENTERED PRIOR TO JULY 1, 1990; OR AT 
ANY TIME AFTER ENTRY OF AN ORDER BY THE COURT ON OR AFTER JULY 1, 
1990, UNLESS THE COURT APPROVES AN ALTERNATE PAYMENT PLAN. 
THE RECEIVING PARENT MAY BE REQUIRED TO SUBMIT AN ACCOUNTING OF 
ORDER FOR MODIFICATION OF CHILD SUPPORT - 4 
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WORKSHEET A: CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION 
[Name [Age Basic Amt Case: Atwood Cause No: 
EtarrAnn $291.19 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
Number of Children: 
PART I: BASIC SUPPORT AMOUNT FATHER I MOTHER TOTALS 
1. Monthly Gross Income 
a. Wages, Salary 
h. Interest, Dividend* 
c. Business Income 
d Other Income 
e. Total Gross Income 
$1,717.04 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$1,717.04 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 $1,717.04 
. . . y i . . . . |2. Monthly Deductions 
a. Income Taxes 
b. FICAySB Taxet 
c. Mandatory Union/Prof Duet 
d. Mandatory Petition Pmt 
e. Non-Recurring Income 
f. Total Deductions 
$257.55 
$131.34 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$388.90 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 $388.90 
|3. Monthly Net Income $1,328.14 $0.00 
1. Combined Monthly Net Income $1,328.14 
p. Basic Child Support Amt $291.19 
p. Proportional Share of Income 1009a (wmmmvtii [7. Parents'Basic Support Amounts $291.19 $0.00 i+mtmiM 
[PART II: HEALTH, DAY CARE, AND SPECIAL CHILD EXPENSES 
18. Health Care Expenses 
a. Monthly Health Intur Premiums 
b. Uninsured Monthly Expenses 
c. Total Monthly Health Expenses 
d. Combined Monthly Expenses 
e. Maximum Ordinary Monthly Amt 
f. Extraordinary Monthly Costs 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$20.00 
$0.00 
). Day Care and Special Expenses 
a. Day Care Expenses 
b. Education Expenses 
c. Long Distance Transportation 
d. Other 
e. Total Day Care/Special Expenses 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
[10. Combines Day Care/Special Expenses $0.00 
11. Total Part II Expenses $0.00 
[12, Parents' Shares of Part II Expenses $0.00 $0.00 
IPART III: TOTAL CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION 
13. Total Support Obligation $291.19 $0.00 
IPART IV: CHILD SUPPORT CREDITS 
|14. Child Support Credits 
a. Monthly Health Care Expense Credit 
b. Day Care/Special Expense Credit 
c. Other 
d Residential Schedule Credit 
e. Total Support Credits 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$291.19 
$291.19 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0,00 
[PART V: NET SUPPORT OBLIGATION AND TRANSFER PAYMENT 
|l5. Net Support Obligation ~$0W $aoo im 
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VORKSHEET B: RESIDENTIAL SCHEDULE ADJUSTMEN' 
6. Children 
7. Basic Support Per Child 
8. Ordinary Expe ises Per Child 
a. Total Monthly Health Expense 
b. Max Ordinary Monthly Health Expense 
c. Ordinary Health Care Amount 
d. Other Ordinary Expenses 
e. Total Ordinary Expenses Per Child 
9. Adjusted Basic Support 
0. Overnights With Father 
1. Proportional Overnights With Father 
2. Overnights with Mother 
3. Proportional Overnights With Mother 
4. Fathers Credit Proportion 
5. Mother's Credit Proportion 
6. Father's Residential Sched Credits 
7. Mother's Residential Sched Credits 
iStarrAnn 
$291.19 
$abo 
$20.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$291.19 
340 
93% 
25 
7% 
100% 
0% 
$291.19 
$0.00 1 
$0.00 
$aoo 
$20.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
45 
12% 
320 
88% 
0% 
lOO^J 
$0.00 
$0.00 1 
JL 1 
$0.00 
$0.06' 
$20.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
45 
12% 
320 
SB% 
0% 
100% 
$0.00 
$0.00! 
1 ° 1 $0.00 
' $aoo 
$20.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
0 
0% 
365 
100% 
0% 
100% 
$0.00 
$0.00 
1 0 1 
1 $0.00 
i so.bb j 
| $20.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 I 
$0.00 
$0.00 
0 
0%| 
365 
100%J 
0%J 
100%4 
$0.00 
$0.00 1 
VORKSHEETC: ADDITIONAL FACTORS 
8. Present Value of Major Assets 
a. Real Estate 
b. Stocks and Bonds 
c. Vehicles 
d. Boats 
e. Pensions/IRAs/Accounts 
f.Cash 
g. Insurance 
h. Other 
& Liens and/or Extraordinary Debt 
l0. Monthly Income Not Attributable to these Proceedings 
a. New Spouse 
b. Other Adults in Household 
c. Child Support (other relationship) 
d. Extraordinary Income of Children 
e. Income from Assistance 
f. Mainenance (other relationship) 
g. Other 
U. Monthly Child Support Paid (other children) 
12. Maintenance Paid (other relationship) 1 
(3. Children in Household (other relationship) 1 
14, New Spouse's Name 1 
*5. Names of Other Adults in Household [_ 
[FATHER 
" 
[MOTHER 1 
- 1 
e c 
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} STATE OF WASHINGTON ) COUNTY OF C L A W f 
I, JoAnne McSride, County Clerk and Clerk of the. 
S'i??.r'Qr Court of Clark County, Washington, DO/4SRE-
BY CERTIFY that this document, consisting of / , 
pag»?(ss«, is a true and correct copy of the original now 
on file and of record in my office and, as County Clerk 
I am ths legal custodian ttereof. 
Signed ensea led atVancouver. Washington this date: ^seal^  J ancouver. ' 
JoAnne Mftftfjafe-Courjty Clerk \ 
. Deputy 
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POWER OF ATTORNEY 
j Wendy A« Lomsdal 
8U3&1 
nf 3 02 south 1UQ £*ast> Logan Utah 
, nominate and appoint 
Donald Eugene Perkins
 nf 123 *« Main, Logan, Utah 6U321 
as my attorney in fact to act in my stead and for myself as follows: 
see attached 
(List all powers of the attorney as appointed in sufficient detail as to inform the attorney and 
those he would deal with as to his rights and responsibilities.) 
I give my attorney in fact full and complete authority to perform 
every act herein specified or necessary, requisite or incident to those acts 
as though I were personally present. I ratify and confirm all acts that my 
attorney should perform in my behalf pursuant to this instrument. 
Signed as a sealed instrument this =? day of 
On this 
persona 
Wendy A 
iS 
•7* day of Mrch, 1996 
y appeared before me 
Lomsdal who signed 
theh foregoingpbostrument. 
(name) / 
Notary Publ ic 
GLENNA L PETE 
W W PUBLIC'STATE, 
95 WEST 100 SOI 
LOGAN, UTAH 
CC-MM EXP JAN, 
(witness) 
(witness) 
JUDICIAL DISTJK,! up 
iDATE. Lt 
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attachment t o ^ower oi btorney -
If at any time-I become unable for any reason t o care and provide f o r my 
5 ch i ldren , namely: Aloerta Rose *>acKson, born 19 i>ec. 1966 S&fr U91-OU-105? 
Pariah Elaine Jackson, corn 28 ^uly 1966 SS# U91-OU-1058 
Rachel Ann °ackson, born Jan, 5* 1991 SS# u91-Q6-915U 
David Michael Jackson, bom 25 Nov. 1992 SS# c^6-28-99ij|i3 ^ 
Anna ^arie Carol ^omsdal, born Mar 19 , 1995 SS# ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ . U ^ ^ ^ 
I , Wendy A. liomsdal, hereby grant f u l l care , control and custody t o Wrco/ 
Donald Eugene Perkins , 123 *. ^ a i n , -^ogan Utah, 8U321; whom ± cons ider S f ^ 
sK * 
RESxDONSIBLE AND TitUoTWOitTrif IKDIVlDUAL WHO WILL rtAKE AN* Am) ALL ijECISIOiSkdfe; 
£>1CHE c 0 ^ -
BEHALF OF MI CHiLD.iEN IN AMD c'0& THEIil DEST IKT^iteoTo. JL do t h i s w i l l i n g l y <gp$L
 K 
O QC 
with f u l l purpose i n ray heart t o always provide a s tab le , lov ing and c a r i n g o £ 
environment for my ch i ldren . 
ill H Z ^ 
K o - fc 
D i u o S 
^ OC QJ 3 
0C -J 9 
NO ONE may claim i did t h i s under duress . ±f any such claim i s made i  (Dsil ° 
FAL3E AND VOID. 
J < eg 
Q: Mr. Perkins may choose t o re loca te ray chi ldren for t h e i r s a f e t y and deiSJ g Q \ K / p 2 
QC UJ < 
i n t e r e s t s 
ch i ldren , and support h i s d e c i s i o n to do s o . 
Mr. Perkins may entreat the help of family , f r i ends ana a s s o c i a t e s as he 
sees f i t BUT always re ta ing ing FULL CAHE CONTAOL AND oUSTODi ON r-ff BEHALF. 
I a l s o hereby grant r i r . ferteins the r ight :<nd a c c e s s t o any funds in 
bank accounts and s t a t e b e n e f i t s through the Horizon Lard of Utah. 
Mr. Perkins may use my res idence to care for my ch i ldren m ;ny incapac i ty , xi 
rtr. Perkins may use my v e h i c l e a l s o . " 
AT NO TIME MAf ki\I uF THiv FOLLOW ii*} CLAIM itfU-HTo OF GuA.tDiANo.iIP Olid LA£ CHILDRE 
WITHOUT MioLLF Aiiu A JUIAIJC PitEo i^vT Ii\i A COUiiTnUOMaLTUATI^ W: 
Michael J . Jackson; Keith Wayne Cox, Janet Lomsdal, Thomas Eugene ^omsdal, 
Donald or Goergia Jackson, Harold ^esby, :• Carol and Richard Green and 
Arvin and Sharon i'lortenson. 
I THOROUGHLY AivD COMPLLTELI" TrfUoT DOKALJ EUGEhE PAXUCLAO tiiVd THE Llrfao 
AND BEST POSSIBLE IKTEitEjTS OF XI CriLLDiiEK WITH I\iO DOUDT Ort xt&JlTAT ION 
WHATSOEVER. 
l now declare that i f t h i s occurs i t w i l l oe tne oes t thing f o g t M : o ^ 
Mi* 
ANY PE.iSON, EKHTf Oil GiiOUP O.i GOWNMiiKT WHO GHAjuUiKGao Tulo ?Jwa.t UP 
ATTORNEY I "WILL oUK IK CIVIL OPafc CulUT. 
• - - - - / _ ^ ^ 
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BUSHED 1905 Lewiston State Bank 
P.O. Box 32,17 East Center 
Lewiston, Utah 84320 
435-258-2456 800-233-6510 
P.O. Box 6097, 2190 North Main 
North Logan, Utah 84341 
435-750-6700 888-710-6403 
1 0 4 2 1 9 7 
0/30/97-11/25/97 
544-74-8867 K 
IN ACCOUNT WITH: 
WENDY LOMSDAL 
295 WEST CENTER 
LEWISTON, UT 8 4 3 2 0 
SUMMARY OF ACCOUNT 
ror nutuuiu uuuimauuii 
24 Hours a Day, Call 
Anytime Access 
Lewiston State Bank's 
Telephone Banking Service 
435-258-3700 
800-233-6510 
Page 1 of 
4 , 1 2 5 . 6 6 4 , 1 2 5 . 6 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 
FINANCE C H A R G E • PREVIOUS BALANCE - PAYMENTS & CREDITS = NEW BALANCE APPROVED CREDIT AVAILABLE CREDIT 
R A N G E O F B A L A N C E S TO W H I C H R A T E S APPLY PERIODIC RATE(S) CORRESPONDING ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE 
THIS BILLING C Y C L E 
AVERAGE 0AILY BALANCE(S) ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE 
Average balance used to calculate annual percentage yield 
Interest earned during statement period 
Interest paid year-to-date 
Beginning statement interest rate 
Annual percentage yield earned 
LTE DESCRIPTION 
Money Market Personal Account Transactions 
CHECKS DEPOSITS 
• 0 3 - 9 7 C h e c k # 1 
• 2 0 - 9 7 W i t h d r a w a l t o CLOSE f o r DD 
1 0 0 . 0 0 
, 4 , 0 2 5 . 6 6 
4 , 0 4 4 . 7 1 
0 . 0 0 
2 8 . 6 9 
3 . 2 5 % 
0 .00% 
BALANCE 
4,025.66 
0.00 
Check--
1 * 
-Amount 
100.00 
Check Amount Check Amount 
This account is closed 
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Keith Cox 
619 East 400 North 
Logan, UT 84321 
753-8697 message phone 
pro se I 
tOG^HuU,-
3 I 43 i > 
\ s i n - * 
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Wendy Lomsdal, 
Petitioner 
vs. 
Keith Cox, 
Defendant 
MOTION AND ORDER FOR 
PAYMENT OF COURT COSTS AND 
ATTORNEYS FEES IN THIS ACTION 
Oral Argument Requested 
Civil no. 974100564DA 
Now comes Keith Cox and requests the honorable Court pursuant to CJA Rule 4-911 grant the 
following. 
1. The moving party lacks the resources to pay costs and fees (see CJA Rule 4.911(2)A). 
Attached Affidavit. 
2. 
3. 
Petitioner has had resources to pay costs (see Lewiston Bank statements) qualified under 
Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 902(9) and Rule 803(8). 
Petitioner has paid $2000 to her attorney recently, (see affidavit of Clara Didericksen) 
K&iYh Grfj 
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RELIEF SOUGHT 
A. Defendant prays the Court grant this motion that each party pay their own court cost, 
attorney fees and expert witness fees. 
Judge CLINT JUDKINS 
Dated this day of 2000 
2 
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XBLISHED1905 
§L 
1042197 
9/27 /97'-10/29/'97 
544-74-8867 V 
Lewiston State Bank 
P.O. Box 32.17 East Center 
Lewiston. Utah 84320 
435-258-2456 800-233-6510 
P.O. Box 6097. 2190 North Main 
North Logan. Utah 84341 
435-750-6700 888-710-6403 
IN ACCOUNT WITH. 
WENDY LOMSDAL 
2 9 5 WEST CENTER 
LEWISTON, UT 8 4 3 2 0 
SUMMARY OF ACCOUNT 
V. 
hor Account mrormation 
24 Hours a Day, Call 
Anytime Access 
Lewiston State Bank's 
Telephone Banking Service 
435-258-3700 
800-233-6510 
Page 1 of 
4 ,213 .47 
REST INSURANCE 
1 
FINANCE CHARGE 
100.00 
• PREVIOUS BALANCE 
RANGE OF BALANCES TO WHICH RATES APPLY 
+ LOANS 
PfRinnm R A T P ^ 
1 12 
-PAYMENTS 4 CREDITS 
CORRESPONDING ANNUAL 
PERCENTAGE RATE 
.19 0 
= N E W B A L A N C E 
.00 
A P P R O V E D CREDIT 
4 , 1 2 5 . 6 6 
AVAILABLE CREDIT 
THIS BILLING C Y C L E 
AVERAGE DAILY BALANCE(S) DAYS ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATI 
Average balance used to calculate annual percentage yield 
Interest earned during statement period 
Interest paid year-to-date 
Beginning statement interest rate 
Annual percentage yield earned 
4,149.83 
12.19 
28.69 
3.25% 
3.30% 
VTE DESCRIPTION 
Money Market Personal Account Transactions 
CHECKS DEPOSITS 
)-09-97 Check # 1 
)-29-97 Post Earnings 
100.00 
12.19 
BALANCE 
4,113.47 
4,125.66 
Check Amount Check Amount Check . Amount 
1 * 100.00 
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Lewiston State Bank 
17 E*»1 Om*r St • Urwtoton, Utah M320 
?*r . • 
i:i2i,300 7&7»: iouaiR?" ' 
. i i 'nmk'^S^iLa 
/OOOOO 10000/-
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Affidavit 
I, Clara Didericksen, do state under pains and penalties of perjury, the following. 
I was out walking recently and was picked up by Wendy Lomsdal. She stated that she 
had paid her own attorney $2000 for trial. 
fiffr**- JL£ fCd^i^J 
Clara Didericksen, Witness 
Subscribed and Sworn to this^ day of ^ ^ • 2000 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Kellie D. Fackrell 
101 South Main 
Brigham City, UT 84302 
My Commission Expires 
March 18,2001 
STATE OF UTAH 
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Affidavit 
Defendant Keith Cox, of 619 East 400 North in Logan, Utah, does state under pains and 
penalties of perjury that today, February 3, 2000, he has approximately $200 in his 
checking account and that these are the only fiinds available to him. 
Xc^<4)C 
Keith Cox, Witness 
Subscribed and Sworn to this*^— day of February 2000 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
KellieD.FackreU 
101 South Main 
Brigham City, UT 84302 
My Commission Expires 
March 18,2001 
STATE OF UTAH 
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AFFIDAVIT OF 
J. VINCENT ECCLES 
EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 9,1998 
PICKING UP ANNA MARIE WITH KEITH COX 
I, J. Vincent Eccles, do state upon pains and penalties of perjury that the 
following statements are true as to the events I observed on September 9,1998 at 5:30 
pm at 156 West 400 North, Logan, UT 84321. 
Keith Cox^rove me in his truck to the above address to pick up Anna Marie. Bill 
Burnard met us at the curbside. Bill Burnard stated that he could not let Keith Cox take 
his daughter for the evening visitation of 3 hours, because Keith had not notified the court 
where his new place of residence is. Bill stated that he had the authority for this 
situation. Bill stated he would deny Keith future visitations until Keith met with Bill at 
Keith's new residence as proof of new residence. Bill also stated that he had denied 
Keith his Labor Day weekend visitation with Anna Marie for the same reasons above. 
Keith Cox stated that he had sent a letter of notification of his new address to 
Wendy Lomsdal at her home address on Saturday, September 5,1998. Bill Burnard 
responded that this letter of notification was not adequate to meet the requirements of the 
court order. Keith Cox had an envelope in his back pocket. He removed the envelope 
from his pocket to give to Bill Burnard. Keith said that it had the address notification 
letter in it. Bill Burnard refused to receive the letter. 
Bill Burnard requested Keith make an appointment with Bill to allow Bill to visit 
Keith's new residence. Keith refused on the grounds that Bill Burnard does not have the 
authority to represent the court in refusing his visitation rights. Keith stated that only the 
judge has the authority if the parents cannot agree on altering visitation and that the 
visitation is for the benefit of the child. 
Bill Burnard stated that he would not go to Keith's new residence this evening 
because it would be on his personal time. Bill had plans to meet someone else. 
r>«~« 1 ^t A f p ; ^ , ; f r t f i V m n p n t P P P I P C 
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Keith stated that, when Keith and Bill talk on the phone, Bill argues for Wendy's 
innocence against the claims of Keith that Wendy is a child abuser. Bill claimed he never 
said that Wendy was innocent of these claims in the phone conversations. 
Dated this !\ day of la*uj<n*i 2000 tu i < dt&JL M 
J. VINCENT ECCLES 
1487 Lynnwood 
Logan, Utah 84341 
(435)753-3819 
•L*-
Subscribed and Sworn to this U day p f O ^ ^ M 2000 
Notary PuDlic 
BRENDA M.SMITH 
399 North Main 
Logan Utah 34321 
My Commission Expires 
August 1 2001 
State of Utah 
1 
I 
I 
I 
'1 
JJ^uW-fa fA .^^iqt^A 
Witness 
SBR 3fiZ '33JC 
Dorro O ^ f A f f i d a v i t o f T V inP .PT l t R c d e S 
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Utah DHS-DCFS 
Revised January 1997 
Form Risk 
Page 1 
CHILD WELFARE RISK ASSESSMENT 
e Name: AnnaMarie Lomsdal 
e: April 2, 1998 
PLEASE CHECK 
TYPE OF CASE 
CPS |X | 
PLEASE CHECK 
Admin 
I I 
Quarterly 
I I 
Closure 
IX| 
Transfer 
I I 
Other 
I I 
rker: Lynn Jaggi In-Home ( I ( I ( I 
ITRUCTIONS: Out-of-Home ( ] I l I I I I ( I 
icate level of risk by entering appropriate data (e.g. person being rated and/or date and/or / or X) in box below applicable risk descriptor for each 
lie. 
cale does not apply, place check mark or " X " mark in box marked "N/AM . 
nformation is unknown, place check mark or MX" mark in box marked "unknown". 
mment section should include justification for ratings, progress on ongoing treatment plans, and family strengths. 
gas of higher risk are distinguished by bold line. ' 
XRETAKER/ALLEGED PERPETRATOR 
1 Degree of Perpetrator Accessibility to Victim I I N/A ( I Unknown 
lot accessible. No 
contact. 
Limited accessibility. 
Infrequent contact & 
only with adult 
supervision. 
In-home, infrequent 
caretaker. 
Not in-home but has 
unsupervised access. 
in-home, frequent 
caretaker. 
Primary caretaker, 
constant conduct. 
XXXXXXXXXXXXX 
)mments: Wendy is a single parent, works outside the home, but is the primary care giver. 
.2 Parenting Skills ( ) N/A ( l Unknown 
Caretaker consistently applies 
ppropriate discipline techniques; 
has good knowledge of age 
appropriate behavior; displays 
flexibility; consequences fit 
behavior. 
Marginally consistent discipline; 
fair knowledge of age appropriate 
behaviors; fairly flexible, open to 
improvement. 
Same as previous, except children 
do not always know what to 
expect; caretaker is not very 
flexible or open to improvement. 
Inconsistent or inappropriate 
discipline; poor knowledge of 
age appropriate behavior; 
inflexible, consequences don't 
fit behavior, child may exhibit 
emotional stress; caretakers 
hostile to change. 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
:omments: No deficiencies in parenting were observed during my brief involvement. 
1.3 Maltreatment History of Caretaker ( I N / A M Unknown 
Loved, well cared for, no 
abuse. 
Some perceived conflict 
with caretakers; no 
specific abuse or neglect; 
situational problems. 
Specific examples of 
abuse or neglect; sees self 
as unloved, unwanted or 
poorly cared for. 
Serious ongoing 
maltreatment; authorities 
may have been involved. 
Obsessed with past 
maltreatment, has 
physical scars or 
emotional/ physical 
disability. 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
Comments: Wendy states that she was extensively abused (physically and sexually) as a child. I don't know if authorities were involved. 
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Utah DHS-DCFS 
Revised January 1997 
Form Risk 
Page 4 
Previous Placement Experience N / A M Unknown 
No previous out-of-home 
placement. 
Previous caretaker-initiated out-of-
home placements (relatives, 
friends, hospitals, etc.). 
Previous agency involved 
voluntary or involuntary 
placements. Less than six 
months; includes shelter care and 
emergency foster care. 
Previous agency involved 
placement for over six months. 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
nments: Wendy was charged in Missouri with failure to protect due to her husband abusing one of the children. 
:es custody for an extended period of time. 
This child was placed in 
Child Fearful or Anxious (XI N/A [ I Unknown 
Child is calm. Child is hesitant to talk 
and ask's the investigator 
not to tell caretaker QR 
nervous around the 
investigator but answers 
questions. 
Appears frightened; 
avoids contact with 
caretaker; checks 
caretaker response OR 
excessively nervous 
around investigator; 
initially hesitates or 
refuses to answer 
questions, but does with 
prompting; may He or 
cover up. 
Child continually checks 
caretaker response. 
Won't answer some 
questions, denies or tells 
conflicting stories; may 
use rehearsed answers. 
OR Appears frightened of 
investigator. Child may 
lie to cover up or cry out 
of fear. 
Severely withdrawn; 
cries, shakes, cowers, 
etc. Extreme fear of 
caretakers, other adults, 
including investigator. 
Child absolutely refuses 
to participate in interview. 
>mments: 
AMILY FACTORS 
,1 Family Violence: Conflict Resolution I ] N/A (X| Unknown 
No family violence, 
adequate problem solving 
skills. 
Verbal aggression present; 
moderate problem solving 
skills; some mutual 
tolerance. 
Verbal threats of violence; 
pattern of conflict; poor 
problem solving skills. 
Physical violence present 
(e.g. slapping, whipping, 
shoving, etc.). Physical 
coercion or threats. 
Serious physical violence. 
Medical treatment 
needed. Physical 
coercion or threats with 
weapon. 
omments: Keith Cox, AnnaMarie's father, claims that there has been some verbal/physical violence towards the children in the past. I haven't 
een able to substantiate current family violence. 
1.2 Role Reversal in the Family I ] N/A (XI Unknown 
Appropriate child and caretaker 
roles. 
Minor imbalance in household, 
management or emotional support 
roles. 
Children assuming majority of 
adult responsibilities. 
Complete role reversal. 
-omments: 
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Utah DHS-DCFS 
Revised January 1997 
Form Risk 
Page 5 
Availability of Housing 
lequate housing and utilities. Adequate temporary housing. 
Utilities inconsistent. | 
iments: 
UTREATMENT/ABUSE FACTORS 
1 Sexual Abuse 
)sexual abuse or 
impropriety. 
Sexual 
suggestiveness; 
sexual comments; 
exposure to soft 
porn. No 
Molestation. 
mments: 
2 Physical Abuse: Discipline 
No physical 
discipline, 
ipropriate methods 
used. 
;xxxxxxxxxxx 
Minimal physical 
discipline used i.e. 
spanking on rear. 
Not excessive. No 
marks left on child. 
imments: The current injury to AnnaMarie apj 
3 Physical Abuse: Confinement or F 
No physical confinement or 
restriction. 
omments: 
Mild 
occasiona 
not rest 
grou 
Harassed, ! 
encouraged 
propositioned 
exposure to 
hardcore or illegal 
porn. No Sexual 
Activity. 
Excessive or 
inappropriate 
discipline used. No 
resulting injury, 
although potential 
1 for some injury 
1 exists. 
Dears to have been cause 
Restriction 
confinement used 
lly physical movement 
ricted i.e. excessive 
nding; timeout. 
[XI N/A I I Unknown 
Pattern of temporary living 
1 arrangements. 
Homelessness. Lack of essential 
utilities. || 
IX) N/A I ] Unknown 
Exhibition to Child. 
Child did not 
participate. 
Molest. No 
Intercourse Porno 
pictures taken of 
child. 
( 1 N/A I 1 Unknown 
Excessive or 
inappropriate 
discipline used 
resulting in superficial 
injury. 
Excessive or 
inappropriate 
discipline used, 
resulting in 
moderately serious 
injury. 
d by an accidental falling on the arm of a chair. 
(X| N/A I | Unknown 
1 Moderately excessive 
1 confinement or restriction i.e. 
1 confined for 24 hours; physical 
1 movement restricted, but for no 
1 more than several hours. 
Physica 
sensory de 
several da 
for mor< 
1 
\ 1 
Penetration; oral 
sex. Prostitution. 
Excessive or 
inappropriate 
discipline used, 
resulting in severe 
injury. 
1 or emotional harm; 
privation; confined for 
ys, physical restriction 
3 than several hours. 
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SAFE System 0 1 J u n " 4 : 5 4 P m 
Login ID: wlundahl P a 9 e 1 of 4 
Activity Record 
01 May 99 - 01 Jun 99 
Case Name: Lomsdal, Anna Case ID: 867462 
03 May 99 18:45 1 minutes REC 
This referral was taken in the Division of Child and Family Services. It was marked as Priority 2. 
Intake worker, Mary Jo Peck. (Lundahl, Wanda 01 Jun 99) 
04 May 99 20:00 60 minutes CLHV Child First Seen (FTF with Victim), 
Support Person Offered, Unscheduled Home Visit, Home Visit Other Than 
Working Hours, Victim Interviewed 
UHV. Rose, Rachel, Sarah and Anna (alleged victim were all present). Was there for 45 minutes 
however mother never did return. When I arrived at the home Rose (age 13) was watching the younger 
children and it was reported to this worker that their mother had gone to the store and not been gone very 
long. They expected her home soon. Rose invited me into the home and I was able to interview Anna in 
the presence of her three older sisters as support persons. Since they are members of the family no 
confidentiality form was necessary. I spent some time talking about ordinary things abcyif her life. Anna 
was quite verbal and seemed to be very comfortable with talking with me. In fact, I stayecl at the home for 
approx. 45 minutes and as I left to go Anna blocked the door and did not want me to leave. In observing 
Anna at the time of this uhv it was noted that no bruising was observed on her face or her back. It is noted 
that the pictures Mr. Cox (fa) provided to DCFS have the date hand written in and there is no way to know 
when the pictures were actually taken or even if, in fact, it was not Mr. Cox himself who bruised his child 
and then photographed it. It is also noted that the pictures provided to DCFS at the time of this 
investigation do not appear to indicate any significant (or even minimal bruising) on Anna. Further, the 
pictures are said (by Mr. Cox) to have been taken on 4-28-99 yet no report of abuse was made until 5-3-
99, six full days after Mr. Cox states he observed and photographed the "bruising." In any case, at the 
time of this uhv no marks or signs of injury are noted on Anna. Anna did seem to have what appear to be 
the remains of a fever blister in the final stages of healing on her lip. Anna does not report having been 
abused by either parent. Anna appeared comfortable there in the home with her sisters. She was 
aqequately clothed and groomed. I spent 45 minutes at the home waiting for mother to return from the 
store but finally left at about 8:45PM. The children were watching a movie (James and the Giant Peach) 
when I left and seemed to be fine in the care of their older sister Rose. It is noted that the condition of the 
home was adequate for daily living. Sparsely furnished and quite old, but still adequate. It is also noted 
that the other three daughters of Wendy Lomsdal who were present at the time of this uhv were 
adequately clothed and appeared to be adequately cared for. Again, Rose reported to this worker that 
she had anticipated her mother's arrival home sooner and that she thought she would be back any time. 
She reported that her mother is ususally quite accurate in returning when she says she will, i left one of 
my cards and asked to have Wendy L call me as soon as she returns. (Lundahl, Wanda 01 Jun 99) 
05 May 99 08:15 3 minutes CLOV 
It was announced to me by my receptionist that Wendy Lomsdal was at my office and wanted to meet 
with me. Unfortunately I was scheduled in court and had other obligations and was unable to see her at 
that time. I asked my receptionist to please have her call me back with a time that would be appropriate 
and that would work for her and my schedules. It is noted that she did not have an appointment but she 
had apparently been told by her daughters of my visit the previous night and had been given the card and 
so she wanted to come and discuss the situation with me. (Lundahl, Wanda 01 Jun 99) 
05 May 99 09:30 30 minutes REV Reviewed Prior CPS Records 
I reviewed the prior DCFS records on this family. It is noted that in September of 1998 there was a 
sexual abuse allegation made where the alleged victim was David Jackson who was five years old. He is 
the son of Wendy Lomsdal. The alleged perpetrator was 15 year old Christopher Dudly who was the son 
Total Duration: 4 hr 29 min p> 
I V\ i 11 A n L I 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Ch,i-D ABUSE NEGLECT REPOki 
>rral Number: 
rral Start D/T 
865211 i Person Section 
19Apr99 14:14:37 
;e Completion D/T 20Apr99 12:28:22 
;e Worker: 
Lomsdal, Anne 
on/Office 
rral Source 
Peck,Mary-Jo Lomsdal, Wendy A 
N Ogden East Family Services Ackerman, Robin" 
{Jackson, David 
'Jackson, Sarah E 
Uackson, Rachel A 
Neighbor 
Name 
Last, First Ml 
Uackson, Alberta R 
Atwood, Starr A 
Gray, Sonny 
Client ID 
|070356177 
|0"90356i76" 
fe0044384" 
1060356177 
030356177 
|040356i77 
020356177 
19Mar95 I 
060410953 
(06037634T 
DOB IAge 
I 
D9Jun56 
1l4May59 
25Nov92 
I28JUI88 
p5Jan91 
19Dec86" 
I 
D6Mar84 
250ct79 
Role ReltoJM/F 
PV « 
4VI 
42PT 
39fJI 
GVI 
10M 
avi 
12Sl 
T9NT 
PV 
ivid 
FR 
BR 
r W feii" 
PR 
In 
Homej 
|Y 
|Y 
IN 
JY 
jr 
!Y 
IN 
N 
nilv Address 
iet Address : 156 West 400 North 
: LOGAN UT Zip: 84321 
Phone: ( 435 ) 753-9383 
rrative Section 
Brent is concerned because Wendy goes to work at 7 a.m. then brings her children home from school and leaves from about 4 p.m. to sometime 
jnd midnight every night. She states there is a 19 year-old brother in the home until he goes to work at midnight. A few weeks ago, Wendy was gone 
r the weekend and so referent's concern is that no one was home with the children from midnight until 8 the next morning when Sonny would have 
le home from work. Today she called because the four youngest children were playing outside, and she doesn't believe there is anyone home. She 
't verify that though. She is upset that Wendy is never home for her children. On Easter she came home from her boyfriend's at about noon. On 
iday's the children have called to invite referent's children to come over for a party, and when referent asks to talk to mother she is not home for those 
tys. She also states there have been times that she and other neighbors have fed the children at 9 p.m. because their mother never called them home 
dinner. She states the children sleep in the basement of the home and the blankets they have are crib sized blankets. She states the basement is 
shed, but it gets cold. 
j states Starr lives with her father. She came to live with her mother for a few weeks and couldn't stand it so went back to her dad's home. 
>e (Alberta) is not currently living in the home either. She is living with a friend of their family's, Robin. It was later discovered by DCFS this is Robin 
merman. 
0 stated was that Rachel was in state's custody for a while, about two years ago. 
we referent the on-call (crisis) number, as well as directed to her contact LCPD if she can't reach DCFS. 
at the time of the neglect occurring. Informed her this would not be investigated. 
le/Place to See Child(ren): 
le/Place to See Parent(s): 
ferent Source of Information: 
ndition of Home: 
tions Taken by On-Call/CPS: 
^cautions: 
ecial Conditions: 
asked her to call while the chili 
eferent Information 
ame: Baker, Sherry Rel To PV: Neighbor 
treet Address: 155 WEST 400 NORTH 
ity: Logan (State: UT 
Phone: ( 435 ) 755-9092 
Zip: 84321 
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Revised July, 1997 
3/11/98 
3/11/98 
3/11/98 
3/11/98 
II 
"am/an 
1110' 
1130 
, 1140 
1200 
1345 
FV 
TC 
FV 
FV 
i FV 
Det. Peterson and 1 went to and AnnaMarie's day care home. name is 
and lives at was outside with 
four children, two of whom were and AnnaMarie. said that first 
noticed the bruise on AnnaMarie's eye last Thursday (3/5/98) and was told by Wendy 
that Anna had fallen on a chair. said has been concerned with the 
children coming to home so hungry each mornijng. They are brought at 7:00 AM 
and are picked up at 4:00 PM. said that the arrangement is that feeds 
them breakfast and lunch (along with some snacks) but is worried that they might 
not be fed properly at night because they are so hungry in the morning. said 
that before that they didn't eat the night before. The kids are often 
dirty when they come. Today AnnaMarie had on the same clothes as yesterday and 
had gum on her face and dirty hair. Wendy brought some clean clothes for 
AnnaMarie. gave her a bath and stated that there were no other injuries on 
her other than the injury below her eye. The injury was still visible today. 1 took a 
few photographs of AnnaMarie and a couple of said has never 
noticed any suspicious injuries on the children. 
1 called the to speak with the referent, was not at work 
so 1 called and left a message on home phone > • requesting that 
call me. 
Det. Peterson and 1 went to the residence where Wendy apparently works by taking 
care of an elderly person. The address is • in Logan. No one 
1 answered the door. 
Det. Peterson and 1 went to the Lomsdal residence at 156 West 400 North in Logan. 
No one answered the door. Det. Peterson and 1 agreed that Law Enforcement would 
not seem to be needed any further on this investigation. 1 will attempt to contact 
Wendy later on in the day. 
1 rPtnrnpH tn _ hut nn nr\f* an<;wprpH thp Hnnr 
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Lomsdal.Anna Case ID: 867462 Service Type: C P S 
BtionDate: 02Jun99 10:00am Worker: Lundahl.Wanda 
Number Factor name 
hild's Interview/Interaction with Worker 
dren At Risk: Lomsdal.Anna 
iments: VERY O P E N AND ENGAGING. 
Risk level Risk short description 
A Child open 
Perp/Caretaker: Lomsdal.Wendy A 
Child's Perceived Fear of Caretaker and/or Perpetrator 
Idren At Risk: Lomsdal.Anna 
vments: 
A No fear 
Perp/Caretaker. Lomsdal.Wendy A 
Violence and Conflict Resolution in the family A No family violence 
ildren At Risk: Lomsdal.Anna Perp/Caretaker Lomsdal.Wendy A 
mments: AS IT RELATES TO WENDY L. AND HER FAMILY T H E R E IS NO DOCUMENTED VIOLENCE. 
Role Reversal in Family 
lildren At Risk: Perp/Caretaker 
omments: 
Availability of Housing 
hildren At Risk: Lomsdal.Anna 
omments: 
A Adequate housing and utilities 
Perp/Caretaker Lomsdal.Wendy A 
Emotional Maltreatment (*Refer to Policy 202.A.1.a.) 
Children At Risk: Lomsdal.Anna 
tomments: 
A No emotional maltreatment 
Perp/Caretaker: Lomsdal.Wendy A 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
EXHIBIT II 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
m 
I H C 
LOGAN REGIONAL HOSPITAL 
LOGAN, UTAH 
o*~~ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
EXHIBIT III (A) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-6-
today because there was a conflict. Stated that there was a 
conflict in their firm. 
MR. MATHEWS: Who is your client's new counsel? 
MR. LARSON: Well, that's why he has to get another 
one, because he had that Amanda — what's her name. I don't 
even know what her last name is now. 
THE COURT: But there is a conflict. So you still 
haven't obtained Counsel, then, Mr. Cox? 
MR. COX: No, I haven't. 
THE COURT: And Mr. Larson is no longer going to 
represent you? 
MR. COX: Me and him had a verbal agreement, and I'll 
honor that. So he's going to withdraw. 
MR. LARSON: The thing is when he came to me I told 
him, ^No custody battles or I'm not going to take the case, 
period." 
THE COURT: All right, and now there's a custody 
battle. 
MR. LARSON: Yeah, and he's got some evidence that 
certainly bears out a change in the complexion of things. I 
just — I'm not going to do a custody battle for poor people. 
It just don't work. 
THE COURT: All right. How long have the parties been 
separated? 
MS. COX: Since November 17th, when the protection order 
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was closed. 
THE COURT: In fact I wouldn't mind seeing that report 
before I set the matter — because looking at what I'm seeing 
here, I've seen these type of accidents before, these pictures 
here. 
MS. COX: Well, and he saw her when he came to my home. 
MR. MATHEWS: They did a full investigation. 
MS. COX: Mr. Yagee came to my home. 
MR. LARSON: I haven't seen it. Like I say, certainly 
there's an issue here that needs to be weighed, and that's the 
difficulty. 
THE COURT: Okay. What was the nature of the accident? 
MS. COX: May I speak or — 
MR. LARSON: Sure. Tell me what the accident — 
THE COURT: Tell me what happened. 
MS. COX: I was at class, and my older son and kids 
were watching Anna, and she was crawling from one couch to the 
chair next to it, and her hand slipped and she fell. I'm not 
sure which eye it was, but she hit her eye right here and it 
caused a bruise. There wasn't any swelling, or she didn't have 
a headache or anything. 
So that was Tuesday, and Keith picked her up Sunday 
morning and took her to the hospital. I found out about it 
because he told me, and I went and got copies of the medical 
report. 
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MR. MATHEWS: I will, your Honor. I'm wondering if we 
can — I will call Lori and ask her what her schedule is, but I 
would like to get this back on track to get this over with. So 
if we could have a — 
THE COURT: I'll review it in — let's review it in 
July? 
MS. COX: No, please, your Honor. 
THE COURT: It takes about at the most — or at the 
least, 60 days to get a custody evaluation completed. 
MS. COX: But will they start it without payment, your 
Honor? 
MR. MATHEWS: No. 
THE COURT: They won't start it without payment. 
MS. COX: Is there any way we can require him to have 
it paid within — so that it can be started? 
THE COURT: July what, did you say? 
COURT CLERK: July 9th at 2 o'clock. 
THE COURT: July 9th at 2 o'clock in the afternoon. 
If it hasn't been started at that time, then the Court may 
consider that Mr. Cox is no longer seeking custody of the minor 
child. So if you want custody, put your money where your mouth 
is and pay the custody evaluation so we can get it started. 
MR. COX: Okay. 
THE COURT: All right. Go ahead, Mr. Mathews. 
MR. MATHEWS: I'll call Lori Holmes and determine when 
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she can start the evaluation. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. MATHEWS: And if she can start the evaluation on 
a date certain, I will notify Mr. Cox somehow, through his 
Counsel or — 
MR. LARSON: What's your address? Let's put it on the 
record. 
MR. MATHEWS: I've got to have his address. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MS. COX: I don't know where he takes my daughter. 
MR. LARSON: What's your address? Tell the Judge where 
your address is. 
MR. COX: At 64 West 600 South is where I get my mail. 
MS. COX: That's not where he lives, your Honor. He 
won't tell me where he lives or where he's taking her. 
THE COURT: Tell Mr. Larson — I'm going to let you 
withdraw here in just a few moments. 
Ms. Cox, you're not prejudiced one iota by this 
Court's order today. We are continuing, the existing orders 
are in effect, and Anna is remaining with you on a temporary 
basis. We're just doing a custody evaluation. If everything 
turns out the way you say, then you have custody of this child 
on a permanent basis, but where he has the right as a father to 
assert custody, to assert that right, so we're going to have 
the investigation. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
EXHIBIT III (B) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-4-
THE COURT: All right. 
MS. DENHOLM: I think my understanding was more that 
he wanted to meet with us to explain the basis of his report, 
answer any questions that we had. Though I suppose — 
THE MATHEWS: I think his letter said that based on 
the outcome of the meeting that he may make some different 
recommendations. So I just assumed that that was kind of an 
informal mediation, and we don't have any objection to that. 
THE COURT: Ms. Denholm, let me tel'l you, if Dr. Price 
is willing to go to that effort, then I think that you ought to 
pursue it. Dr. Price is held with great esteem by this Court. 
I've read many, many custody evaluations from many different 
evaluators. I don't know of one that is better than Dr. Price. 
So if the two of you are able to meet with him, and 
he's willing to try to work out or explain the basis of his 
— I think it's fully explained in his evaluation, but if he 
wishes to meet with you to explain further his recommendations, 
and hopefully reach a resolution that the two of you can make, 
fine. Then let's let him do that, and save you some further 
litigation. 
It's always a — this is always a good time for a 
reality check. Mr. Cox, it is. It's a good time for a reality 
check. I think that both of you, from what Dr. Price has told 
me, are good parents. Both of you can provide and have good 
parenting skills with Anna, but if he were called to testify, 
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keep in mind that children are programmed or bribed —xx well, 
let me just back up and ask you one question before we get into 
that. How old was Anna when you went to do the evaluation? 
A. When I was doing the evaluation, she was three years 
of age. 
Q. Okay. 
A. When I started in July 22nd, 1998, she was three years 
of age. 
Q. I was interested in what you had to say,* because I 
know that she's a young child, a toddler, which I guess would 
be accurate. You talk about — in that paragraph you talk 
about children who may be programmed, and then you talk about 
how you get around that by relying on non-verbal responses. 
Could you go into that just a little bit and explain to the 
Court how that's done. 
A. Because of Anna Marie's age, and I wasn't able to use 
the normal tests and evaluations that I would,use on a child 
who is five-and-a-half or older, I had Anna Marie evaluated by 
one of my colleagues, Susan Erickson, and there was a Denver 
Developmental Report that was done. Starts on page 8. 
What I was interested in seeing was Anna was — if she 
was on task with her developmental issues, and about what sort 
of things she might struggle with and what would be her areas 
that she needed to improve and if she had any deficits. 
Q. Okay, and this was done through non-verbal responses? 
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regularf consistent visitation, and that the Court should be 
able to insure that he be allowed to have access and visitation 
with his daughter. 
Q. There's no suggestion here that Anna doesn't love her 
parents. 
A. No, I think Anna loves both of her parents, and I 
think Anna enjoys spending time with both parents. 
Q. That recommendation that you just articulated to the 
Court, is that still your recommendation today? 
A. Well, as far as I have information, that's still my 
recommendation. 
MR. MATHEWS: Thank you, Dr. Price. 
THE COURT: Ms. Balmain. 
MS. BALMAIN: Thank you. I have just a few questions. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MS. BALMAIN: 
Q. Do you recall what address it was that you did visit 
Mr. Cox at? 
A. At 619 East 400 North, Logan, Utah. 
Q. Do you recall how many different addresses he had 
during the course of your evaluation? 
A. At least three that I was aware of, because I think 
shortly after I visited this twice, he moved. 
Q. Okay. Did you review any of the records regarding the 
allegations that another child of Ms. Lomsdahl had been abused? 
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A. To be the primary parent or to take care of her? 
Q. To be the primary parent. 
A. Well, the number of times you'd moved. That you don't 
have — you're not able to demonstrate the parenting knowledge, 
reservoir of knowledge, the parenting skills. The fact that 
Anna has siblings that she's very attached to, and I think she 
would be very upset if you took them away from her. 
Q. You've already answered the question. 
A. Thank you. Q. You state on page 13 in paragraph 2 
that XXI do not believe that Wendy's emotional problems at the 
present time interfere with her parenting with her children." 
Do you believe she does have emotional problems? 
A. I think she struggles with depression. I think she 
has some issues that have not been resolved about what we've 
previously talked about being able to maintain a relationship 
with a husband, but I don't think there's anything that I'm 
aware of that interferes with her being a good parent. 
Q. At point B on Rule 4-903, the second sentence says, 
"Anna has six other siblings." 
A. Or has siblings. 
Q. There's only one Anna, but she has ten siblings. 
A. Is that including yours in Missouri? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I was focusing on the ones living with Wendy, but 
you're right. 
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a forwarding address of phone. So then I left word with the 
gentleman that if possible to have Mr. Cox contact me so that 
I could get his address. The Court had strongly ordered in 
the previous hearing that Mr. Cox keep the Court aware of his 
address. 
I went and met with Mr. Cox on a Wednesday evening at 
the usual time he picked up Anna at 5:30, and informed him at 
that time that I needed to know where he lived before he could 
take Anna to that residence, and he was uncooperative at that 
time, didn't want to tell me. 
He said that he had sent a letter to Wendy Lomsdahl 
with the correct address in it, and apparently Ms. Lomsdahl 
did not open this letter and just returned it, and he felt that 
that was adequate to inform the Court and myself and whoever 
else needed to know of his address. 
There was some discussion about it, and Mr. Cox became 
a little bit threatening. So I called the Logan City Police 
Department. Mr. Cox left the scene. Logan City showed up and 
he came back and there was some discussion at that time as to 
what was going on. 
Q. Okay, and so did Mr. Cox visit with Anna that night? 
A. No. 
Q. In September of 1998? 
A. No. 
MR. COX: What date was this? 
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A. Yes, it was. 
Q. So that I could — you testified you went to ascertain 
where he was living; is that correct? 
A. I'm sorry, repeat the question. 
Q. You went to — that particular night you testified to, 
the purpose of that contact was to ascertain his new address; 
is that correct? 
A. Right, and I felt at that time that he hadn't complied 
with the Court order, which was to keep us all in-formed — the 
Court and the guardian ad litem's office — of his present 
address, and told him that I was — or that he was not allowed 
to take Anna that night until he complied with that order. 
Q. And he refused? 
A. He did. 
THE COURT: Mr. Cox, do you have questions of this 
witness? 
MR. COX: Yes. , 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. COX: 
Q. How many times did you refuse me my visitation with my 
daughter? 
A. As to my recollection, I think it was twice. 
Q. Uh-huh. One was on the 9th of September? 
A. Yes, that's correct. 
Q. And did I ask you a question, "Where do you get your 
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There's a living room, kitchen, bathroom, and two bedrooms 
upstairs, and what is now three bedrooms downstairs, with a 
backyard, (inaudible) and big tree. 
Q. And you live there with whom? 
A. Sunny Gray, who is my oldest. He's 20. He works and 
pays me rent. Star Atwood, who will be 16 in March. She is my 
oldest daughter. She's been there since November 1st, when her 
stepmother asked me to bring her to my home. Also, there's 
Rose Jackson, who is 13. She goes to Mount Logan'Middle 
School. Her and Sarah and David and Rachel are all full 
brothers and sisters. Sarah — 
Q. You're getting ahead of yourself. 
A. Okay. Sarah is 11; she goes to Edith Bowen. Rachel 
is 9; she goes to Edith Bowen. David is 7; he goes to Edith 
Bowen. Then Anna Marie is almost 5, and she goes to Head 
Start. 
Q. Okay, and how old is Rachel? » 
A. Rachel is now 9 years old. She was baptized just 
January. Maybe she's 8. I'm sorry. 
Q. And they're all living with you at this point? 
A. Yes, they are. 
Q. Do you have any children who are not living with you? 
A. No, I don't. 
Q. All of your children live with you; three of whom — 
now, you have Anna, who is the youngest? 
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THE COURT: Go ahead. I don't hear an objection. 
Answer the way you feel appropriate. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. "Alert, very quiet female patient 
brought to ED by father. Father concerned of possible physical 
abuse by mother. Divorced father had visitation — * looks 
like "on Sunday. Picked child up this morning." 
"Noted one centimeter abrasion with contusion left 
eye orbit, brownish yellow in color. Eyes tracked well. Neck 
supple, no drainage from ears, good bilateral breath sounds. 
Two small one-centimeter yellowish contusions posterior thorax, 
left scapular area. Abdomen soft. No nausea, vomiting. Large 
birthmark right lower quadrant to right thigh. Multiple old 
contusions over bony providences." 
"Father requests photos be taken. Child nonverbal 
with RN. Will shake head yes or no. Did tell father that she 
hit her eye on chair. No other signs and symptoms of trauma. 
Father almost badgering with child. Told to refrain from doing 
» 
that multiple times." 
Q. The copy I've got is just a little bit different than 
that. Oh, okay. I guess this was a printout up here. Okay. 
Is this your handwriting on this page? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. I've got the pictures somewhere. 
THE COURT: Would you like these marked, Mr. Cox? 
MR. COX: What? 
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THE COURT: Would you like these marked and introduced 
into evidence? 
MR. COX: I sure would. 
THE COURT: Any objection to the Court receiving these 
into evidence? 
MS. BALMAIN: No, thank you. 
MR. MATHEWS: No. 
THE COURT: Be received. 
(Exhibit No. 2 received into evidence) 
THE COURT: Ask your next question, Mr. Cox. 
MR. COX: Yeah. 
Q. BY MR. COX: Who arrived at the decision that this 
should be reported to Social Services? 
A. That's our policy that we do that. If there's any 
question of abuse, we report. 
Q. On the front page of that report does it say that you 
asked me to refer? 
A. No. It just says you were concerned about possible 
physical abuse by mother. Nowhere do I have that you request 
that that be reported. I just automatically do that according 
to our policy. 
Q. You did ask me, though, if it would be all right, 
right? 
A. I don't specifically remember that. I don't normally 
ask that of people. I mean, I just in any — 
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THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection. Strike the 
answer. Now, Mr. Cox, I don't want you asking him any more 
questions about child support. It's not his realm to testify 
about that. 
Q. BY MR. COX: How often have I contacted you since I've 
been here by phone and otherwise? 
A. Frequently. Probably every-other week. 
MR. COX: I guess that's all I have. 
THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. Mathews? 
MR. MATHEWS: No. 
THE COURT: Ms. Balmain? 
MS. BALMAIN: tio, thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. You may step down. 
Mr. Cox, do you have any additional witnesses? 
MR. COX: I'd like to call Dianne Balmain to get her to 
confirm this material that came from Missouri. 
MS. BALMAIN: May I respond? 
THE COURT: You may. 
MS. BALMAIN: My role as guardian ad litem doesn't 
allow me to be a witness in the case. I'm a lawyer and an 
advocate for one of the parties. If Mr. Cox would like me 
to verify to the Court that I did receive some records from 
Missouri regarding past abuse of Ms. Lomsdahl's other children 
who were (inaudible) by a former partner of hers, I'd be glad 
to do that. 
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THE COURT: Very well. 
MS. BALMAIN: That is information that I received from 
Mr. Cox. Also I provided that to DCFS as part of one of their 
investigations. 
MR. COX: I'd like this to be entered into evidence/ 
the investigative summary. 
THE COURT: Do you want to respond, Ms. Balmain? 
MS. BALMAIN: I can respond. Unfortunately those 
records are part of the Missouri Division of Child and Family 
Services records, and my thought, actually, as to how that 
information would come before the Court is that I had called 
Wanda Lundall to testify. She's the last one of the DCFS 
personnel in Utah to do an investigation, and as part of her 
investigation she did review all of the prior investigations, 
which included all of the documentation from Missouri. 
I didn't offer any of the specifics of any of the DCFS 
investigations because it's rather voluminous, and some of the 
forms are difficult to understand if you're not acquainted with 
them on a day-to-day basis. So I don't necessarily have an 
objection to that investigative summary coming into the Court's 
attention, but I would want to articulate to the Court that the 
information therein was considered as part of any investigation 
regarding any risk to Anna at this time. 
Frankly what happened was that one of Ms. Lomsdahl's 
older children, who was actually very young at that time, was 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-170-
MS. BALMAIN: I know that she didf because I gave it to 
her. 
THE COURT: All right. Very well. Mr. Mathews, do you 
have a response to the proffer of these documents? 
MR. MATHEWS: Well, I think if we're going to allow 
those documents to come in as evidence, then certainly the 
summary of the investigations that were done here by DCFS, 
those should be appended, attached with those documents, 
so that the Court has a full view of what was examined*and 
considered here when DCFS in Utah made their reports on what 
those conclusions were. 
THE COURT: Let me indicate — 
MR. MATHEWS: Otherwise — oh, go ahead. 
THE COURT: Let me indicate to all parties we've got to 
short circuit it here. You know you can become inundated with 
information. The Court's reviewed all of the documentation 
which has been submitted to it. The Court has also* reviewed 
the testimony by Ms. Lundall. 
I have no objections to receiving the documents. 
I think your point is well taken, Mr. Cox. If you want the 
actual reports to be made a part of the evidence and you want 
to produce the summary, the Court will receive it. 
I don't think that's going to make any difference, the 
actual receipt of the documents. I'm well aware of what went 
on in both places. It may be a lot to do about nothing to see 
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Article III 
Section 1. The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such 
inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The judges, both of the 
supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour, and shall, at stated times, 
receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in 
office. 
Section 2. The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, 
the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority;—to all 
cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;--to all cases of admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction;—to controversies to which the United States shall be a party;-to controversies between two 
or more statesi-between a state and citizens of another statei-between citizens of different 
states;-between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states, and between a 
state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects. 
In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be 
party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the 
Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under 
such regulations as the Congress shall make. 
The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held in 
the state where the said crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any state, the 
trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed. 
Section 3. Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying war against them, or in 
adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless 
on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court. 
The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason, but no attainder of treason shall 
work corruption of blood, or forfeiture except during the life of the person attainted. 
• Next Article-Previous Article 
• Table of Articles and Amendments 
• Overview of Full Constitution 
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AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning - Due process of law and just compensation 
clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or 
in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be 
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
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AMENDMENT IX 
[Rights retained by people.] 
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others retained by the people. 
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AMENDMENT X 
[Powers reserved to states or people.] 
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. 
© 2000 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., one of the LEXIS PublishingTM companies. All rights reserved. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 
1. [Citizenship - Due process of law - Equal protection.] 
2. [Representatives - Power to reduce appointment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
4. [Public debt not to be questioned - Debts of the Confederacy and claims not to be paid.] 
5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship - Due process of law - Equal protection.] 
All persons bom or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, 
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representatives - Power to reduce appointment] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective 
numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But 
when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President 
of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, 
or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, 
being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except 
for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced 
in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male 
citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of President and Vice 
President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, 
having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, 
or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion 
against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of 
two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned - Debts of the Confederacy and claims not to 
be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts 
incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or 
rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay 
any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or 
any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations, and claims 
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shall be held illegal and void. 
Sec, 5. [Power to enforce amendment] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this 
article. 
History: Proposed by Congress on June 16, 1866; declared to have been ratified by three-fourths 
of all the states on July 28,1868. 
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Ch.21 GENERALLY 42 § 1 9 8 3 
§ 1 9 8 3 . Civil action for deprivation of rights 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of 
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the 
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action 
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For 
the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusive-
ly to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of 
the District of Columbia. 
(R.S. § 1979; Pub.L. 96-170, § 1, Dec. 29, 1979, 93 Stat. 1284.) 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Revision Notes and Legislative Reports ing "Territory," and provisions relating 
1979 Acts. House Report No. 96-548, to Acts of Congress applicable solely to 
see 1979 U.S. Code Cong, and Adm. the District of Columbia. 
News, p. 2609. 
Codifi ti Effective Dates 
» o K m-7n • t. A ,. A ™ io-7i 1979 Acts. Amendment by Pub.L. 
R.S. § 1979 is from Act Apr. 20, 1871,
 n , . - A ,. u l . . •* t 
22 § 1 17 Stat 13 96-170 applicable with respect to any 
' ' '
 f , , r. i deprivation of rights, privileges, or immu-
Secuon was formerly classified to sec-
 n i t i e s s e c u r e d b t h e Constitution and 
toon 43 of Title 8, Aliens and Nationality.
 l a w s o c c u r r i n g a f t e r D e c . 29, 1979, see 
Amendments section 3 of Pub.L. 96-170, set out as a 
1979 Amendments. Pub.L. 96-170 add- note under section 1343 of Title 28, Judi-
ed "or the District of Columbia" follow- ciary and Judicial Procedure. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Attorney's fees to prevailing party other than United States, see 42 USCA § 1988. 
Citizenship clause, see USCA Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. 
Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights, damages for, see 42 USCA § 1985. 
Institutionalized persons required to exhaust remedies to maintain action under 
this section, see 42 USCA § 1997e. 
Jurisdiction of district courts of civil rights actions, see 28 USCA § 1343. 
Privileges and immunities clauses, see USCA Const. Art. IV § 2, cl. 1 and Amend. 
XIV, § 1. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Administrative Law 
Defense against discrimination, complaint, see West's Federal Practice Manual 
§ 16321 et seq. 
Discriminatory zoning, see West's Federal Practice Manual § 12763. 
Exhaustion doctrine, application of, see Koch, Administrative Law and Practice 
§ 13.5 
Federal jurisdiction, see West's Federal Practice Manual § 7521 et seq. 
Habeas corpus, see Koch, Administrative Law and Practice § 8.15. 
Immunity, see Koch, Administrative Law and Practice § 10.78 
Preliminary procedures, see West's Federal Practice Manual § 16161 et seq. 
Preparation of complaint, see West's Federal Practice Manual §§ 7966, 9084. 
Procedural techniques of constitutional damage suit, see Koch, Administrative 
Law and Practice § 7.42 
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Article I, Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; to 
acquire, possess and protect property; to worship according to the dictates of their consciences; to 
assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances; to communicate 
freely their thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right. 
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Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
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Article I, Section 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or 
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in 
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
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Article I, Section 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws - Impairing contracts.] 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 
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Article I, Section 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
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Article I, Section 26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.] 
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express words they are 
declared to be otherwise. 
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Article I, Section 27. [Fundamental rights.] 
Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the security of individual rights and the 
perpetuity of free government. 
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Article IV, Section 1. [Equal political rights.] 
The rights of citizens of the State of Utah to vote and hold office shall not be denied or abridged on 
account of sex. Both male and female citizens of this State shall enjoy equally all civil, political and 
religious rights and privileges. 
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30-3-3. Award of costs, attorney and witness fees - Temporary alimony. 
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and in any action to establish an 
order of custody, visitation, child support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, 
the court may order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and witness fees, including expert 
witness fees, of the other party to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action. The 
order may include provision for costs of the action. 
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, visitation, child support, alimony, or 
division of property in a domestic case, the court may award costs and attorney fees upon 
determining that the party substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense. The court, in its 
discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a party if the court finds the party is 
impecunious or enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees. 
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may order a party to provide money, 
during the pendency of the action, for the separate support and maintenance of the other party 
and of any children in the custody of the other party. 
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the final order or judgment may be 
amended during the course of the action or in the final order or judgment. 
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30-3-4. Pleadings - Findings - Decree - Use of affidavit - Sealing. 
(1) (a) The complaint shall be in writing and signed by the petitioner or petitioner's attorney. 
(b) A decree of divorce may not be granted upon default or otherwise except upon legal 
evidence taken in the cause. If the decree is to be entered upon the default of the respondent, 
evidence to support the decree may be submitted upon the affidavit of the petitioner with the 
approval of the court. 
(c) If the petitioner and the respondent have a child or children, a decree of divorce may not 
be granted until both parties have attended the mandatory course described in Section 30-3-11.3, 
and have presented a certificate of course completion to the court. The court may waive this 
requirement, on its own motion or on the motion of one of the parties, if it determines course 
attendance and completion are not necessary, appropriate, feasible, or in the best interest of the 
parties. 
(d) All hearings and trials for divorce shall be held before the court or the court commissioner 
as provided by Section 78-3-31 and rules of the Judicial Council. The court or the commissioner 
in all divorce cases shall enter the decree upon the evidence or, in the case of a decree after 
default of the respondent, upon the petitioner's affidavit. 
(2) The file, except the decree of divorce, may be sealed by order of the court upon the 
motion of either party. The sealed portion of the file is available to the public only upon an order 
of the court. The concerned parties, the attorneys of record or attorney filing a notice of 
appearance in the action, the Office of Recovery Services if a party to the proceedings has 
applied for or is receiving public assistance, or the court have full access to the entire record. 
This sealing does not apply to subsequent filings to enforce or amend the decree. 
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30-3-5.2. Allegations of child abuse or child sexual abuse - Investigation. 
When, in any divorce proceeding or upon a request for modification of a divorce decree, an 
allegation of child abuse or child sexual abuse is made, implicating either party, the court, after 
making an inquiry, may order that an investigation be conducted by the Division of Child and 
Family Services within the Department of Human Services in accordance with Title 62A, 
Chapter 4a. A final award of custody or visitation may not be rendered until a report on that 
investigation, consistent with Section 62A-4a-412, is received by the court. That investigation 
shall be conducted by the Division of Child and Family Services within 30 days of the court's 
notice and request for an investigation. In reviewing this report, the court shall comply with 
Section 78-7-9. 
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30-3-10. Custody of children in case of separation or divorce - Custody consideration. 
(1) If a husband and wife having minor children are separated, or their marriage is declared 
void or dissolved, the court shall make an order for the future care and custody of the minor 
children as it considers appropriate. In determining custody, the court shall consider the best 
interests of the child and the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of the 
parties. The court may inquire of the children and take into consideration the children's desires 
regarding future custody or visitation schedules, but the expressed desires are not controlling and 
the court may determine the children's custody or visitation otherwise. Interviews with the 
children may be conducted by the judge in camera only with the prior consent of the parties. 
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider, among other factors the court finds 
relevant, which parent is most likely to act in the best interests of the child, including allowing 
the child frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent as the court finds 
appropriate. 
(3) If the court finds that one parent does not desire custody of the child, or has attempted to 
permanently relinquish custody to a third party, it shall take that evidence into consideration in 
determining whether to award custody to the other parent. 
(4) (a) A court may not discriminate against a parent due to a disability, as defined in Section 
57-21-2, in awarding custody or determining whether a substantial change has occurred for the 
purpose of modifying an award of custody. 
(b) If a court takes a parent's disability into account in awarding custody or determining 
whether a substantial change has occurred for the purpose of modifying an award of custody, the 
parent with a disability may rebut any evidence, presumption, or inference arising therefrom by 
showing that: 
(i) the disability does not significantly or substantially inhibit the parent's ability to provide 
for the physical and emotional needs of the child at issue; or 
(ii) the parent with a disability has sufficient human, monetary, or other resources available to 
supplement the parent's ability to provide for the physical and emotional needs of the child at 
issue. 
(c) Nothing in this section may be construed to apply to: 
(i) abuse, neglect, or dependency proceedings under Title 62A, Chapter 4a, Child and Family 
Services, or Title 78, Chapter 3a, Juvenile Courts; or 
(ii) adoption proceedings under Title 78, Chapter 30, Adoption. 
History: L. 1903, ch. 82, § 1; C.L. 1907, § 1212x; C.L. 1917, § 3004; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
40-3-10; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 7; 1977, ch. 122, § 5; 1988, ch. 106, § 1; 1993, ch. 131, § 1; 1997, 
c h . 4 3 , § l ; 1 9 9 9 , c h . 6 , § l . 
Amendment Notes. - The 1997 amendment, effective May 5,1997, added Subsection (4). 
The 1999 amendment, effective May 3, 1999, in Subsection (1) inserted "or visitation" and "or 
visitation schedules" in the third sentence and added the last sentence, and substituted "Child and Family 
Services" for "Family Services" in Subsection (4)(c)(i). 
Cross-References. - Disposition of property and children, § 30-3-5. 
Removal of children from homestead, §30-2-10. r 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Compiler's Notes. - In 1997, the Utah legislature changed the designation of parties in domestic 
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30-3-10.4. Modification or termination of order. 
(1) On the motion of one or both of the joint legal custodians the court may, after a hearing, 
modify an order that established joint legal custody if: 
(a) the circumstances of the child or one or both custodians have materially and substantially 
changed since the entry of the order to be modified, or the order has become unworkable or 
inappropriate under existing circumstances; and 
(b) a modification of the terms and conditions of the decree would be an improvement for 
and in the best interest of the child. 
(2) The order of joint legal custody shall be terminated by order of the court if both parents 
file a motion for termination. At the time of entry of an order terminating joint legal custody, the 
court shall enter an order of sole legal custody under Section 30-3-10. All related issues, 
including visitation and child support, shall also be determined and ordered by the court. 
(3) If the court finds that an action under this section is filed or answered frivolously and in a 
manner designed to harass the other party, the court shall assess attorney's fees as costs against 
the offending party. 
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62A-4a-412. Reports and information confidential. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, reports made pursuant to this part, as well as any 
other information in the possession of the division obtained as the result of a report is confidential and 
may only be made available to: 
(a) a police or law enforcement agency investigating a report of known or suspected child abuse or 
neglect; 
(b) a physician who reasonably believes that a child may be the subject of abuse or neglect; 
(c) an agency that has responsibility or authority to care for, treat, or supervise a child who is the 
subject of a report; 
(d) a contract provider that has a written contract with the division to render services to a child who is 
the subject of a report; 
(e) any subject of the report, the natural parents of the minor, and the guardian ad litem; 
(f) a court, upon a finding that access to the records may be necessary for the determination of an 
issue before it, provided that in a divorce, custody, or related proceeding between private parties, the 
record alone is: 
(i) limited to objective or undisputed facts that were verified at the time of the investigation; and 
(ii) devoid of conclusions drawn by the division or any of its workers on the ultimate issue of whether 
or not a person's acts or omissions constituted any level of abuse or neglect of another person; 
(g) an office of the public prosecutor or its deputies in performing an official duty; 
(h) a person authorized by a Children's Justice Center, for the purposes described in Section 
67-5b-102; 
(i) a person engaged in bona fide research, when approved by the director of the division, if the 
information does not include names and addresses; 
(j) the State Office of Education, acting on behalf of itself or on behalf of a school district, for the 
purpose of evaluating whether an individual should be permitted to obtain or retain a license as an 
educator or serve as an employee or volunteer in a school, limited to information with substantiated 
findings involving an alleged sexual offense, an alleged felony or class A misdemeanor drug offense, or 
any alleged offense against the person under Title 76, Chapter 5, Offenses Against the Person, and with 
the understanding that the office must provide the subject of a report received under Subsection (l)(k) 
with an opportunity to respond to the report before making a decision concerning licensure or 
employment; and 
(k) any person identified in the report as a perpetrator or possible perpetrator of child abuse or 
neglect, after being advised of the screening prohibition in Subsection (2). 
(2) (a) No person, unless listed in Subsection (1), may request another person to obtain or release a 
report or any other information in the possession of the division obtained as a result of the report that is 
available under Subsection (l)(k) to screen for potential perpetrators of child abuse or neglect. 
(b) A person who requests information knowing that it is a violation of Subsection (2)(a) to do so is 
subject to the criminal penalty in Subsection (4). 
(3) Except as provided in Subsection 62A-4a-116 (8)(c), the division and law enforcement officials 
shall ensure the anonymity of the person or persons making the initial report and any others involved in 
its subsequent investigation. 
(4) Any person who wilfully permits, or aides and abets the release of data or information obtained as 
a result of this part, in the possession of the division or contained on any part of the management 
information system, in violation of this part or Section 62A-4a-116, is guilty of a class C misdemeanor. 
(5) The physician-patient privilege is not a ground for excluding evidence regarding a child's injuries 
or the cause of those injuries, in any proceeding resulting from a report made in good faith pursuant to 
this part. 
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76-5-301.1. Child kidnaping. 
(1) A person commits child kidnaping when the person intentionally or knowingly, without authority 
of law and against the will of the victim, by any means and in any manner, seizes, confines, detains, or 
transports a child under the age of 14 with intent to keep or conceal the child from its parent, guardian, 
or other person having lawful custody or control of the child. 
(2) A seizure, confinement, detention, or transportation is deemed to be against the will of the victim 
if the victim is younger than 14 years of age at the time of the offense, and the seizure, confinement, 
detention, or transportation, is without the effective consent of the victim's custodial parent, guardian, or 
person acting in loco parentis. 
(3) Violation of Section 76-5-303 is not a violation of this section. 
(4) Child kidnaping is a first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of 
not less than 6,10, or 15 years and which may be for life. Imprisonment is mandatory in accordance 
with Section 76-3-406. 
Amended by Chapter 40,1996 General Session 
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76-5-303. Custodial interference. (1) A person, whether a parent or other, is guilty of custodial 
interference if, without good cause, the actor takes, entices, conceals, or detains a child under the age of 
16 from its parent, guardian, or other lawful custodian: 
(a) Knowing the actor has no legal right to do so; and 
(b) With intent to hold the child for a period substantially longer than the visitation or custody period 
previously awarded by a court of competent jurisdiction. 
(2) A person, whether a parent or other, is guilty of custodial interference if, having actual physical 
custody of a child under the age of 16 pursuant to a judicial award of any court of competent jurisdiction 
which grants to another person visitation or custody rights, and without good cause the actor conceals or 
detains the child with intent to deprive the other person of lawful visitation or custody rights. 
(3) Custodial interference is a class A misdemeanor unless the child is removed and taken from one 
state to another, in which case it is a felony of the third degree. 
Amended by Chapter 18,1984 General Session 
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78-7-9. Appointment of attorney guardian ad litem in child abuse and neglect 
proceedings. 
(1) If child abuse, child sexual abuse, or neglect is alleged in any proceeding in any state 
court, the court may upon its own motion or shall upon the motion of any party to the proceeding 
appoint an attorney guardian ad litem to represent the best interest of the child, in accordance 
with Sections 78-3a-911 and 78-3a-912. 
(2) The court may appoint an attorney guardian ad litem, when it considers it necessary and 
appropriate, to represent the best interest of the child in all related proceedings conducted in any 
state court involving the alleged abuse, child sexual abuse, or neglect. 
(3) The attorney guardian ad litem shall be appointed in accordance with and meet the 
requirements of Sections 78-3a-911 and 78-3a-912. 
(4) If an attorney guardian ad litem has been appointed for the child by any court in the state 
in any prior proceeding or related matter, the court may continue that appointment or may 
reappoint that attorney guardian ad litem, if still available, to act on behalf of the child. 
(5) The court is responsible for all costs resulting from the appointment of an attorney 
guardian ad litem and shall use funds appropriated by the Legislature for the guardian ad litem 
program to cover those costs. 
(6) If the court appoints a guardian ad litem attorney pursuant to this section or Section 
78-3a-912, the court may assess all or part of those attorney's fees, court costs, paralegal, staff, 
and volunteer expenses against the minor's parent or parents in an amount that the court 
determines to be just and appropriate. The court may not assess those fees or costs against a 
parent who is found to be impecunious. 
(7) An attorney guardian ad litem appointed in accordance with the requirements of this 
section and Sections 78-3a-911 and 78-3a-912 is, when serving in the scope of duties of an 
attorney guardian ad litem, considered an employee of this state for purposes of indemnification 
under the Governmental Immunity Act 
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78-45c-201. Initial child custody jurisdiction. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 78-45c-204, a court of this state has jurisdiction to make 
an initial child custody determination only if: 
(a) this state is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or was 
the home state of the child within six months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child 
is absent from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state; 
(b) a court of another state does not have jurisdiction under Subsection (l)(a), or a court of the home 
state of the child has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this state is the more appropriate 
forum under Section 78-45c-207 or 78-45c-208; and 
(i) the child and the child's parents, or the child and at least one parent or a person acting as a parent 
have a significant connection with this state other than mere physical presence; and 
(ii) substantial evidence is available in this state concerning the child's care, protection, training, and 
personal relationships; 
(c) all courts having jurisdiction under Subsection (l)(a) or (b) have declined to exercise jurisdiction 
on the ground that a court of this state is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the 
child under Section 78-45c-207 or 78-45c-208; or 
(d) no state would have jurisdiction under Subsection (l)(a), (b), or (c). 
(2) Subsection (1) is the exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a child custody determination by a 
court of this state. 
(3) Physical presence of, or personal jurisdiction over, a party or a child is neither necessary nor 
sufficient to make a child custody determination. 
Enacted by Chapter 247, 2000 General Session 
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Rule 201. Judicial notice of adjudicative facts. 
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial notice of adjudicative facts. 
(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in 
that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) 
capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot 
reasonably be questioned. 
(c) When discretionary. A court may take judicial notice, whether requested or not. 
(d) When mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied 
with the necessary information. 
(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled upon timely request to an opportunity to be 
heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the matter noticed. In the 
absence of prior notification, the request may be made after judicial notice has been taken. 
(f) Time of taking notice. Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the proceeding. 
(g) Instructing jury. In a civil action or proceeding, the court shall instruct the jury to accept 
as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. In a criminal case, the court shall instruct the jury that it 
may, but is not required to, accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. 
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Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial. 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as 
a witness: 
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event or condition 
made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter. 
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the 
declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. 
(3) Then existing mental, emotional or physical condition. A statement of the declarant's 
then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, 
motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory 
or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, 
identification, or terms of declarant's will. 
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Statements made for purposes 
of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, 
pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof 
insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. 
(5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a 
witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify 
fully and accurately, shown to have been made or adopted by the witness when the matter was 
fresh in the witness' memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the 
memorandum or record may be read into evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit 
unless offered by an adverse party. 
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data 
compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses, made at or near the 
time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a 
regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to 
make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the 
custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of information or the method or 
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in this 
paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every 
kind, whether or not conducted for profit. 
(7) Absence of entry in records kept in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (6). 
Evidence that a matter is not included in the memoranda, reports, records, or data compilations, 
in any form, kept in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph (6), to prove the nonoccurrence 
or nonexistence of the matter, if the matter was of a kind of which a memorandum, report, 
record, or data compilation was regularly made and preserved, unless the sources of information 
or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any 
form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B) 
matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, 
excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law 
enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in 
criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority 
granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of 
trustworthiness. 
(9) Records of vital statistics. Records or data compilations, in any form, of births, fetal 
deaths, deaths, or marriages, if the report thereof was made to a public office pursuant to 
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requirements of law. 
(10) Absence of public record or entry. To prove the absence of a record, report, statement, or 
data compilation, in any form, or the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of a matter of which a 
record, report, statement, or data compilation in any form, was regularly made and preserved by a 
public office or agency, evidence in the form of a certification in accordance with Rule 902, or 
testimony, that diligent search failed to disclose the record, report, statement, or data 
compilation, or entry. 
(11) Records of religious organization. Statements of births, marriages, divorces, deaths, 
legitimacy, ancestry, relationship by blood or marriage, or other similar facts of personal or 
family history, contained in a regularly kept record of a religious organization. 
(12) Marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates. Statements of fact contained in a 
certificate that the maker performed a marriage or other ceremony or administered a sacrament, 
made by a clergyman, public official, or other person authorized by the rules or practices of a 
religious organization or by law to perform the act certified, and purporting to have been issued 
at the time of the act or within a reasonable time thereafter. 
(13) Family records. Statements of fact concerning personal or family history contained in 
family Bibles, genealogies, charts, engravings on rings, inscriptions on family portraits, 
engravings on urns, crypts, or tombstones, or the like. 
(14) Records of documents affecting an interest in property. The record of a document 
purporting to establish or affect an interest in property, as proof of the content of the original 
recorded document and its execution and delivery by each person by whom it purports to have 
been executed, if the record is a record of a public office and an applicable statute authorizes the 
recording of documents of that kind in that office. 
(15) Statements in documents affecting an interest in property. A statement contained in a 
document purporting to establish or affect an interest in property if the matter stated was relevant 
to the purpose of the document, unless dealings with the property since the document was made 
have been inconsistent with the truth of the statement or the purport of the document. 
(16) Statements in ancient documents. Statements in a document in existence twenty years or 
more the authenticity of which is established. 
(17) Market reports, commercial publications. Market quotations, tabulations, lists, 
directories, or other published compilations, generally used and relied upon by the public or by 
persons in particular occupations. 
(18) Learned treatises. To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness upon 
cross-examination or relied upon by the expert witness in direct examination, statements 
contained in published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or 
other science or art, established as a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the 
witness or by other expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the statements may be 
read into evidence but may not be received as exhibits. 
(19) Reputation concerning personal or family history. Reputation among members of a 
person's family by blood, adoption, or marriage, or among a person's associates, or in the 
community, concerning a person's birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, death, legitimacy, 
relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or family 
history. 
(20) Reputation concerning boundaries or general history. Reputation in a community 
arising before the controversy, as to boundaries of or customs affecting lands in the community, 
and reputation as to events of general history important to the community or State or nation in 
which located. 
(21) Reputation as to character. Reputation of a person's character among associates or in the 
community. 
(22) Judgment of previous conviction. Evidence of a final judgment, entered after a trial or 
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upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere), adjudging a person guilty of a 
crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, to prove any fact essential to 
sustain the judgment, but not including, when offered by the prosecution in a criminal 
prosecution for purposes other than impeachment, judgments against persons other than the 
accused. The pendency of an appeal may be shown but does not affect admissibility. 
(23) Judgment as to personal, family or general history, or boundaries. Judgments as proof 
of matters of personal, family or general history, or boundaries, essential to the judgment, if the 
same would be provable by evidence of reputation. 
(24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing 
exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court 
determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is 
more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent 
can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purpose of these rules and the 
interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a 
statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to 
the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a 
fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the statement and the 
particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant. 
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Rule 902. Self-authentication. 
Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility is not required 
with respect to the following: 
(1) Domestic public documents under seal A document bearing a seal purporting to be that 
of the United States, or of any state, district, commonwealth, territory, or insular possession 
thereof, or the Panama Canal Zone, or the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or of a political 
subdivision, department, officer, or agency thereof, and a signature purporting to be an 
attestation or execution. 
(2) Domestic public documents not under seal A document purporting to bear the signature 
in the official capacity of an officer or employee of any entity included in Paragraph (1) hereof, 
having no seal, if a public officer having a seal and having official duties in the district or 
political subdivision of the officer or employee certifies under seal that the signer has the official 
capacity and that the signature is genuine. 
(3) Foreign public documents. A document purporting to be executed or attested in an 
official capacity by a person authorized by the laws of a foreign country to make the execution or 
attestation, and accompanied by a final certification as to the genuineness of the signature and 
official position (A) of the executing or attesting person, or (B) of any foreign official whose 
certificate of genuineness of signature and official position relates to the execution or attestation 
or is in a chain of certificates of genuineness of signature and official position relating to the 
execution or attestation. A final certification may be made by a secretary of embassy or legation, 
consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent of the United States, or a diplomatic or 
consular official of the foreign country assigned or accredited to the United States. If reasonable 
opportunity has been given to all parties to investigate the authenticity and accuracy of official 
documents, the court may, for good cause shown, order that they be treated as presumptively 
authentic without final certification or permit them to be evidenced by an attested summary with 
or without final certification. 
(4) Certified copies of public records. A copy of an official record or report or entry therein, 
or of a document authorized by law to be recorded or filed and actually recorded or filed in a 
public office, including data compilations in any form, certified as correct by the custodian or 
other person authorized to make the certification, by certificate complying with Paragraph (1), 
(2), or (3) of this rule or complying with any law of the United States or of this state. 
(5) Official publications. Books, pamphlets, or other publications purporting to be issued by 
public authority. 
(6) Newspapers and periodicals. Printed materials purporting to be newspapers or 
periodicals. 
(7) Trade inscriptions and the like. Inscriptions, signs, tags, or labels purporting to have been 
affixed in the course of business and indicating ownership, control, or origin. 
(8) Acknowledged documents. Documents accompanied by a certificate of acknowledgment 
executed in the manner provided by law by a notary public or other officer authorized by law to 
take acknowledgments. 
(9) Commercial paper and related documents. Commercial paper, signatures thereon, and 
documents relating thereto to the extent provided by general commercial law. 
(10) Methods provided by statute or rule. Any method of authentication or identification 
provided by court rule, statute, or as provided in the constitution of this state. 
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Rule 4-903. Uniform custody evaluations. 
Intent: 
To establish uniform guidelines for the preparation of custody evaluations. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to the district and juvenile courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Custody evaluations shall be performed by persons with the following minimum 
qualifications: 
(A) Social work evaluations shall be performed by social workers licensed by the state in 
which they practice. 
(B) Psychological evaluations shall be performed by psychologists licensed by the state in 
which they practice. 
(C) Psychiatric examinations shall be performed by a licensed physician with a specialty in 
psychiatry. 
(2) In divorce cases, one evaluator shall perform the evaluation on both parties and shall 
submit a written report to the court, unless one of the prospective custodians resides outside of 
the jurisdiction of the court. In those cases, two individual evaluators may be appointed. The 
evaluators must confer prior to the commencement of the evaluation to establish appropriate 
guidelines and criteria and shall submit only one joint report to the Court. 
(3) Evaluators must consider and respond to each of the following factors: 
(A) the child's preference; 
(B) the benefit of keeping siblings together; 
(C) the relative strength of the child's bond with one or both of the prospective custodians; 
(D) the general interest in continuing previously determined custody arrangements where the 
child is happy and well adjusted; 
(E) factors relating to the prospective custodians1 character or status or their capacity or 
willingness to function as parents, including: 
(i) moral character and emotional stability; 
(ii) duration and depth of desire for custody; 
(iii) ability to provide personal rather than surrogate care; 
(iv) significant impairment of ability to function as a parent through drug abuse, excessive 
drinking or other causes; 
(v) reasons for having relinquished custody in the past; 
(vi) religious compatibility with the child; 
(vii) kinship, including in extraordinary circumstances stepparent status; 
(viii) financial condition; and 
(ix) evidence of abuse of the subject child, another child, or spouse; and 
(F) any other factors deemed important by the evaluator, the parties, or the court. 
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Rule 4-911. Motion and order for payment of costs and fees. 
Intent: 
To establish the process by which the court may order the payment by one party of the costs 
and fees of another party in a domestic relations or domestic violence action. 
Applicability: 
This rule applies to the district court. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) In any action designated by § 30-3-3(1), either party may move the court for an order 
requiring the other party to provide costs, attorney fees, and witness fees, including expert 
witness fees, to enable the moving party to prosecute or defend the action. The motion shall be 
accompanied by an affidavit setting forth the factual basis for the motion and the amount 
requested. The motion may include a request for costs or fees incurred: 
(A) prior to the commencement of the action; 
(B) during the action; or 
(C) after entry of judgment for the costs of enforcement of the judgment. 
(2) The court may grant the motion if the court finds that: 
(A) the moving party lacks the financial resources to pay the costs and fees; 
(B) the non-moving party has the financial resources to pay the costs and fees; 
(C) the costs and fees are necessary for the proper prosecution or defense of the action; and 
(D) the amount of the costs and fees are reasonable. 
(3) The court may deny the motion or award limited payment of costs and fees if the court 
finds that one or more of the grounds in paragraph (2) is missing or enters in the record the 
reason for denial of the motion. 
(4) The order shall specify the costs and fees to be paid within 30 days of entry of the order 
or the court shall enter findings of fact that a delay in payment will not create an undue hardship 
to the moving party and will not impair the ability of the moving party to prosecute or defend the 
action. The order shall specify the amount to be paid. The court may order the amount to be paid 
in a lump sum or in periodic payments. The court may order the fees to be paid to the moving 
party or to the provider of the services for which the fees are awarded. 
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Canon 1. A judge shall uphold the integrity and independence of the 
judiciary. 
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society. A judge 
should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing, and shall personally observe, high 
standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary will be preserved. 
The provisions of this Code are to be construed and applied to further that objective. 
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Canon 2. A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety 
in all activities. 
A. A judge shall respect and comply with the law and should exhibit conduct that promotes 
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. 
B. A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence the judge's 
judicial conduct or judgment. A judge shall not lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance 
the private interests of others; nor shall a judge convey or permit others to convey the impression 
that they are in a special position to influence the judge. A judge shall not testify voluntarily as a 
character witness but may provide honest references in the regular course of business or social 
life. 
C. A judge shall not belong to any organization, other than a religious organization, which 
practices invidious discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, or national origin. 
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Canon 3. A judge shall perform the duties of the office impartially and 
diligently. 
A. Judicial duties in general The judicial duties of a full-time judge take precedence over all 
the judge's other activities. The judge's judicial duties include all the duties of the judge's office 
prescribed by law. In the performance of these duties, the following standards apply. 
B. Adjudicative responsibilities. 
(1) A judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to the judge except those in which 
disqualification is required or permitted by rule, or transfer to another court occurs. 
(2) A judge shall apply the law and maintain professional competence. A judge shall not be 
swayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism. 
(3) A judge should maintain order and decorum in proceedings before the judge. 
(4) A judge shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, 
and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity, and should require similar conduct 
of lawyers, and of staff, court officials, and others subject to judicial direction and control. 
(5) A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. A judge shall not, in the 
performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice, including but not 
limited to bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual 
orientation or socioeconomic status, and should not permit, and shall use all reasonable efforts to 
deter, staff, court officials and others subject to judicial direction and control from doing so. A 
judge should be alert to avoid behavior that may be perceived as prejudicial. 
(6) A judge should require lawyers in proceedings before the judge to refrain from 
manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national 
origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, against parties, witnesses, 
counsel or others. This Canon does not preclude legitimate advocacy when race, sex, religion, 
national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, or other similar 
factors, are issues in the proceeding. 
(7) A judge shall accord to every person who is legally interested in a proceeding, or that 
person's lawyer, full right to be heard according to law. Except as authorized by law, a judge 
shall neither initiate nor consider, and shall discourage, ex parte or other communications 
concerning a pending or impending proceeding. A judge may consult with the court personnel 
whose function is to aid the judge in carrying out the judge's adjudicative responsibilities or with 
other judges provided that the judge does not abrogate the responsibility to personally decide the 
case pending before the court. No communication respecting a pending or impending proceeding 
shall occur between the trial judge and an appellate court unless a copy of any written 
communication or the substance of any oral communication is provided to all parties. A judge 
may obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on the law applicable to a proceeding before the 
court if the judge gives notice to the parties of the person consulted and the substance of the 
advice, and affords the parties reasonable opportunity to respond. A judge may, with the consent 
of the parties either in writing or on the record, confer separately with the parties and their 
lawyers in an effort to mediate or settle matters pending before the judge. 
(8) A judge shall dispose of all judicial matters promptly, efficiently, and fairly. 
(9) A judge shall not, while a proceeding is pending or impending in any court, make any 
public comment that might reasonably be expected to affect its outcome or impair its fairness or 
make any nonpublic comment that might substantially interfere with a fair trial or hearing. A 
judge should require similar abstention on the part of court personnel subject to judicial direction 
and control. This Canon does not prohibit a judge from making public statements in the course of 
official duties or from explaining for public information the procedures of the court. This Canon 
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